The Historic American Engineering Record was established in 1969 by the National Park
Service, the American Society of Civil Engineers, and the Library of Congress. Its purpose
is to record the Nation's historic engineering, industrial, and transportation resources.
Under the tripartite agreement, the National Park Service administers the HAER program
with funds appropriated by Congress and supplemented by outside donations. By their
very nature, Historic American Engineering Record projects require numerous people
with diverse professional backgrounds, and several people worked on the HAER recordation
of Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40. Christina M. Carlson of BREGMAN & COMPANY, INC.,
Bethesda, Maryland, and Robert Lyon, a historian with the National Park Service,
Rocky Mountain Regional Office, prepared the histories. Arnold Thallheimer of Custom
Photography in Austin, Colorado, took the large-format photographs of the sites,
and Kathleen Hoeft and Chalmers G. Long, Jr., of Long Hoeft Architects, Georgetown,
Colorado, prepared the measured and interpretive drawings.
Funding for this publication was provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Chicago District. Corps Archeologist Keith Ryder participated in the selection
of the two Nike sites to be documented, and assisted in obtaining research materials.
He also developed the scope of work for the recordation project, including this
publication. Many National Park Service employees also contributed their time and
effort. Michael D. Snyder, Superintendent of the Rocky Mountain System Support Office,
provided overall support and direction. Historian Christine Whitacre coordinated the
HAER recordation, and edited the HAER reports for publication. Lysa Wegman-French
provided technical review and support, as did Architect Thomas Keohan. Ramona Ruhl
edited and formatted the final HAER reports. Special thanks are offered Interpretive
Specialist Richard M. Kohen for his excellent design and layout.
Gregory Kendrick, Program Leader
Cultural Resources
Stewardship and Partnership Team
Rocky Mountain System Support Office
National Park Service
Introduction
The Nike-Hercules Story, a promotional film distributed by the U.S. Army and
Bell Laboratories in the 1950s, vividly illustrates the fears generated by the Cold War.
In the film's opening scenes, a group of children play on the picket-fenced front
lawns of what appears to be an ideal American suburb. As a young boy throws a toy
airplane into the air, the camera follows the shadow of the make-believe bomber
soaring above the street. Suddenly, the film's playful mood ends. An adult watching
the airplane is reminded of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and the toy plane's silhouette
becomes ominous -- a terrifying portent of what might happen if this were not a child's game.
As the airplane casts its "thin shadow of dread" over Elm Street, the narrator speaks to the
necessity of shielding America's cities and towns from enemy attack. In the immediate
post World War II years, Americans believed that such an attack was most likely to come
in the form of a high-flying Soviet aircraft armed with atomic weapons.
Designed to serve as the last line of defense for American citizens, Nike
installations encircled major metropolitan centers throughout the United States.
Located in military bases, farmlands, public parks, and residential areas across
the Nation, antiaircraft Nike missiles were a "backyard" reminder of the fragile
state of world peace in the years following World War II. Although victorious in war,
America soon perceived itself vulnerable to the same atomic devastation suffered by
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945. At war's end, the United States was
the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, but that monopoly was shortlived. Equally
short-lived was the Nation's wartime alliance with the Soviets, who Americans now
saw as their primary Cold War adversary. In 1949, Americans learned that the Soviet
Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb, several years ahead of U.S.
intelligence estimates. In 1952, the United States regained its nuclear superiority
with an even more powerful weapon: the H (hydrogen) bomb. But one year later, the
Soviet Union exploded its own H-bomb. Fueled by charges of a weapons "gap," the
Cold War arms race escalated, as did Americans' concerns for their national security.
Haunted by the memory of Pearl Harbor, horrified by the possibility of nuclear
devastation, Americans feared a surprise bomber
attack on the United States. Antiaircraft artillery had protected America's coasts
since World War I, but few of those units were on alert in the immediate post-World
War II years. Moreover, newer high-flying aircraft were now beyond the range of
antiaircraft guns. The Army had begun surface-to-air missile development during
World War II, but it was only after President Harry S Truman informed the Nation
that the Soviets had the atomic bomb that the military received sufficient funding
to act on those plans. By 1953, the U.S. Army had begun building Nike air defense
systems around 40 U.S. cities and military/industrial installations. At its peak
ten years later, the Nike defense system included approximately 300 batteries in
the United States.
The Nation's first operational, guided, surface-to-air missile, Nike was an important
technological breakthrough in air defense. The Nike system brought together an
array of antiaircraft, missile, computer, and radar elements. Nike could detect,
identify as friend or foe, track, and destroy enemy aircraft. Representing the close
relationship between the military and private industry, the U.S. Army contracted
with Bell Laboratories, Western Electric, Douglas Aircraft, and Aerojet Engineering
Corporation to develop and build the system. In an effort to develop the system
quickly and cost effectively, the earliest Nike missile system was based on
existing technology to the greatest extent possible. Ajax, the first-generation
Nike missile, carried a conventional warhead that could destroy a single aircraft.
As the United States and the Soviet Union developed more sophisticated weaponry,
defensive systems be came equally advanced. The second-generation Nike missile,
Hercules, had a nuclear warhead that could kill several aircraft at once. Zeus,
the final member of the Nike family, was designed to target high-altitude enemy missiles.
Continental air defense during the Cold War is a complex subject. The history of Nike
Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40 presented here purports only to present a portion of
that story, and must be viewed within the broader context of Cold War diplomacy
and military preparedness. At the same time that the U.S. Army was developing and
deploying the Nike systems, the U.S. Air Force produced its own surface-to-air
missile systems. The similarities of those systems, and the ensuing rivalry that
developed between the Air Force and the Army over them, is part of the Nike story.
In addition to the Air Force and Army, the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Air Force,
as part of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), also shared the defense
mission. Nike was part of an extensive early-warning radar, communications, and
weapons network -- including fighter planes, Navy picket ships and dirigibles,
Texas Towers, early-warning aircraft, and long-range and short-range radars
-- that extended from the southern borders of the United States to the arctic tundra,
from Hawaii to the Azores.
