This is a scanned and OCR'd version of the unclassified "US Army Air Defense Digest, 1972".
Bob Campbell (bcampbell12333@yahoo.com)
kindly lent this book to me. Thank you Bob.
(The book has been returned! :-)
The first 64 pages have been scanned. The remaining pages deal with Hawk, Chaparral, Vulcan, Redeye, Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System, and other weapons. Although interesting, these are not included in this web page.
*** Please note - scanning and OCR (Optical Character Recognition) is an imperfect art. My OCR software is probably not "state of the art". There were frequent obvious errors - some of which could be interpreted as slurs or insults. An example was a frequent mis-conversion of "CONAD" into "GONAD". This presenter apologizes for any errors - and suggests that the viewer retain a healthy skepticism of this conversion.
CONTENTS
. | . | page |
CHAPTER 1. | AIR DEFENSE DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES | . |
. | Army Air Defense Operations | 1 |
. | North American Air Defense Command | 1 |
. | United States Army Air Defense Command | 17 |
. | US Air Defense in North Atlantic Treaty Organization | 20 |
. | Air Defense in Pacific Area | 21 |
. | Air Defense in the Field Army | 24 |
. | Air Defense Artillery Maintenance | 27 |
. | Electronic Warfare | 28 |
. | Identification, Friend or Foe | 31 |
. | Air Defense Artillery Communications | 33 |
CHAPTER 2. | AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY CONTROL SYSTEMS | . |
. | BIRDIE (AN/GSG- 5) | 38 |
. | Missile Monitor (AEˇJ/MSG-4) | 40 |
. | Missile Mentor (AN/TSQ-51) | 43 |
. | Three-Dimensional Radar | 46 |
. | Radar Netting System | 47 |
. | Data Converter AN/GSA-77 | 48 |
. | Evolution of Defense Acquisition Radars | 50 |
CHAPTER 3. | CURRENT AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY WEAPON SYSTEMS | . |
. | General | 52 |
. | Improved Nike Hercules | 52 |
. | Air Defense Artillery Engagement Simulator; Guided Missile System Radar-Signal Simulator Station AN/MPQ-T1 (Nike Hercules) | 62 |
. | Hawk | 64 |
. | Air Defense Artillery Engagement Simulator; Guided Missile System Radar-Signal Simulator Station AN/TPQ-21 (Hawk) | 76 |
. | Chaparral | 77 |
. | Vulcan | 78 |
. | Forward Area Alerting Radar | 81 |
. | Air Defense Artillery Automatic Weapons Employmenc | 83 |
. | Older Air Defense Artillery Automatic Weapons | 83 |
. | Redeye | 86 |
. | Safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System | 91 |
. | Antiair Warfare Weapons of the US Navy and US Marine Corps | 100 |
. | Air Defense Weapons of the US Air Force | 103 |
CHAPTER 4. | PROPOSED AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SYSTEMS | . |
. | SAM-D. | 107 |
. | Command, Control, and Coordination System AN/TSQ-73 | 109 |
. | Three-Dimensional Acquisition Radar | 110 |
CHAPTER 5. | AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY TRAINING MATTERS AND INSTRUCTION | . |
. | Nonresident Instruction | 111 |
. | Training Literature | 113 |
. | Training Films and Graphic Training Aids | 116 |
. | MOS Evaluation Tests | 119 |
. | Innovative Techniques for Missile Electronics and Automatic Data Processing Training | 119 |
. | Guided Missile Systems Officer Course (4F-1181) | 121 |
. | Allied Student Program | 123 |
CHAPTER 6. | UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES | . |
. | United States Army Air Defense School | 129 |
. | US Army Combat Developments Command Air Defense Agency | 136 |
. | US Army Air Defense Board | 137 |
. | 1st Advanced Individual Training Brigade (Air Defense) | . |
. | 11th Air Defense Artillery Group | 138 |
. | US Army Air Defense Human Research Unit | 138 |
. | McGregor Guided Missile Range | 139 |
. | Keeping Abreast of Technical Developments | 140 |
. | AirDefense Center Team Conference | 140 |
APPENDIX | Abbreviations | 141 |
Chapter 1
Air Defense Doctrine and Procedures
AUTHORITY
Specific authorization for the Army to engage in air defense operations is derived
from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 2,
United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), November 1959. These directives assign the Army
primary functions as follows: "To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct
of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically, forces to defeat enemy
land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land area." UNAAF assigns the Army the
following air defense missions: "To organize, train, and equip Army air defense units,
including provision of Army forces as required for defense of the United States against
air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) is a combined command exercising
operational control of forces allocated for air defense of Canada, Alaska, and the
continental United States. Its mission is "to defend the North American Continent
against an attack. " Headquarters NORAD, located at Colorado Springs, Colorado,
prepares operational plans, conducts tactical exercises and readiness tests, and
coordinates plans and requirements for new air defense weapons. It is the supreme
headquarters for directing the air defense of North America in the event of war.
EVOLUTION
Early in 1954, the same committee authorized a combined planning group of representatives
from the Royal Canadian Air Force and the US Air Force Air Defense Command. Studies conducted
by this group indicated that the best air defense of North America was an
integrated defense, with forces of both countries operating under a single command,
responsible to both governments. Following the completion of another study 2 years
later which had the same conclusions, integration of operational control of the two forces
was recommended .
In the meantime, the two countries had gone ahead with the development of a joint
radar warning network. Together, they built the Pine Tree line of radars across southern
Canada. Canada started constructingthe mid-Canada line, and the United States began the
distant early warning (DEW) line across the northern rim of the continent. Conditions
for operating and manning these lines were mutually agreed upon.
Thus, by 1957, there had been a considerable history of joint planning, coordinating,
and sharing, and the need for further integration had been recognized. In August of
that year, the United States Secretary of Defense and the Canadian Minister of National
Defence announced that the two governments had agreed to establish a system of
integrated operational control of air defense forces for North America and an
integrated headquarters. On 12 September 1957, NORAD was established, followed
by the signing of an official agreement by both countries on 12 May 1958.
The Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINCNORAD), was to
be responsible to the Chief, Defence Staff of Canada, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
of the United States. The agreement further stipulated that the appointment of
CINCNORAD and his deputy had to be approved by both governments and that both would
not be from the same country.
NORAD FORCES
NORAD has no organic fighting elements of its own, but is furnished combat-ready
forces, including Reserve and National Guard forces, by three component commands
(fig 1): US Army Air Defense Command(ARADCOM), US Air Force Aerospace Defense Command
(USAF ADC), and Canadian Forces Air Defence Command (CF ADC), plus the air defense
forces of the Alaskan Command. CINCNORAD exercises operational control over all air
defense forces attached or otherwise made available by component commanders and the
Alaskan Command.
ARADCOM furnishes Nike Hercules missiles (high-altitude, surface-to-air) and
Hawk missiles (low- and medium-altitude, surface to-air). Under this command are
the US Army missile units protecting the key population and industrial centers of
the United States.
Most of NORAD's fighter-interceptor squadrons are provided by the USAF ADC.
This component also contributes Bomarc surface-to-air missiles, CONUS radar
squadrons, and early warning airborne radars. USAF ADC is responsible for the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and SPACETRACK (a part of the Space
Detection and Tracking System(SPADATS)), providing NORAD important information
about ballistic missiles and orbiting space objects. The Air National Guard provides
interceptor squadrons on full-time assignment to NORAD through USAF ADC.
Figure 1. NORAD/CONAD operational control structure.
The CF ADC provides fighter-interceptor squadrons and long-range radars which contribute
heavily to performance of surveillance, detection, and identification functions.
Alaskan air defense forces are made available to CINCNORAD for operational control.
This force is not a component of NORAD. The force, consisting of Army and Air Force AD
weapons, are part of the Alaskan Command (a unified command). Commander in Chief, Alaska
(CINCAL), has a dual role. He is the commander of the Alaskan Command and also the
commander of the Alaskan NORAD region. The geographical boundaries of the Alaskan
Command and Alaskan NORAD region are the same.
The US Navy's space surveillance system (NAVSPASUR) furnishes information to NORAD
on orbiting space objects. The US Navy would also provide augmentation forces upon
direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) is a unified command made up of US
personnel within the NORAD structure. This organization gives the US a capability
of unilateral action where strictly United States interests are involved. Accordingly,
the mission of CONAD is aerospace defense of Alaska, Greenland, and the continental
United States (CONUS), and Mexico if requested by the Mexican Government. The senior
American officer in NORAD is the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense (CWCONAD).
If CINCNORAD is an American, he also is CINCONAD. If CINCNORAD is a Canadian, then the
Deputy CINCNORAD is CINCONAD.
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
To accomplish its mission, NORAD is guided by these air defense principles: hit the
enemy as far out as possible; increase the pressure as he continues; complicate his tactical
problem by empl,ying a family of weapons to perform low, medium, high, close-in,
and distant missions; and realize optimum economy and efficiency of effort through
centralized direction and decentralized execution of the air battle.
NORAD must guard against manned bomber attack as well as ballistic missile attack.
It must watch over the North American Continent from treetops to beyond the atmosphere.
Currently, the North American Continent is divided into eight regional areas (fig 2)
of air defense responsibilityˇ Each region commander is responsible to CINCNORAD for
all air defense activity within his designated area.
Figure 2. NORAD operational boundaries.
Each NORAD region is the basic unit for decentralized fighting of the air battle.
Regions that cross the international boundary are manned jointly by United States
and Canadian personnel. The sizes of regions vary depending generally on the amount
of air traffic and number of vital target areas located within each region.
To perform its mission, NORAD must accomplish four basic actions: detect the presence
of airborne objects, aircraft, or missiles; identiiy them as friendly or hostile; intercept
and examine those not identified as friendly; and destroy those identified as hostile,
using interceptor aircraft or air defense missiles.
NORAD employs several detection and warning systems, each designed to detect one
of the three possible threats. The northernmost detection system is BMEWS. The three
BMEWS stations(Thule, Greenland(fig 3), Clear, Alaska(fig 4) and Flyingdales Moor in
Northern England) employ electronic systems providing detection and early warning of
attack from enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
Figure 3. NORAD BMEWS site at Thule, Greenland.
BMEWS was made possible by scientific developments in the electronics field.
The system uses huge radars, approximately the size of a football field, which can
detect a missile at a distance of 3,000 miles. The power required for a single
station would meet the electrical needs of a small city.
The heart of the BMEWS detection system is a combination transmitter-receiver
which transmits an extremely brief burst of energy many times each second in narrow
fans of radiofrequency energy at two different degrees of elevation. As a missile
passes through these fans, it reflects energy to the station, enabling the coordinates
of flight to be recorded. From a set of coordinates, the trajectory can be plotted and
the impact point, time, and point of launch calculated. Data processing equipment at
the site rapidly computes the data and flashes a warning to NORAD.
[I did not include the photo, figure 4., on page 6]
Another detection system is the manned bomber sunreillance network, composed of
land-based radar networks (fig 5) and Air Force planes. The first line of radars
begins in the far north with the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line (fig 6). This
radar fence, which stretches from the eastern shores of Greenland across the
Canadian Arctic to Western Alaska, provides initial warning of attack by manned
bombers. A ground-based radar system, called contiguous coverage, is extended out
to sea off the southeast coast by Air Force radar planes (fig 7). All of these
systems are joined together by a communications network terminating in the NORAD
Combat Operations Center at Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Figure 5. NORAD radar detection system.
[I did not include the photos, figures 6 and 7, on page 8]
Another part of the NORAD detection and warning system is the Space Detection and Tracking
System (SPADATS) which keeps track of all manmade objects in space. Through a global system
of radar, radio, and optical sensors, the system brings under NORAD operational control
space detection and tracking resources available to the military. Civilian and government
scientific agencies throughout the free world contribute to the system on a cooperative basis.
Primary military members of the SPADATS are the USAF SPACETRACK system and US Navy's
NAVSPASUR. SPACETRACK provides tracking information through a series of USAF sensors
(radar, optical, and electronic). The CF ADC provides inputs from an optical sunreillance
device, the Baker-Nunn camera (fig 8). NAVSPASUR is composed of three powerful transmitter
stations and six receiver stations alternately spaced across the southern United States
from California to Georgia. Data from this network are furnished to NORAD Space Defense
Center(SDC) computers through the system's headquarters and opei-ations center at Dahlgren,
Virginia.
Figure 8. Baker-Nunn camera.
Space tracking information from this widespread system flows into the SDC (fig 9)
at Colorado Springs wnere giant digital computers digest reams of complex orbital data
on space objects.
Figure 9. Space Defense Center at NORAD Headquarters.
The wide variety of data received from the numerous sources enables the SDC to
provide complete and timely cracking information on manmade objects in space. SDC
also maintains a running catalog, constantly revised and updated, on space traffic.
Thousands of observations are received daily and are used to refine existing orbital
characteristics of hundreds of objects. This includes not only payloads but space junk,
such as burned-out boosters and wires the size of a lead pencil.
Once the computers have digested all the tracking data and produced their findings,
the information can be transmitted to the battle staff area in the adjacent NORAD combat
operations center by closed-circuit television.
Identification is one of NORAD's most difficult problems, caused chiefly by the
large amount of air traffic in the United States and Canada. On the average, there
are approximately 1,200 overwater flights daily and an estimated 200,000 internal flights .