Simultaneous was the development of newer, more powerful, weapons. After the
Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, America's attention turned to the development
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By the time of the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962, the threat of manned bombers paled in comparison to the steady
advance of ever more powerful and plentiful ICBMs. As America's ICBM arsenal increased,
its defense policies changed. Nuclear deterrence became the primary means of
preventing war. America's enemies would be de terred from attack, U.S. defense
planners reasoned, because an enemy strike would be followed by massive nuclear retaliation.
By the time the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, signalling the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. Army had already deactivated America's Nike bases with the exception of four
batteries in Florida and Alaska, all of the Nation's Nike batteries were phased out by 1974.
For almost two additional decades, the United States continued to supply Nike Hercules
missiles to foreign countries; Japan phased out its last Nike installation in 1992.
Although no longer an integral part ofAmerica's air defense, surface-to-air missiles have
become increasingly important on the modern battlefield. The Patriot missile, a
technological descendent of Nike, played a major role during Operation Desert Storm.
Although they were located near major population centers, Nike missile bases were
low-scale and relatively obscure facilities. Nike battery commanders held open
houses at their bases and worked to build community relations. Still, Nike installations
were often closed and abandoned before many local residents understood the full extent
of what lay behind the securty fencing. Today, only remnants of Nike installations
remain within the United States. Nike Missile Base SF-88L within the Golden Gate National
Recreation Area near San Francisco, California, has been partially restored and is open
on a limited basis for public visitation. Gateway National Recreation Area in
New Jersey and New York also contains portions of a Nike base. These sites,
however, are the exceptions. Most Nike sites are rapidly vanishing from the
Nation's landscape.
Military installations, particularly Cold War sites, present unique challenges
to historians and preservationists. Created from standardized plans, Nike bases
throughout the country were virtually identical; their various components rearranged
to suit the specific landscape and military needs of each site. How many of these
sites should be documented, and to what level? In Illinois, the decision was made
to document the two most intact Nike bases within the state. These bases reflect
two different defense areas, as well as two phases of missile technology.
Nike Missile Base C-84 was equipped with the Nike Ajax missile. Nike Missile
Base SL-40 had the more advanced Nike Hercules. The HAER recordation of Nike Bases C-84
and SL-40 also reflects another common challenge of documenting deactivated
military sites.
Although the buildings, including the underground missile storage
areas, were relatively unchanged, the U.S. Army had removed the missile, radar,
and communications equip ment several years ago. As America's former Cold War sites
continue to be surplused or updated, the need to accurately document military sites
must be continually balanced against the demands of national security.
Today, Nike Missile Base SL-40 near Hecker, Illinois, is the Beck Vocational
Center; its buildings preserved through adaptive reuse. Until recently, Nike Missile
Base C-84 near the Chicago suburb of Barrington, Illinois, served as an archival
repository for Lake County; the records were stored in one of the three underground
missile storage areas. The base, now surrounded by suburban development, was being
offered for sale and redevelopment at the time of the HAER recordation. The HAER
record of these two missile sites, presented here in edited form, adds to our
understanding of the Cold War, and contributes to the vast and continually growing
body of literature and graphic documentation that is the Historic American
Engineering Record.
Christine Whitacre, Historian
Stewardship and Partnerships Team
Rocky Mountain System Support Office
National Park Service
A FRAGILE PEACE
At the end of World War II, Americans hoped for peace and an end to the trauma of the
previous 15 years of depression and war. Victory in World War II led to a period of
prosperity and growth for America, but did not result in a sense of security. Within
five years after the war, the United States would help rebuild its recent enemy, Germany,
and create an alliance to oppose its former ally, the Soviet Union. The Soviot Union and
the United States soon engaged in a Cold War, each side convinced the other was
plotting its domination and destruction. In the ensuing arms race, both superpowers
developed new weapons systems in a seemingly endless competition. Defensive as well
offensive weapon systems became part of the race as both the Soviets and the United States
tried to gain a military advantage. The U.S. Army's Nike missile would play an important
role in America's air defense strategy.
The roots of the Cold War can be traced on the Soviet side to American intervention,
1918-1920, in the Russian Civil War against the Bolsheviks, and subsequent
non-recognition of the Soviet regime until 1933. For Americans, suspicion of the
Soviets was rooted in the Bolshevik calls for world revolution, the mass purges
of the 1920s and 1930s, and the Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939
that led to the outbreak of war and a new partition of Poland. During World War II,
disputes over the timing of the invasion of France, and differing visions of the
shape of postwar Europe exacerbated these tensions.
In 1941, while the Red Army reeled in retreat, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
demanded territorial concessions during Allied discussions of postwar aims.
Stalin wanted to keep the territory taken from Poland and Finland in 1939 and 1940,
as well as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Before the
Teheran Conference in November 1943, Averill Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, briefed President Franklin Roosevelt on Soviet objectives. Harriman
told Roosevelt that the Soviets would insist on their 1941 frontiers and were
determined to have a friendly government in Poland.1
At the same time, domestic political pressures restrained Roosevelt from making
the Soviet aims clear to the American public. Congressmen with Polish-American
constituencies worried about the fate of Poland long before Teheran. In August 1943,
Representative John Dingell of Michigan told Roosevelt that "we Americans are not
sacrificing, fighting, and dying to make permanent and more powerful the Communistic
Government of Russia and to make Joseph Stalin a dictator over the liberated countries
of Europe."2
Fearing loss of support in the 1944 elections, and also fearing that
Congress might refuse to join the United Nations over this issue, Roosevelt kept the
question quiet. However, he could be blunt when necessary. In the summer of 1943,
the President warned Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski that the United States would
not fight Stalin to prevent the taking of eastern Poland or the Baltic
States.3
Disagreements between the two sides became obvious during the Yalta Conference in
February 1945. Roosevelt essentially gave Soviet leader Joseph Stalin a free hand
in eastern Europe because he knew there was no way to prevent it. Roosevelt understood
that the American public would not have supported a new war against the Soviets in
order to save eastern Europe. However, when the reality of Soviet policies became
obvious, the reactions of the American public and Congress against the Soviets were
predictable.4 On February 9, 1946, Stalin gave a rare
public address in which he suggested that future wars were inevitable until the
ultimate triumph ofcommunism. The West reacted with dismay. Time magazine characterized
Stalin's remarks as "The most warlike pronouncement uttered by any toprank statesman
since V-J Day." Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas described the speech as
"the Declaration of World War III."5
Also in February 1946, the Canadian government arrested 22 people for espionage on
behalf of the Soviet Union. Searching for a rationale to explain Soviet behavior,
the administration of President Harry S Truman queried Moscow's U.S. Embassy staff.