Aircraft penetrating the North American Continent enter air defense identification
zones (ADIZ) established around and throughout the continent to assist in identification
processing. Any aircraft originating from an oversea area must enter an ADIZ within 20
miles of a predetermined point and within 5 minutes of an estimated time, based on the
pilot's flight plan filed at his takeoff point and sent ahead to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) inthe United States and Department of Transport (DOT) in Canada.
This information is relayed to appropriate NORAD region control centers (NRCC) and used
for correlation when the track is acquired.
If an aircraft enters an ADIZ, but is not within prescribed limits, it is declared
an unknown and interceptors may be scrambled to make positive visual identification. The
ADIZ system is part of the NORAD identification process known as flight plan correlation.
Under combat conditions, the identification process would be somewhat simplified
when provisions of emergency plans and security control of air traffic and air navigational
aids (SCATANA) are placed in effect. SCATANA provides for orderly grounding of
nonessential aircraft and establishing military control over radio navigational aids.
In view of the large number of aircraft flights taking place within NORAD airspace
in any given 24-hour period, it is a rare day when none of these appear at the NORAD
combat operations center as unknown. The average number of unknowns in the system has
steadily declined over the years untir now the number isapproximately 40 per month.
Of these, it is common to find two or three instances where interceptors are scrambled
recalled before intercept because of the identity being established by further
communication checks.
The regular fighter-interceptor squadrons (fig 10) of the NORAD system, in an
emergency, would be augmented by available fighter aircraft of the US Navy, US Marine
Corps, US Air Forces, Air National Guard, and interceptor training units of the CF
ADC. All of these forces are highly mobile and constantly practice dispersal and
forward base deployment.
NORAD COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER
Nerve center of the North American Air Defense Command is the Combat Operations
Center (COG) situated in Cheyenne Mountain, south of Colorado Springs (fig 11). The
COC is housed in steel buildings beneath more than a thousand feet of solid granite.
The main part of the COC is a three-story building complex (fig 12) constructed within
the intersecting chambers. It includes 200,000 square feet of floorspace to accommodate
a maximum of 1,800 people. The COC is virtually safe from thermonuclear attack
(fig 13). It is from the COC that the first warning of an attack on North America
would come. If such an attack should come, the air battle for survival of the United
States and Canada would be directed from the COG.
Figure 10. Phantom jets of NORAD patrol the Alaskan skies
Figure 12. Buildings housing NORAD COC rest
on these mammoth springs.
Data are received in the COC from the huge complex of radar stations, interceptor
squadrons, missile sites, space tracking and ballistic missile warning units, and NORAD
regions and are stored in a large digital computer. Here, too, information is received
from other sources, such as the Strategic Air Command (SAC), naval forces off both coasts,
the Pentagon, and the Department of National Defence in Canada.
This information is displayed on an electronic wall display system (fig 14). The
system permits almost instantaneous observation of the positions of aerospace and
seaborne objects thousands of miles away and over any part of the continent covered
by radar networks. It flashes surveillance information on large, theater-like screens
for easy observation.
Figure 14. Underground COC showing battle staff and
main display boards during a test exercise.
Included is a map of North America, the surrounding oceans, Greenland, Iceland,
parts of Siberia, and the Caribbean islands. Symbols show the location and direction
of travel of all aircraft of special interest to NORAD. These may be strategic friendly
elements or a commercial or military aircraft that for one reason or another is classed
as an unknown until positive identification is made. NORAD is interested in unidentified
submarines, friendly aircraft carriers, Soviet fishing trawlers, and air activity over
Cuba and Siberia. All this is presented on the main display with special coded symbols
that provide a variety of information about the subject.
To the right of the main display is the weapon status hoard. This is associated with
the main display, and information on the board is received, processed, and displayed
automatically. The top part of this board, referred to as the "commander's box score,
" shows at a glance the number of hostile aircraft in the NORAD system, the number of
unla~owns, the weapons committedto these tracks, the kills made, and NORAD losses.
Below is a listingof worldwide major military commands and their defense readiness
conditions. The bottom part of the status board shows the number of weapons available
to NORAD on a 5-minute alert, including fighter-interceptors and surface-to-air missiles.
Figure 15. NORAD space-watching activities are conducted in the Space Defense Center.
Other types and sources of information are available on call. The weather
forecast office in the COC is manned with trained meteorologists who are always
on duty and ready to provide the latest weather information, either in person or
through the closed-circuit television network, to monitors in front of each member
of the battle staff. SDC is located in the COC (fig 15) and can provide information
(fig 16) to the battle staff either by a per sonal briefing or through the television system.
SEMIAUTOMATIC GROUND ENVIRONMENT
Conduct of an area air defense battle requires a vast amount of information,
dependable communications, and coordination among many organizations. Receiving
this information, processing it, and using the necessary instructions in the
limited time available proved impossible for unaided human beings, and an electronic
air surveillance and weapon control system was devised to do the job. This system,
called semiautomatic ground environment (SAGE), receives information, processesit,
and communicates instructions to those concerned.
Figure 17. SAGE data flow.
Figure 17 shows the flow of data to and from the NORAD region control center (NRCC)
in the air defense organization. Data are transmitted automatically to the NRCC from
ground-based search radars and, on demand, from height-finder radars. Information on
weapon status, weather, and airborne early warning is received by telephone, radio,
and teletype and is programed into the computer. Similarly, data from the NRCC are
transmitted automatically to direct Bomarc missiles and aircraft equipped with data
link receivers to hostile aircraft. Digital data transmission is used to pass hostile
track information to Missile Mentor (AN/TSQ-51) or battery integration and radar display
equipment (BIRDIE) command, control, and coordination systems for action by Nike Hercules
and Hawk fire units. Selected data are automatically sent to adjacent NRCC's. Manned
interceptors, not equipped with data link, are directed to the hostile aircraft by
voice (ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio). Telephone, teletype, and radio are used to
pass information to civil defense agencies, SAG, and other headquarters.
The US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) is both a major combat command of
the US Army and a component of NORAD. As a member of the two-nation air defense
organi zation, ARADCOM is assigned the mission of providing combat-ready Army forces
to the Commander in Chief, NORAD, for the air defense of designated strategic and
metropolitan target complexes. The mainstay of ARADCOM's weapon inventory is
nuclear-capable Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles. Nike Hercules missiles
are augmented by nonnuclear Hawk missiles, currently deployed in defense of the
Homestead-Miami and Key West areas in southern Florida. Nike Hercules is effective
even at altitudes up to 150,000 feet and the Hawk from treetop level to 38,000 feet.
HISTORY
The history of ARADCOM dates from 1 July 19j0 when it was established as the Army
Antiaircraft Command. However, it was 10 April 1951 before all antiaircraft artillery
units located within the continental United States and allocated to its defense were
placed under the command jurisdiction of the newly formed command.