George F. Kennan, minister-counselor at the embassy and a 20-year veteran of the
Foreign Service, replied with the "long telegram," an 8,000-word explanation of the
sources of Soviet conduct. Kennan argued that Soviet hostility to the West would last
as long as its regime was based not so much on ideology as the need to justify
dictatorial rule. Kennan noted that the tsars had also claimed dangers from abroad
as justification for harsh methods at home.
The implication was clear: Soviet
behavior was based on the Soviet system's needs, not on Western actions. Hence,
negotiation would have little effect towards resolving problems. Defining a policy
that later became know as "containment," Kennan suggested that the United States
strengthen the West, resist Soviet expansion, and wait for internal changes in
the Soviet Union. Shortly after Kennan's telegram, former British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill visited the United States. In a speech delivered at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, Churchill lamented that "from Stettin
on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has fallen across
Europe."6
In February 1947, the British informed President Truman they were giving up part
of their sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean, specifically Greece and
Turkey. Greece was in the midst of a civil war between the royalist government and
communist goerrillas, and Turkey was under continuing pressure from the Soviet Union
to revise the Montreaux Convention -- which limited Soviet access to the Dardanelles
Straits and the Mediterranean. Together, these countries needed over $400,000,000
in immediate aid, which the British could not afford. In requesting funding from
Congress, President Truman characterized the war in Greece as a Soviet attempt to
establish control in the Middle East.
In addition Truman stressed, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures"7 Congress approved the
$400,000,000 for Greece and Turkey. This policy -- soon known as the Truman Doctrine
-- committed U.S. assistance to any country struggling against Commmunism. Containment
had officially replaced the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.
The Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 further escalated Cold War tensions. After World War II,
Germany had been partitioned into four Allied occupation zones: American, Soviet, British,
and French. The weak and dependent Germans were unable to support themselves. This
situation suited the Soviets, who wanted to keep Germany from ever again becoming a threat.
The Western Allies wanted a rejuvenated Germany able to contribute to the European
economy, and proposed currency reform among the occupation zones to revive commerce
and regularize financial matters. When the Soviets refused, the Western Allies went
ahead with the reform within their own zones. This move sealed the division of Germany
into East and West. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets isolated Berlin, which was 90 miles
inside the Soviet zone, from all ground traffic.
While the United Nations debated the crisis, President Truman used aerial transport
to bring fuel and food to the desperate Berliners in "Operation Vittles." Thousands
of World War TI pilots were called back into service to deliver 4,500 tons of supplies
per day, making more than 250,000 flights.8 The blockade
and airlift ended 11 months later when the Soviet Union gave up, in May
1949.9 However, the damage was done. The Berlin Blockade,
together with the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia, convinced many Americans that
Stalin would seize every opportunity to expand Soviet control.
In 1949, at the urging of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) was formed. This new alliance included the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Iceland, Norway, France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium,
and Luxembourg.10 Each signatory pledged to regard an
attack on any of them as an attack on all of them.11
By banding together, the West could begin to match the numerically superior Red Army.
Indeed, this policy allowed the United States to "get tough with Russia" without
building an enormous military structure. By joining NATO, America committed itself
to containing the Soviet Union within the territories it occupied in
1949.12
While most Americans shared a common concern over the spread of communism, a more
immediate threat was demonstrated by the Soviet Union on September 2, 1949. On that
day the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb -- abruptly ending America's monopoly
on nuclear weapons. The explosion shocked Americans, who had perceived the Russians
as technologically behind the United States. When the Soviet Union exploded an even
more powerful hydrogen bomb in August 1953, only ten months after America's first
H-bomb test, the sense of fear and urgency increased in the United States.
American fears intensified when the Soviets unveiled their first long-range bomber,
the M-4 Bison, during their 1954 May Day parade. The following year, an American
Embassy air attache visited Tushino Airport and observed twice as many Bisons as
American military intelligence had estimated. Soviet officials had actually deceived
the American observer. The ten Bisons that had flown overhead had made a wide circle
and then had been joined by an
additional eight aircraft, which made another pass over the viewing platform. The hoax
succeeded in creating the impression of a larger Soviet bomber force than actually
existed. When the Soviets introduced a second long range bomber, the Tu-20 Bear, talk
of a bomber "gap" began. Succumbing to the deception, Air Force intelligence estimated
that the Russians would have 600 to 700 strategic bombers operational by
1959.13
Despite the hoax, the United States was forced to acknowledge that the Soviet Union
had developed a long-range bomber capable of delivering a nuclear weapon from Siberian
air fields to the continental United States. The frightening prospect of a long-range
Soviet bomber dropping a nuclear warhead on an unsuspecting American city resurrected
a "Pearl Harbor atmosphere" in the United States. As nuclear stockpiles increased,
the United States encouraged citizens to build fallout shelters and created civil
defense systems designed to cope with an enemy attack.14
In 1956, Congress added $928 million to the Air Force budget for the purchase of B-52
aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. Army, the armed service responsible for protecting
American ground forces, also was anticipating the threat of an enemy strike. As early as
1953, the Army began deploying the first Nike antiaircraft batteries around American
cities.