The command's early armament consisted of 90-mm guns of World War Il vintage and
120-mm guns. Later, the 75-mm Skysweeper, last of the conventional antiaircraft
artillery weapons to be developed, was added to the command's arsenal. The first
surface-to-air guided missile to be phased into the Army air defense system was
the Nike Ajax, which became operational on site in the Washington-Baltimore defense
in May 1954. On 21 March 1957, in recognition of its growing combat-ready,
surface-to-air guided missile force, this command was redesignated the US Army
Air Defense Command.
In June 1958, ARADCOM's first Nike Hercules unit attained operational readiness
in the Chicago defense. Since that time, all of the command's missile sites have
been converted to the second-generation Nike Hercules.
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
The Department of the Army authorized the Army National Guard to convert 32
antiaircraft artillery battalions, then equipped with conventional guns, to Nike
Ajaw missile battalions in 1957. The 4th Missile Battalion (Nike Ajar), 251st
Artillery, California Army National Guard, was the first National Guard
surface-to-air guided missile battalion integratedinto the active continental
United States defense mission. This unit assumed around the-clock operations at
four battery sites in the Los Angeles area on 14 September 1958. At the completion of
the phased training program, the Army National Guard was furnishing 76 batteries in
14 states, defending 15 areas. These were the first US Reserve Forces with modern
surface-to-air missiles.
In May 1962, the first of the Army National Guard Nike Ajax units were phased out
and started retraining to operate and maintain the second-generation Nike missile,
the nuclear capable Nike Hercules. Four units of the Maryland National Guard were
selected for the initial conversion to Nike Hercules, becoming operational on 11 December 1962.
The last four Nike Ajax sites manned by the National Guard were phased out in May 1964
at Norfolk, Virginia. The final stages of the Nike Hercules conversion program were
completed in 1965 with 48 Army National Guard batteries, representing 16 states and
defending 18 areas, participating in the on-site program. Since that time, due to
threat reassessments and budget cuts, the number of ARADCOM batteries, both National
Guard and Regular Army, has been reduced significantly.
Guardsmen assume full operational responsibility for manning the sites around the clock.
Full-time personnel man the equipment 24 hours a day, keeping it in constant readiness.
This cadre of full-time specialists is capable of initiating effective fire on the
enemy without additional personnel. Remaining members of the units are citizens of the
community who retain their military skills by attending regular drills with their units.
If an air attack should occur, they would report immediately to their assigned units.
These Army National Guard units, although an integral part of the air defense system
when they become operational in wartime, retain their identity as State units under the
command of the governors of their respective states in peacetime. ARADCOM has been
assigned responsibility for training supervision and support of these units. In event
of an emergency reqlunng use of these units in a combat role, operational command
would be exercised by CINCNORAD through the Commanding General, ARADCOM.
OPERATIONS
Administrative and training supervision over the widespread defenses is exercised
by ARADCOM regions. Figure 18 shows the region boundaries, region headquarters, and
the location of ARADCOM defenses. Region headquaaers and their locations are as follows:
The combat effectiveness of ARADCOM units is determined by certain indicators,
such as engagement simulator training, operational readiness evaluations, defense
combat evaluations and technical proficiency inspections (TPI). All indicators
must be considered together to determine the effectiveness of units. ARADCOM
materiel readiness evaluation teams aid the units in maintaining a combat-ready posture.
Figure 18. ARADCOM region boundaries and region headquarters.
ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND POST IN NORAD OPERATIONS
The wide dispersion of ARADCOM sites poses a unique problem that requires a specific
control and communications system. At the heart of this control and communications
system are the Army air defense command posts (AADCP). Tactical supervision of Nike
Hercules and Hawk fire units is exercised from AADCP's. An AADCP can use a
semiautomatic electronic command, control, and coordination system or be manually
operated. The command, control, and coordination system used is either of two
transportable systems, the BIRDIE (AN/GSG-5) or Missile Mentor (AN/TSQ-51).
Most AADCP's are linked to an NRCC by digital data and voice, and to their associated
fire units by data links, voice lines, and radio. In addition, some AADCP's are linked
to the NRCC by teletypewriter lines. Normal operation calls for semiautomatic data
processing from NRCC to fire units through the AADCP's, with backup facilities
available for emergency and supplemental operations. Command, control, and
coordination systems provide for complete semiautomatic operation with fire units
when SAGE data are cut off. Facilities are also available for manual plotting
and voice telling if needed.
Those AADCP's tied to an NRCC automatically receive early warning, aircraft
identification, and other data. These data are collected by the AADCP's, improved
when possible, and transmitted to fire units. In NORAD regions equipped with SAGE
where Missile Mentor or BIRDIE command, control, and coordination systems are in
operation, NORAD has prescribed five levels of operations for weapon control for
SAGE air defense artillery operations.
In level I operations, the primary NRCC (fig 19) supervises the air battle for
combat elements; l.e. vectoring fighter interceptors, programing and firing Bomarc
missiles automatically through the SAGE computer, and supervising and monitoring
SAM engagements through the AADCP. Reference data (symbology) is furnished over the
automatic data link (ADL). Level 1 also indicates to the commander that all backup
facilities are fully operational(i.e., the NORAD control center (NCC)).
Level 2 indicates that the primary NRCC is still controlling the air battle, but
that the backup facilities are degraded to some extent.
Level 3 indicates that the primary NRCC is still controlling the air battle,
but that the backup facilities are not operational or are not available.
Level 4 indicates that the NRCC is no longer controlling the air battle and
that the combat elements are being controlled by the backup facility (NCC).
In each region there are at least two NCC's which can furnish limited early warning
and identification to fhe AADCP as well as vector interceptors and program and launch Bomarcs.
Level 5 indicates that the air battle is being conducted autonomously by the
AADCP's (or fire units) and manually directed fighter-interceptors. Level 5 indicates
that the SAGE and BUIC control systems are ineffective; therefore, Bomarc can no
longer be employed because Bomarc must be programed and directed by a computer.
Autonomous operations are predicated on the complete loss of communications between
the AADCP and all higher headquarters m the NORAD chain or between the fire unit
and its AADCP. It must be emphasized that this loss is a total loss of
communications and not a temporary outage due to natural causes (floods, hurricanes,
etc.). In autonomous operations, the Army air defense commander(AADC), or the
battery commander, assumes full responsibility for the air battle, using the very
limited identification means available to him.
Specified United States air defense artillery units in Europe are part of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integratedair defense system of Allied Command Europe
(ACE), one of the military commands of NATO. The senior military authority in NATO
is a military committee composed of a chief of staff or special delegate of each
member nation.