NIKE DEPLOYMENT AND U.S. AIR DEFENSE
America's first military organization devoted entirely to air defense was the Air Defense
Command (ADC), which began on February 26, 1940 at Mitchel Field, New York. The Air
Defense Command was created following a recpmmentation by Major General Heery "Hap"
Arnold, who had pointed out the weaknesses in America's air defense system. The Air
Defense Command was formed to "conduct experimests in the northeastern states to
determine how fighter planes, antiaircraft artillery, and an air warning system
could be integrated into a single air defense network.15
New to the problem of air defense, the Air Defense Command looked to the British
example. In August and September 1940, during the Battle of Britain, the British had
shown that a well-dispersed air force was a difficult bombing target, and demonstrated
the value of an early warning system based on radar.16
The United States undertook several large scale exercises that attempted to unify all
air defense elements. On the basis of this experimentation, the Air Defense Command
recommended that the United States follow Britain's practice of placing air defense
responsibility under pursuit aviation commanders.17
On March 7, 1941, the War Department assigned the mission of air defense to the
Army Air Corps. The Army Air Corps created four numbered air forces, each with an
interceptor command assigned the mission of air defense. The numbered air forces
were responsible for organizing and planning, while the interceptor
commands carried out air defense operations. These operations included control of
antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units trained and ad ministered by the Coast Artillery
Corps, which was charged with the mission of developing weapons and
techniques.18 However, lack of funds and commitment
prevented these units from becoming part of a unified, fully prepared air defense system.
Prior to World War II, the possibility of America being struck by an enemy air attack
was remote. Protected on both sides by oceans -- and with the limited range of aircraft --
America seemed insulated from European or Asian air attack. The Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, dramatically iilustrated the weaknesses of American
air de fense. Following Pearl Harbor, the nation was forced to implement an air defense
system that was still in its infancy; only eight months had passed since the Air Corps
had received over all responsibility. Early in 1942, the Army reorganized into three
principal elements: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service
Forces. Each received sepa rate but related duties.19
As the United States entered World War II, there was little doubt concerning the
importance of antiaircraft artillery. On March 9, 1942, the War Department activated
the Antiaircraft Command as part of the Army Ground Forces. With Major General Joseph
A. Green serving as its first commanding general, the Antiaircraft Command's primary
mission was "to instruct and train officers and enlisted men for duty with antiaircraft
artillery and barrage balloon units, and to activate, organize, equip and efficiently
train such units for combat service.20
The War Department established the Antiaircraft Artillery School at Camp Davis,
North Carolina. Two years later, the school moved to Fort Bliss, Texas, where the
clear weather and solitude accommodated excellent year-round training and testing.
Between March 9, 1942, and September 2, 1945, the command trained 613 antiaircraft
artillery combat units for deployment overseas and in the con tinental United States.
The Army Service Forces, through the Chief of Ordnance and Chief Signal Officer,
also played a significant role in air defense through procurement, delivery, and
equipment maintenance.21 At the same time, the Army
Air Forces maintained operational control of air defense through its four numbered air
forces. This complex organizational structure caused difficulties. In 1942, the Army
Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces had "sharp disagree ments" concerning the
circumstances under which an antiaircraft artillery unit could be-
gin firing.22 Each side argued that it should have the
command to control the antiaircraft artillery units. The issue, however, remained unresolved.
As Nike research began in 1945, the rivalry over the control of America's air defense
systems escalated. The Army Ordnance Corps was responsible for Nike development, but the
Army Air Forces had overall responsibility for air defense. In 1946, the War Department
issued several directives that led to different interpretations by the Army Air Forces
and Army Ground Forces. Finally, in September 1946, the War Department resolved the
controversy by declaring that Army Air Forces would control antiaircraft artillery
units with air defense
missions. The War Department also determined that the Air Defense Command would provide
Army Ground Forces with some degree of influence by integrating antiaircraft artillery
officers into its staff. Army Ground Forces also remained responsible for providing the
technical training of antiaircraft units.
The disagreements over air defense coincided with the military's "turfwars" over
missile systems. After World War II, America's defense planners and aeronautical firms
accelerated their missile development programs. Between March and April 1946, the Army
Air Forces Commander "Hap" Amold authorized 28 missile projects. At the same time, the
Army Ground Forces and the Navy proceeded with their own missile programs. In an effort
to develop an overall structure for America's burgeoning missile program, the military
divided these missiles into four basic categories: airto-air, air-to-surface,
surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface. However, it proved to be much more difficult
to divide up the responsibilities for those weapons.23
In July 1947, the National Security Act created three separate military departments:
Navy, Army, and Air Force. However, the act failed to adequately define the roles and
missions of the departments. It also failed to stem the interservice rivalry. Separate
from the National Security Act, the Army and the Air Force formulated over 200
agreements regarding air defense. These agreements, which became known as the
Eisenhower-Spaatz Agree ments, resulted in the Air Force having operational control of
air defense, while the Army staffed the air defense units. Also under these agreements,
both the Air Force and the Army controlled surface-to-air missiles, but under different
circumstances. The Air Force was in charge of surface-to-surface "pilotless aircraft"
and strategic missiles. The Army controlled tactical missiles, defined as those missiles
that supported and protected ground operations. The Air Force also was responsible for
surfaceto-air missiles for area defense, while the Army controlled surface-to-air missiles
that protected field forces from air attack.24
President Harry S Truman, in an effort to strengthen America's air defense, directed
the Air Force to reorganize in October 1948. The Continental Air Command was formed on
December 1, 1948, headed by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The Air Defense
Command fell under the Continental Air Command jurisdiction, resulting in the Air Force
retaining overall responsibility for air defense. At the same time, the Army continued
to provide antiaircraft artillery units and personnel to sup port the air defense
function. Not surprisingly, disagreements continued between the Army and Air Force
over air defense responsibilities.
In 1949, in an effort to clarify roles and responsibilities, the Army recommended
that it be responsible for all surface-launched missiles, while the Navy controlled
ship-launched missiles and the Air Force controlled air-launched missiles. In 1950,
the Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS) agreed to a variation of the Army's recommendation. The
JCS assigned to the Air Force and Navy the responsibility for surface-to-air missiles
that supplemented interceptor aircraft. The Army and Navy were responsible for shortrange
surface-to-surface missiles that replaced field artillery, as well as surface-to-air
missiles that extended the range of antiaircraft artillery.25
Another concession the Army won was to establish an antiaircraft artillery chain of
command, which became the Army Antiaircraft Command (ARAACOM). The Army activated
ARAACOM in 1950, immediately following the beginning of the Korean War. The Army
Antiaircraft Command was based at Ent Air Force
Base at Colorado Springs, Colorado. At first, ARAACOM only had oversight for planning and
training. On April 10, 1951, the Army Antiaircraft Command assumed actual command of
Army air defense units. By July 1951, the Army Antiaircraft Command headquarters
commanded a total of 38 antiaircraft artillery batteries.26
The Army, Navy, and Air Force were still arguing over roles and responsibilities in 1953,
by which time Nike missiles were in production. As historian Jacob Neufeld notes, "The
Army continued to claim that all missiles launched from the ground belonged in its
province, as they were merely extensions of artillery. The Navy, intent on maintaining
its roles and missions, pursued a large number of missile projects in various areas.
For its part, theAir Force firmly believed that the Army and Navy were bent on capturing
Air Force roles and missions. Everywhere, it seemed, there was evidence of a
conspiracy.27
In January 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson assigned ARAACOM exclusive
responsibility for surface-to-air missiles used in point defense, including Nike missiles,
which had been deployed since 1953. On March 21, 1957, the Army Antiaircraft Command was
redesignated as the Army Air Defense Com mand (ARADCOM)- the term "antiaircraft" was now
obsolete as air defense targeted both aircraft and missiles. Army Air Defense Command
units defended major industrial and population centers of the United States, as well
as selected Strategic Air Command bases. Army Air Defense Command Posts were established
at battalion, group, or brigade level.28
The assignment of research and development for guided missiles -- whether for area or
point defense -- to more than one branch of the military created not only rivalry
but a duplication of effort. However, the military rationalized the duplication as a
means of maximizing America's ability to have the flexibility to adjust a weapons
system design to changing technologi cal innovations and political
circumstances.29 That this duplication continued
can be understood in the context of the Cold War fears of the early 1950s. Through
rigged elections and coups Communists had gained control in several eastern European
countries. In addition, the Korean War began and finished with no clear victory.
Ernest Yanarella, in The Missile Defense Controverrsy -- Strategy, Technology,
and Politics, 1955-1972, noted that: "The fears of war breaking out at any moment,
the perception of a hostile and potentially aggressive enemy capable of inducing heavy
loss upon North America, and the belief in the vast potency of a military technology
capable of rendering obsolete whole weapons systems -- all these attitudes promoted
duplication [of weapon systems] as a lesser evil to the possi bility of
unpreparedness."30
As a result, the Army and the Air Force developed separate air defense missile
programs. While the Army worked with Bell Laboratories on the development of Nike,
the Air Force conducted simultaneous missile development with various contractors,
including a series of studies that eventually led to the development of the BOMARC
missile system. In February 1946, the Air Force awarded Boeing, together with the
University of Michigan, the design contract for BOMARC. (The name "BOMARC" was derived
from Boeing Airplane Co. and the Michigan Aeronautical Research Center.) BOMARC was
an active-homing, surface-to-air missile, which could carry either conventional or
nuclear warheads.
In 1958, illustrative of the competition that developed between the Army's and
Air Force's missile systems, Air Force officials called for a plan to replace the
Nike bases surrounding
Chicago with BOMARC bases. As the Chicago Sun Times reported:
-
The basis of the Air Force plan is a charge that the atom-tipped Nike-Hercules
already stationed at one site in Chicago, cannot cope with Russia's fast net jet
bombers. Army officials rebutted this contention with the "hard fact" that the
Hercules is already operational and easily adaptable to existing bases, while the
BOMARC is distictly a weapon of the future.31
Charging the Air Force with "planning in World War TI terms," the Army predicted
that by the time BOMARC was fully combat-ready, Soviet bombers would no longer be
the major threat to American security. The Army claimed that by 1960 "the main Russian
threat will be the ICBM and its answer is the Army's Nike-Zeus," which was the last of
the three types of Nike missile.32 In 1959, the
Department of Defense conducted a mock attack on Chicago to evaluate the effectiveness
of Nike Hercules. Strategic Air Command bombers carried out the simulated attack. When
Nike Hercules proved to be only eight percent effective against these bombers,
Air Force officials used this event as an opportunity to push the BOMARC
missile.33 Ultimately, however, the Department of
Defense utilized both missile systems for America's air defense -- although there
were far more Nike than BOMARC bases.
Development of the NIKE Missile System
The first generation Nike missile, the Ajax, was designed to intercept and destroy Soviet
nabbed bombers. In the event that the Cold War turned hot, Nike missiles could provide
the last line of defense for the Nation's population and industrial centers. Although the
U.S. Army did not build the first Nike missile batteries until 1953, research and
development of the defensive antiaircraft weapon systems began during World War II.
As the United States entered World War II, its antiaircraft arsenal included
.50 caliber machine guns, 37mm guns, 40mm "Bofors" guns, fixed and mobile 3" guns,
and 90mm guns. The 90mm gun was the major heavy antiaircraft weapon used by the
United States during the war years. In 1938, the United States initiated development
of an integrated antiaircraft defense system. That investment resulted in the development
of the 90mm gun, standardized in February 1940. Using the M-9 director radar system,
the 90mm gun could hit aircraft flying at 30,000 feet, and the combination of the 90mm
gun and M-9 radar proved successful in World War II against the German V-l rockets.
The War Department also developed a 120mm antiaircraft gun, but its large size limited
mobility.