The standing group, composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the
United Kingdom and the United States, is the executive agency of the military committee.
NATO is divided into three military commands and a regional planning group.
The command that concerns air defense is Allied Command Europe, which covers the land
area extending from the North Cape of Norway to North Africa and from the Atlantic
to the eastern border of Turkey.
Of particular interest in Allied Command Europe is Allied Forces, Central Europe,
extending from the southern boundary of Denmark to the northern boundary of Italy.
Allied Forces, Central Europe, has responsibility for air defense of this area and
has divided the area by a line running southwest-northeast through the approximate
center. The responsibility for air defense of the northern portion is assigned to
the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force (2 ATAF), while responsibility for air defense
of the southern portion is assigned to the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF)
(fig 20).
The commander of 4 ATAF exercises operational control of all assigned air defense
artillery forces through the sector operations center (SOC). Tactical control of
surface-to-air guided missile units in the US area of responsibility is exercised
by the SOC sector controller. The SOC is a NATO installation, combining facilities
of the battle staff, an Air Force control and reporting center, and an Army missile
control center (i.e., Army air defense command post). Missile control centers,
tactical headquarters of the Army air defense commanders, supervise the operations
of subordinate air defense artillery units. The battle staff, supervised by the
sector controller, supervises overall air defense operations. The master controller
coordinates activities between the missile control center and the control and
reporting center. Operational procedures of US Army air defense artillery units
in NATO are similar to those of air defense artillery units in the United States.
In the Pacific area, US Army air defense artillery units are deployed in Korea,
Okinawa, and Vietnam. The Commanding General, US Army, Pacific(USARPAC), commands,
trains, and administers the Army units. Operational control of all Pacific area
air defense forces is vested in Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) (fig 21).
As an example of how a PACAF air defense sector operates when forces are deployed,
the Korean sector is typical (fig 22).
Air defense artillery units in Korea are integrated for operational control into
the overall air defense system of the West Pacific North Air Defense Region, a
subordinate command of PACAF. The Commanding General, 5th US Air Force, is the
West Pacific North Air Defense Region commander. The region is divided into four
specific actively manned air defense sectors, one of which is the Korea air
defense sector. The 314th Air Division is responsible for air defense of the
Korea air defense sector and operates a tactical air controlcenter(TACC) that
coordinates the activities of two control and reporting centers/Army air defense
command posts (fig 23). The control and reporting center (CRC) in each subsector
coordinates the activities of air defense means in its area of responsibility.
Operational procedures of air defense artillery units in Korea are similar to
those of units in the United States.
Figure 19. NORAD operational structure.
Figure 21. Pacific air defense organization.
Figure 22. Pacific Air Forces operational control structure.
In World War II and in the Korean conflict, the ground-gaining arms could almost
always be assured of being able to operate without serious hindrance from enemy air.
This basic assumption that our airpower could and would always provide us with air
superiority and hence freedom of action on the ground in any future action has
generally gone unquestioned, and has been perpetuated in the scenarios of almost
every major exercise, command post exercise (CPX), Army training test (ATT), or
other field problems.
This assumption is no longer valid. A technically and tactically competent
enemy can gain and maintain air superiority for at least a limited time over areas
of his own choosing. This problem is greatly simplified if he has adequate
conventional gun and surface-to-air missile defenses in being so that he is
relatively free to shift his fighter aircraft, even for short times, from
basically defensive to offensive operations.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Oversea Land Areas,
May 1964, serves as common doctrine and prescribes the establishment of a coordinated
and integrated air defense system under a single commander. This document states that
air defense forces must be organized, equipped, trained, and, when possible, positioned
and alerted prior to hostilities. An air defense cannot be adequately improvised.
Constant surveillance must be maintained to insure timely response of air defense
forces and concurrent warning to the offensive forces of the command. The enemy air
threat must be considered as an entity and countered by a strategy based upon unity
of effort. Tne hostile threat and targets to be defended are the points of departure
for all air defense planning and the basis on which air defense requirements must
be computed.
Within an oversea unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force,
the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander.
Normally, this will be the Air Force component commander. Representation from the other
service components involved will he provided, as appropriate, to the air defense
commander's headquarters. The mission of the area air defense commander will be to
coordinate and integrate the entire air defense effort within the unified command.
Subject to the authority of the unified commander, he will establish broad policies
and procedures for the employment of air defense means and the coordination of such
means with the operations of other elements within the area. Where a significant
portion of the means for air defense is contributed by a service other than that of
the area air defense commander, a senior officer should be appointed from that service
to serve as deputy to the area air defense commander in air defense matters.
The area air defense commander will establish air defense regions. The number
of such regions may vary, depending upon geographical factors and the complexities
of the air defense problem. He will appoint regional air defense commanders and
designate their areas of responsibility, taking into consideration such factors
as the geography of the area, the hostile threat, and the contributions of the services.
In a region where a significant portion of the regional air defense means consists of
air defense weapon systems of another service, a senior officer of that service should
be appointed to serve as deputy in air defense matters to the regional air defense
commander. Service staff representation will be assigned, as appropriate, to the
regional air defense activities. The regional air defense commander will be fully
responsible for, and will have full authority in, the air defense of his region.
However, he will normally delegate authority to the field army commander(s) for control
and operational employment of Army air defense artillery means within the field army area.
Coordination of the employment of all air defense means withm the field army is
normally accomplished in the tactical operations centers at field army(FATOC), corps
(CTOC), and division (DTOC) levels (fig 24). The tactical operations center is an
integrated staff facility where representatives of the special and general staff sections
are grouped to assist the commander in exercising control of current tactical operations.
Air defense is represented in the TOC by the airspace coordination element (ACE) composed
of both ADA and Army aviation personnel. The senior ADA unit headquarters provides
personnel and equipment to the ACE of the force to which it is organic, assigned, or
attached. Only the divisional Chaparral/Vulcan battalion TOE provides organic
resources for this purpose. Other ADA units obtain ACE personnel and equipment as
provided in TOE 44-510 or from unit resources.
The ACE has three basic functions: coordination of AD operations with other tactical
and tactical support operations, coordination of airspace utilization by Army forces,
and coordination of Army aviation operations.
Joint service coordination is accomplished by means of liaison sections (fig 25).
The air defense artillery brigade establishes liaison with the Air Force at the
tactical air control center and at the control and reporting center. Air defense
artillery groups, if assigned or attached to a corps, would be expected to
establish liaison with a control and reporting post. The divisional Chaparral/Vulcan
(C/V) battalion liaison section is provided for liaison with the air defense artillery
group or Hawk battalion, whichever is appropriate. This team is a link between the
organic divisional air defense capability and the corps of Army area air defense
capability for coordination of air defense plans. Liaison either through personnel
or via communications should be established between the C/V battalion and the forward
area control post (FACP) of the Air Force whenever possible.