By the close of the war, advances in air warfare made it plain that even the latest
antiaircraft weapons were not capable of countering future air threats. Guided
missiles capable of striking high-flying aircraft were necessary. The B-29 atomic
bombing mission of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 vividly demonstrated the
destructive power of high-altitude heavy aircraft. As World War II drew to a close,
America's military planners began planning for air defense systems that could
counter these new offensive weapons. In response to potential
threats from the air, the Army began developing two separate, but related, pieces
of equipment: the M-33 integrated fire control system and what would become the
Nike missile.
In 1944, the U.S. Army contracted with Bell Telephone Laboratories to develop a
fully integrated radar/computer antiaircraft fire control system. The result was the
M-33 system. Earlier systems, such as the M-9, while successful, were a collection
of individual equipment elements from various sources that were organized into
working units by the military. The M-33 system, however, offered a complete
radar/computer system.34 This system, which would
later operate with the Nike Ajax missile, provided the basis for a significantly
improved fire control system.
On August 17, 1944, Army Lieutenant Jacob W. Schaefer submitted a memorandum proposing
a new antiaircraft weapon system. The heart of this proposed system was a rocket guided
from the ground that would work in conjunction with two radars linked to a computer.
One radar would track incoming enemy aircraft, transmitting current location points
to the computer. The computer would then calculate future target positions and be able to
relay to the missile, through the other radar, any course corrections needed to
intercept the enemy aircraft. The Army sent copies of Lieutenant Schaefer's technical
proposal to Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL)
for their consideration.35
In May 1945, Bell Laboratories presented a verbal report to the Army on
"Project Nike" (named after the winged goddess of victory in Greek mythology).
A written report, "A Study of an Antiaircraft Guided Missile System," was released
the following July. The report, which was the work of a group of Bell Laboratories'
scientists and engineers that included W.A. McNair, H.W. Bode, G.N. Thayer, J.W. Tukey,
and B.D. Holbrook, stressed swift deployment of a weapon system that could combat
highspeed, high-altitude bombers. The engineers recommended a weapon that was derived,
to every extent possible, from existing technology. In order to save time and money,
the engineers also recommended that the missile be as simple as possible. Bell
Laboratories' engineers also urged that the more expensive and complex equipment,
such as the radar system, remain on the ground where it could be re-used and have
the benefit of routine maintenance.36
The Bell Laboratories' report recommended that Project Nike be comprised of a
supersonic rocket missile vertically launched under the thrust of a solid-fuel booster,
which would drop on completion of its function. The launched missile would be propelled
by a liquid-fuel motor, and guided to a predicted "intercept point." The commands for
missile detonation would be controlled from the ground -- and transmitted by radio
signals from a ground-based computer and radar system that would track both the
target and the missile in flight.37
A few months later, the Antiaircraft Artillery Board published a report that
listed more specific, desired characteristics of the proposed Nike missile. The
board wanted a missile that had:
- the ability to operate effectively in high altitudes
up to 60,000 feet and at ranges of 50,000 yards;
- the ability to destroy large bombardment-type aircraft when detonated within
60 feet of the airplane;
- a self-destruction feature;
- the highest degree of security against interference or enemy electronic
countermeasures;
- ability to be transported by motor vehicle; and 6) an assembly period
of no more than 3 hours.38
In June 1945, the Rocket Branch of the Army Ordnance Corps (co-sponsored by a
division of the Army and the Air Force) assumed full responsibility for Project Nike,
and named Western Electric and Bell Laboratories as the prime contractors fbr development
of the radar system. As designed by Bell Laboratories and Western Electric, the missile
command and control radar system incorporated characteristics of the M-33 antiaircraft
fire control system, saving both time and money on research development, production,
logistics, and personnel training.39 The Army selected
Douglas Aircraft Company (later the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Corporation) as the
major contractor for the design of the missile, booster, and launcher. In turn,
Douglas Aircraft contracted with the Aerojet Engineering Corporation to design the
liquid-fuel rocket motor and solid-fuel booster rockets. Following the start of the
Korean War in 1950, the Department of Defense asked the contractors to produce a working
version of the Nike system as soon as possible. This first missile was the Nike Ajax.
Nike Ajax
The Nike Ajax was the first in the Army's family of guided missiles, and the world's
first operational, guided, surface-to-air missile system.40
(The name "Ajax" derived from Greek mythology, where there were two Ajax characters
-- both swift, skillful, and strong.) The first Nike Ajax site was activated in
December 1953, at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The 36th Antiaircraft Artillery
Missile Battalion tactically deployed at this site on March 20, 1954, as part of
the Washington-Baltimore Defense Area.41 The Nike Ajax
was a two-stage, supersonic missile. The missile was extremely slender, only 12
inches in diameter. Twenty-one feet long and 34 feet high with the booster attached,
the missile weighed slightly over 2,455 pounds.42
Nike Ajax carried three high-explosive warheads, weighing 12, 179, and 122 pounds,
each wrapped in 1/4-inch, optimum cubic fragments. The warheads were mounted in the
nose, center, and aft sections. Two arming mechanisms and five detonating cords
activated the warheads, following burst orders issued from the
ground.43
The Nike Ajax missile had a two-stage propulsion. The first-stage, solid-propellant
booster produced a 59,000-pound thrust for 2 1/2 seconds, then separated and fell
away as the second stage fired. A liquid-fueled sustainer motor powered the second
stage. It burnedjet fuel, JP-4, with red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer. As
JP-4 and red fuming nitric acid are not self-igniting, a small quantity of
aniline/furfuryl alcohol (and later dimethyl hydrazine) provided the catalyst
for combustion.44 In flight, the sustainer motor burned
for 70 seconds and consumed 135 kilograms of JP-4.45
Nike Ajax had a burnout speed of Mach 2.3, a range of 25-30 miles, and a ceiling of
65,000 feet. (Mach 1 is the speed of sound; Mach 2.3 is 2.3 times as fast as the
speed of sound, or 1,679 mph.) The Nike Ajax had three sets of cross-shaped fins,
in addition to those on the booster. The forward set of fins was for steerage,
the middle set was mounted with sensing equipment, while the rear set provided
stability. Douglas Aircraft manufactured the Nike airframes and assembled the
missiles at its plant in Santa Monica and, later, at the Army Ordnance Missile
Plant in Charlotte, North Carolina. In total, Western Electric and Douglas
Aircraft produced 358 ground batteries and nearly 14,000
Nike Ajax missiles for the Army during the duration of the missile's
deployment.46In addition to Western Electric,
Bell Laboratories, and Douglas Aircraft, the U.S. Army subcontracted with
hundreds of other companies to supply parts for the Nike Ajax weapon system. These
contracts valued approximately $1.16 billion. Research, development, and design
engineering came to approximately $179.2 million; industrial services and supplies
cost about $947.6 million; and the remaining $39.1 million was invested in production
facilities.47
The last operational Ajax site in the United States ceased operations in May 1964,
and a Nike-Ajax missile was offered to the Smithsonian the following
November.48 However, beginning in 1967, Nike Ajax
installations were deployed in countries that shared common defense interests
with the United States, such as Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Taiwan, and Turkey. The Army also continued
to fire Ajax missiles as part of training exercises at MacGregor Range near
Fort Bliss, Texas.