Coordination may be accomplished by collocation of the AADCP's with the appropriate
Air Force installation or by utilizing established communications networks used by
liaison teams. In theaters where Air Force and Army air defense organizations are
equipped with compatible electronic command and control systems, coordination will
he further improved by having the systems operationally connected.
Figure 24. Organization of type field army.
Current oversea deployments vary from area to area. The principal differences are
generated by the need to tailor the defense to the local conditions. The local conditions
are included in a consideration of the threat and geographical factors.
To meet the requirement for rapid response to hostile air activity, communications
are paramount. The Army, realizing this need for faster, more positive fire distribution
of surface-to-air missiles in the field army, developed The AN/MSG-4 (Missile Monitor)
command, control, and coordination system. This system may be employed for centralized
or decentralized control as directed by the Army air defense commander.
Coordinated air defense effort is a requirement, not only within a field army but
between the field army and tactical air force. To fulfill this responsibility, the Army
air defense commander normally establishes liaison with the tactical air force. This
liaison may be accomplished by collocating the AADCP of various air defense artillery
commands with the functional counterpart of the tactical air force or by liaison between
these elements. Figure 25 graphically depicts a typical solution of the liaison requirement.
Liaison expedites the flow of early warning and identification information, two vital
elements of data for any air defense. Both the control and reporting center and control
and reporting post can provide early warning information to air defense artillery units,
and the control and reporting center can provide target identification information.
Figure 25. Field army ADA command, coordination, and liaison.
The tactical and operational requirements of current and future air defense artillery
systems demand employment of skilled technicians and adequate test equipment To provide
responsive maintenance support to the Army air defense commander. Preventive maintenance
must be efficiently scheduled and malfunctions rapidly corrected. Maintenance management
is the responsibility of every commander and includes motivation, organization, accurate
records and reports, and training.
The commander of an air defense artillery unit must have the capability of maintaining
a high degree of operational readiness around the clock, in peacetime as well as in combat,
and in the United States as well as overseas. He requires technicians who are system
diagnosticians, supported by repairmen with a capability for repair of defective assemblies
and subassemblies. Emphasis must be in the direction of performing tests, maintenance,
and repairs as close to the point of failure as practical. Support personnel organic to
air defense artillery units and organizations provide the commander a maintenance capability
commensurate with his responsibility. In this light, the principal maintenance functions
(organizational and direct support) are immediately responsive to the operational
requirements of the system.
The organizational maintenance technician is concerned primarily with system
analysis. He has a thorough understanding of electronic theory, the practical
application of this theory,
and the functions of all components within his area of responsibility. He supervises
or performs preventive maintenance and verifies system operational readiness. To
reduce repair time and minimize travel on the battlefield, the organizational
maintenance technician is trained and must be permitted to perform maintenance
to the highest practical level under combat operational conditions.
Timely reports must be made of conditions that adversely affect the maintenance
effort. Examples of these conditions are shortages of qualified personnel, equipment,
and repair parts; improper scheduling of training; and assignment of missions which
impair maintenance of equipment. Commanders must insure that reports concerning
maintenance support of their equipment are accurate and reflect the operational
readiness of their unit. Analysis of these reports aids in determination of total
support requirements.
In short, an effective maintenance program is of the utmost importance in air
defense artillery units. Air defense commanders must apply techniques of maintenance
management which will insure operating equipment to meet operational readiness
requirements. The best in air defense, in peacetime or war, is dependent on efficient
maintenance.
GENERAL
Electronic warfare (EW) is military action involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and the retention of friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. As such,
EW must be considered an integral part of the military operationit supports. Both
sides will use all aspects of electronic warfare. From the air defense artilleryman's
point of view, electronic warfare consists of the enemy's attempts to degrade ADA
electronic equipment capabilities and ADA efforts to counter that degradation. The
latter is accomplished by:
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURES
Electronic warfare support measures is that category of EW involving actions
taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic
energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations in support of military operations.
The analysis of intercepted radar and data link signals can provide a comprehensive
picture of the electronic capabilities of opposing forces. From these signals a fairly
accurate estimate can be made of the number, types, and locabons of emitters in the
opposing force. The data on number, types, and locations of opposing emitters, coupled
with intelligence from other sources, provide a reasonably accurate assessmentof the
size, disposition, and possible intent of the opposing forces. With this information
available, the tactical commander can better determine the EW equipment that is needed
and the tactics that should be used to make his operation most effective. Some types
of information secured by EWSM and the means used to obtain this information are listed
below.
ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES
Electronic countermeasures is that subdivision of electronic warfare involving
actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum. ECM is used by the enemy to introduce signals directly into other radar
receivers. Its object is to impair the use of electromagnetic energy or prohibit
accurate interpretation of the information on the radar indicators of other air
defense missile systems. ECM does this through production of obscuring, confusing,
or connicting patterns on these indicators.
Electronic countermeasures are classified either as jamming or deception depending
on the purpose and application of the countermeasure signal. Jamming ECM and deception
ECM can he either transmitted or reflected.
Deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, or reflection
of electro-magnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead an enemy in the
interpretation or use of information received by his electronic systems. Deception
against air defense artillery radars is intended to deceive the radar operator or
the tracking system of a radar set. To be effective the deception signal must be
interpreted as a real target or signal. It must confuse or delay the radar operator
or cause unacceptable inaccuracies in the radar system. The deception signal can be
produced by transmitters (transmitted deception) or by reflectors (reflected deception).
Transmitted deception is produced by special radiofrequency transmitters.
These transmitters produce signals which can cause false or inaccurate echoes, or
a combination of both. These are presented to a radar set to confuse the operator
or the automatic electronic control system. The signals from the deception
transmitters may be deceptive strobe lines or targets ranging from a single target
of inaccurate range to targets representing a large formation of planes or targets
scattered all over the indicator to make it difficult to discern the true target.
There are four primary types of transmitted deception. Three are known as "track
breakers" because they are used against tracking radars in an effort to break radar
lock-on. The fourth type is used against acquisition radars.
Reflected deception is produced by objects capable of reflecting electromagnetic
energy so that the return echoes will present false or inaccurate information to the
radar operator or electronic control circuits. Because these are reflective devices,
they are used only to counter radar and are commonly referred to as confusion reflectors.
The most commonly used confusion reflectors are chaff, rope, corner reflectors, and decoys.
Jamming is produced by two methods. The jamming signals may be produced by an active
transmitter, or they may be the result of reflecting or reradiating a radar transmission.
Both types of jamming are used to accomplish the same purpose: to screen the video
return of the attacking aircraft.
Transmitted jamming is used to overcome real target returns by the use of brute
force techniques. It is designed to saturate or block victim receivers, display units,
and automatic tracking circuits. A jamming signal will, in some cases, be transmitted
at the same frequency as that of a specific radar and will be intended to jam that radar.
Other types of jamming signals will cover the frequencies of many radars simultaneously.
Still other jamming signals will sweep through a broad band of frequencies at such fast
rates that, for all practical purposes, the entire frequency band is jammed continuously.
There are many variations of transmission jamming and many types of transmission jamming
equipment. However, the general purpose of all types of jamming and jammers is to inject
into a radar set a signal of such characteristics and intensity that it will seriously
impair the effectiveness of radar operation or will render a radar set temporarily useless.
The most common means of accomplishing reflected jamming is through the use of chaff
in large quantities. It reflects the pulses from the radar transmitter back to the radar
where they are picked up and processed by the receiver. These echoes from the large
quantities of chaff cause indications on the radar scope that obscure actual target
echoes. Reflected jamming may also be used with transmitted jamming to increase the
intensity of the jamming signals displayed on the radar indicator.
ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES
The means of reducing the effectiveness of enemy ECM are known as electronic
countercountermeasures. ECCM, in a broad sense, includes alloperations, equipment
circuits, and training designed either to avoid ECM or to improve the operation of
electronic equipment under ECM conditions. Because of tremendous strides in the
development of ECM devices, it has become necessary to provide the radar operator
with controls, additional equipment, and special circuits to aid operation in an
ECM environment. Each control or circuit is designed to be effective against a
specific kind of ECM, thus establishing a requirement for an extensive training
program for radar operators and supervisors. The operator must recognize the
effects of each type of ECM and know which ECCM control or technique is designed
to be most effective in combating the ECM. If his ECCM controls and techniques
are to be effective, the operator must have a properly functioning radar system.
He must also have the ability to distinguish between accidental interference, set
malfunction, and deliberate jamming. Efforts to reduce the effects of ECM, to avoid
ECM, or to improve operations in an ECM environment are generally directed toward
four areas: increased power, frequency diversity, special circuits, and operator training.
Of the four, operator training is the most important. For radars to operate effectively
in an ECM environment, the operator must expect ECM, recognize and identify ECM, report
ECM, and take appropriate ECCM action.
Identification of airborne objects presents a major problem to all air defense
units. To prevent destruction of friendly aircraft, a positive means of identification
must be provided. This need was initially met by development of the Mark III
identification, friend or foe (IFF), system. This system, used with ground station
radars during World War II, assisted in the identification of aircraft, but limitations
of the system caused its use to be discontinued at the end of the war. Research was
started to develop an identification system to satisfy the needs of all services. The
Mark XIFF system was the result.
The Mark X IFF system is composed of two groups of equipment. One, the
interrogatorresponder, is located with ground radars and the other, the transponder,
is located aboard friendly aircraft. The interrogator-responder is installed at the
ground station and depends on a parent radar for a synchronizing trigger, an ac power
input, and a plan position indicator (PPI) to display IFF video. Its major components
include a coder control (modes i, 2, and 3), receiver-transmitter, and antenna. The
interrogator- responder antenna is unidirectional. Because the radar antenna is also
unidirectional, the two antennas must be synchronized for azimuth resolution.
(This causes IFF video to be portrayed on the PPI at the same azimuth as the radar
video of the interrogated target.) The airborne transponder is independent of any
radar that might be located in the aircraft; however, it requires power from a source
in the aircraft. The unit consists of a receiver-transmitter and antenna. The antenna
is omnidirectional; thus, it can receive and transmit in any direction.
The sequence of operation (fig 26) for Mark X equipment is the same for Nike
Hercules and Hawk batteries; battalion operation centrals; command, control, and
coordination systems; and AADCP's.When target video appears on the PPI, the acquisition
radar operator or tactical control assistant (Hawk battery) places the
interrogator-responder in operation by turning on the challenge switch.
(The acquisition radar operator or tactical control assistant will determine
which IFF modeis to be interrogated.) This causes a pair of radiofrequency (RF) pulses
to be transmitted from the IFF antenna at the same azimuth as the radar pulse. These
RF pulses will have an interpulse spacing, from leading edge to leading edge, of
3, 5, or B microseconds, depending on which mode is being interrogated (mode 1,
3 microseconds; mode 2, 5 microseconds; and mode 3, 8 microseconds). The transponder
receives the RF pulse-pairs and amplifies the challenge signal (both RF pulses must
be present because one pulse does not constitute a valid challenge). Upon receiving
a valid challenge, the transponder will then transmit its identification signal. The
reply is received and amplified in the interrogator-responder 'eceiver. The output of
the receiver through the decoder is sent to or four arcs at a range greater than the
the PPIwhere it will be displayed as one, two, interrogated aircraft but at the same
azimuth (one are is the valid response for a mode 1, 2, or 3 challenge, two arcs
constitute a valid response in modes 1 and 3 for an identification of position (IF)
reply, and four arcs indicate that the aircraft has declared an emergency).
Figure 26. Identification, friend or foe (IFF).
The Mark X IFF equipment used in conjunction with air defense artillery radars
includes a selective identification feature (SIF) which enables the IFF equipment to
receive 32 codes in mode 1 responses and 64 codes each in mode 2 and mode 3 responses.
The 160 possible codes of the Mark X IFF/SIF system enabled the establishment of a
more positive identification system. When the selective identification feature (SIF)
of the Mark X IFF system is used, correct responses by the interrogated aircraft will
be displayed as one are, except for IP, at a range greater than the interrogated
aircraft hut at the same azimuth. Should the aircraft declare an emergency, the
SIF reply would appear on the PPI as four arcs.
Currently under development is a new family of IFF equipment known as the Mark XII
system. The Mark XII IFF includes AN/TPX-46 and AN/TPX-50 interrogator sets which
incorporate the features of Mark X with two additional modes, C and 4. The AN/TPX-46
with Mark X modes 1, 2, and 3/A, and Mark XII IFF capability in mode 4, will replace
the AN/TPX-26 and AN/TPX-27 Mark X IFF/SIF now in use in US Army air defense installations.
The AN/TPX-50 with Mark X modes 1, 2, and 3/A and Mark XII mode 4 capability will be
mounted on the forward area alerting radar associated with Chaparral/Vulcan weapon
systems The AN/TPX-45 with modes 1, 2, and 3/A capability is used with self-propelled Hawk.
At present, four modes of interrogation between military aircraft and military and
civil ground stations are used. Modes 1 and 2 are assignedto and used bythe military.
Mode 3/A is assigned to both military and civilian aviation for common air traffic
control. Modes 2 and 3/A are currently limited in application due to the relatively
few codes provided. In the new sets, modes 2 and 3/A will be expanded to 4, 096 code
selections and, under the Mark XIIconcept, an additional mode 4 will be provided.