Nike Hercules
The Army began developing the next generation of Nike missile -- Hercules --
in 1953, the same year that Nike Ajax became operational. The Army named the missile
for one of the most celebrated heroes of classical mythology, a figure renowned for
strength and endurance. The new guided missile would need these characteristics
in order to destroy the newer, more sophisticated generations of military aircraft.
Aircraft capabilities had increased in range and altitude, demanding an improved air
defense system. In addition, nuclear payloads were a greater threat. Designed to
carry either nuclear and/or high-explosive warheads, the Nike Hercules missile could
attack supersonic aircraft operating at altitudes in excess of 150,000 feet and at a
range of more than 87 miles.49
Nike Hercules represented several notable improvements over the first generation
Ajax. The solid-fuel booster for the Nike Hercules was a cluster of four Nike Ajax
missile booster units. Another improvement was a solid-fueled propellant that
replaced liquid-fueled propellant for the sustainer motor. At launch, the Nike
Hercules weighed 10,405 pounds; later versions weighed 10,710 pounds. Burn-out
speed was typically Mach 3.5 in early production; that speed was later increased
to Mach 3.65.50 Also improved was the acquisition
radar for the Nike Hercules system, which ultimately had a range of 100 miles.
The missile and target-tracking radars also had increased
ranges.51 In 1958, the Army began replacing Nike Ajax
missiles with Nike Hercules. An "Improved Nike Hercules" system became operational
in 1961. The Improved Hercules could combat yet more sophisticated offensive weapons,
including aircraft bombers that reached speeds of Mach 2, as well as air-supported
missiles and rockets operating at velocities of Mach 3. The High Power Acquisition
Radar (HIPAR) built by General Electric was also an important component of the
Improved Hercules system.52 While the range of standard
Hercules radars was 125 miles, HIPAR extended the acquisition range to 175 nautical
miles, allowing more than 400 seconds from the time of target acquisition to the
time of intercept.53 With the increasing speed of
enemy aircraft and ballistic missiles, every extra moment was essential. The
Improved Hercules system also proved effective against surface-to-surface targets
and had a limited antimissile capability.
In 1960, a Hercules missile supported by HIPAR scored a direct hit against a Corporal
ballistic missile at White Sands Missile Range. Later that same year, a Hercules missile
successfully intercepted another Hercules traveling at a height of 19
miles.54
By June 1958, the Army had converted most of the Ajax batteries around New York City,
Washington, D.C., and Chicago to Hercules systems. Funding for the gigantic task of
conversion and new production fluctuated between $47.97 and $129.6 million per month.
At the peak of the Hercules effort in 1957-60, Douglas Aircraft operated not only the
Charlotte Ordnance Missile Plant, but three other Nike Hercules facilities in North
Carolina: WinstonSalem, Burlington, and Greensboro. At peak production, the Ajax
and Hercules missiles were, respectively, $19,300 and
$55,200.55 Nike Ajax magazines
(the underground storage facilities) needed modification to accommodate the heavier,
longer, and wider Nike Hercules missiles. The primary change was an increase in
electrical generating capacity to lift the heavier missile out of the underground
facility. Fueling facilities at the launch area were required only if Ajax missiles
were also operational at the base; the solid fuel booster and sustainer motor of the
Hercules did not use liquid fuel.
| Type of Pit
| Missile Type
| Launcher
on Elevator
| Length of Pit
| Width of Pit
|
|---|
| A
| Ajax
| Yes
| 42 Feet
| 63 Feet
|
| B
| Ajax/Hercules
| Yes
| 49 Feet
| 60 Feet
|
C (converted to
Hercules from A)
| Hercules
| No
| 42 Feet
| 63 Feet
|
| D
| Hercules
| Yes
| 62 Feet
| 68 Feet
|
Four different underground magazines accommodated the changing missile design.
The "A" box was designed for Ajax missiles. The larger "B" box also accommodated
Hercules missiles. The "C" box was, essentially, a former Ajax magazine modified
to hold Hercules missiles. Box "D," designed for Hercules missiles, was the largest
magazine.
After 1958, the Army constructed all Nike facilities with magazines designed
specifically for the Nike Hercules, the "D" box. Nike Missile Base SL-40,
constructed in 1958, had a "D" type magazine. During the transitional years,
as Nike Hercules missiles were first coming on line, many batteries had a mix
of Ajax and Hercules missiles. For example, between 1958-1961, Nike Missile Base SF-88L
near San Francisco, held 5-6 Hercules missiles in launch section "A," and 10-11 Ajax
missiles in launch section "B." This was typical of many Nike batteries across the nation.