Mode C (altitude reporting) is provided for Air Force and civil aviation but is not
currently planned for Army aircraft.
The operational concept of the Mark XII identification, friend or foe, system is
similar to and compatible with the Mark X IFF/SIF. Both are really
identification-of-friend systems. An aircraft not identified as a friend is an
unknown, possibly a foe. The Mark XII mode 4 cryptosecure feature provides the most
positive and reliable identification of friendly aircraft to date.
Within NORAD, air defense artillery communications in a fixed environment is
provided by a combination of means to include both the sophisticated facilities of
the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) and leased commercial facilities. The Defense
Communications System (DCS) automatic voice network (AUTOVON) has been extended
throughout the NORAD organization. Leased cable, microwave radio, and other means
provide redundancy to enhance communications sunrivability while insuring reliability
under adverse conditions.
Presently, ARADCOM defenses are supported by either peripheral microwave or
land line service. The North American Air Defense Objective Plan (NADOP) authorizes
replacement of existing landline systems with peripheral systems (microwave or other)
providing dedicated air defense communications between the Army air defense command
post (AADCP), alternate command post(ALCOP), and all missile fire units. Landline
defenses will he aflorded the same circuit capability as microwave defenses until
such time as peripheral communications systems are installed. VHF radio will be
retained as operations control backup.
Communications for air defense artillery units (Hawk and Nike Hercules) in an
oversea or mobile air defense environment are furnished by both organic and
nonorganic equipment. The primary means of communication for Hawk and Nike Hercules
units is a very high frequency/ultrahigh frequency (VHF/UHF) radio relay system.
This primary system of VHF/UHF multichannel equipment supports the electronic
command, control, and coordina tion systems deployed with these field units.
It is capable of transmitting both digital data and voice information.
Figure 27. Radio terminal set AN/TRC-145
The basic equipment used to establish primary communications is the radio
terminal set AN/TRC-145 (fiy 27). This set is a package consisting of two AN/GRC-103
radio receivertransmitters and two TD-660 telephone multiplex terminals. It provides
a dual 6/12-channel duplex capabilitg with a rated range of 40-48 kilometers between
stations, provided electrical line of sight is maintained. The AN/TRC-145 can be used
as a dual terminal or relay set, or as both simultaneously.
Should it be necessary to provide communications beyond the line of sight
capability or range of the AN/TRC-145, radio relay set AN/TRC-113 (fig 28) could be
used to extend the circuit. The AN/TRC-113 consists of three AN/GRC-103 radio
receiver-transmitters, two of which are necessary for providing relay operation
and the third being used solely as a standby component for increased reliability.
This equipment is scheduled to become an addition to ADA TOE and will be fielded
as they become available. Older equipment, consisting of the AN/TRC- 24 radio
receiver-transmitter and the AN/TCC-7 telephone multiplex terminal, will continue to be
used until the new equipment is issued.
Nike Hercules and Hawk units are issued the following organic radios to provide
backup to the primary communications system.
The AN/GRC-106 (fig 29), an amplitude-modulated (AM), single sideband (SSB) radio set,
is used in tactical nets. Designed for mobile or fixed use, it is capable of providing
communication over a distance of 50 miles when using the organic whip antenna.
Figure 29. Radio set AN/GRC-106.
The AN/GRC-122 is a shelter-housed transportable radioteletypemiter set which uses
the AN/GRC-106 as its major basic component. The AN/GRC-122 is authorized for air defense
artillery battalions primarily to provide teletypewriter communication with higher
headquarters.
The AN/GRC-26 is a longrange AM radio used at group and brigade levels.
The TOE for all air defense artillery echelons, brigade to battery, include new
type communications equipment. In voice command nets, the new AN/VRC-12 family of
frequencymodulated (FM) radios has been issued. The basic receiver transmitter of the
AN/VRC-12 family issued to air defense artillery units is the RT 524 which is shown
in figure 30 as the major component of the AN/VRC-46. The AN/VRC-47 (fig 31) is a basic
FM receivertransmitter with an auxiliary receiver and associated equipment, and the
AN/VRC-49.
Figure 30. Radio set AN/VRC-46,
Figure 31. Radio set AN/VRC-47
consists of two of the basic receiver-transmitters with a retransmission unit and
associated equipment. These small, rugged radio sets possess a range capability of
32 kilometers using a whip antenna. Channel capacity is increased to 920 channels,
making it capable of netting with infantry, armor, or field artillery units.
Technical advances in weapon systems and advanced concepts of deployment result
in ever-increasing demands within the field of communications. Fortunately,
improvements in communications equipment design have met this challenge, and the
end product is a new series of radios with improved capabilities as well as reduced
size, weight, and power requirements .
The man-packed AN/PRC-25 radio, another of the improved radios, is a
forward area radio set to replace the AN/PRC-H, -9, and -10 radios. Its use by
Nike Hercules batteries will improve unit security control. This basic set is also to
be built as a vehicle-mounted version (AN/VRC-53) or as a convertible
man-packed /vehiclemounted version (AN/GRC-125). The normal range is 8 kilometers.
Communications provided for air defense artillery forward area weapons
(FAW) include all means necessary to transmit information, intelligence, commands,
and means to establish liaison with other units. Communications means available to
these units include radio, wire, and messenger. TOE radios (AN/CRC-106, AN/GRC-46,
and the VRC-12 family) discussed above are the primary means of communications in
the FAW units. Wire and messenger are used as a backup to these organic radios.
The challenge presented to air defense artillery communications as a result of
technical advances in command, control, and coordination systems and modern weapons
has been more than adequately satisfied by aggressive research and development within
the field of communications equipment. The new, compact, longer range communications
equipment is being issued to all echelons of air defense artillery to provide an even
greater capability to accomplish the latter portion of the artillery axiom--move, shoot,
and communicate.
If you have comments or suggestions, Send e-mail
to Ed Thelen
Return to Home
Updated August 7, 1998
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Figure 11. Cheyenne Mountain, showing the entrance to NORAD COC
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Figure 13. Protecting the entrance to NORAD COC from nuclear blast are these
gigantic 25-ton swinging doors
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Figure 16. Located at Eglin Air Force Base, this "phased array" radar
provides the SDC with current satellite information.
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Figure 20. NORAD organization.
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Figure 23. Concept of PACAF air defense operations.
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Electronic warfare is divided into three categories: electronic warfare support
measures(EWSM), electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter-countermeasures.
In EW the reconnoitering units are commonly called ferrets, and all activity
pertaining to the accumulation of enemy electronic information is referred to as
ferret operations. Ferret personnel are highly skilled in the operation of specialized
radar detection equipment.
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Figure 28. Radio relay set AN/TRC-113.
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