Nike Zeus
Nike Zeus, the final Nike missile, was aimed at intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), Zeus was the third missile in the Nike family, and brought Nike development
into the ICBM era. Named for the ruler of the Greek Gods, the Zeus missile measured
63 feet 3 inches, had a diameter of 60 inches, and weighed 40,000 pounds at launch.
The tandem booster, designed by Thiokol, had a thrust of 450,000 pounds --
then the highest ever attained through a single nozzle. The Zeus had a range of more
than 250 miles. The Nike Zeus system also included the Zeus Acquisition Radar (ZAR),
a significant improvement over the Nike Hercules HIPAR system. Shaped like a pyramid,
the ZAR featured a Luneberg lens receiver
aerial weighing about 1,000 tons. The first successful intercept of an ICBM by
Zeus was in 1962 at Kwajalein in the Marianas Islands.56
Dispite its technological advancements, the Department of Defense terminated Zeus
development in 1963. The Zeus system, which cost an estimated $15 billion, suffered
from several technical flaws, including an inability to distinguisd enemy warheads
from chaff, reflectors, and other types of decoys.57
Still, the Army continued to develop an anti-ICBM weapon system -- referred to as "Nike-X"
-- that was largely based on the technological advances of the Zeus system.
Nike-X featured phase-array radars, computer advances, and a missile tolerant of skin
temperatures three times those of the Zeus. In September 1967, the Department of
Defense announced the deployment of the Sentinel antiballistic missile system,
major elements drawn from Nike-X development. In March 1969, the Army deployed the
Saffeguard program, which was designed to defend Minuteman missiles, and which
also was based on the Nike-X system.58
Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40
In 1955, the Army designated 30 sites as top priorities for Nike installations,
all located in or near major cities: Washington-Baltimore, New Your, Chicago, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Hanford (Washington), San Francisco, Los Andeles, Seattle, Norfolk,
Pittsburgh, and Niagara-Buffalo. The Department of Defense chose these sites because
of their dense population, and industrial and/or military characteristics. In most cases,
these sites were already protected by 90mm and 120mm antiaircraft
guns.59 Ultimately, the Army constructed
approximately 300 Nike sites in 29 states: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
Originally, the Army intended Nike to be a mobile weapon system. As such, Nike's
battery control and launching areas were to be above round facilities, fulfilling the
Army's requirements that the missiles be as mobile as antiaircraft guns. However, Army
safety regulations also governed the surface storage of explosives. As a result, each
Nike base required at least 119 acres of land. In October 1952, just three months before
Nike equipment began rolling off production lines, Army personnel responsible for
land acquisition realized that the needed acreage would be difficult to secure.
The needed land was both costly and scarce, particularly if it was in or near
metropolitan areas -- the primary locations for Nike
bases.60
In an effort to reduce the amount of required land, the Army examined the possibility
of placing Nike launcher facilities in underground
magazines. An underground installation decreased the real estate requirements to 40 acres
of land. The feasibility of such a modification was confirmed during 1953, when a
prototype underground Nike installation was built at White Sands Missile Range.
Test firings proved successful in June 1953, and the Army decided to employ underground
launcher installations at all Nike bases within the continental United States. Even
though underground installations were chosen as the primary system, the Army continued
to design the Nike system for dual application. One version was a fixed installation;
the other was adapted to mobile field use. The mobile system, transported by road
or aircraft, could be ready for action within seven hours after arriving at a
base.61
Site Planning and Selection
Site selection for Nike facilities involved several phases of planning, design, and
evaluation. A fundamental military principle was that a circular defense provided
the best protection. As such, Nike installations ringed their protected cities and
industrial centers -- called, in military planning parlance, "vital areas." Each
vital area was surrounded by a buffer zone. The size of each buffer zone was
determined by the amount of damage the enemy could theoretically inflict, as
related to the ability of the area to absorb damage and continue operating. Army
experts soon found that no two sites were exactly the same. Although each Nike
installation included essentially the same facilities, the configuration varied
from base to base. Preliminary siting plans were sent to ARAACOM Headquarters at
Colorado Springs, Colorado. These plans were then forwarded to the Pentagon for
final approval.62
As part of the planning process for Nike deployment, Army technicians also plotted
"bomb release lines" around each vital area. The horizontal distance that a bomb
would fall forward from the release point to detonation depended principally
on the speed and altitude of the releasing aircraft. By judging the possible
altitudes and speeds of enemy aircraft, a critical line was determined around
the vital area, beyond which the defense had to be able to destroy all enemy
aircraft. The Army then deter mined the number of Nike installations required to
effectively deny enemy penetration. Attack assumptions, defense characteristics,
and command specifications were all taken into consideration. In addition, Army
tacticians determined the number of missiles required at each site, evaluating such
factors as prevailing climate conditions, technical support, crew proficiency,
terrain difficulties, and maintenance schedules.
The Army placed Nike installations where they could best deter mass attacks from a
single direction and, at the same time, maintain the most effective capability
against multiple attacks from different directions. Utilizing a "defense in depth"
concept, some Nike units were located well out from the vital area; others were
close in. The location of the units was a compromise between moving inward to
maximize firepower against a massed attack, and moving outward to increase
effectiveness against multiple attacks. Ideally, the Nike installations offered
mutual support -- one Nike unit covering the "dead area" of its adjacent
unit.63
The battery control area of each Nike installation, containing the guidance and
control equipment, was between a minimum of one half mile and a maximum of three
miles from the associated launching area. The minimum distance was determined by
the maximum tracking capability in elevation of the missile tracking radar, and the
maximum distance by practical considerations of providing communications by cables.
A Nike installation's
launchers made use of a common disposal area, within which the expended booster cases would
fall. The Army was careful to select a booster disposal area that minimized danger to
Army personnel and property, as well as the surrounding civilian population.
An adequate disposal area encompassed a circle of a one-mile readius with the center
located about one and one-half miles from the nearest launcher section or populated
area.64
Despite the reduced real estate requirements that resulted from the conversion to
underground launchers, Nike installations fell behind schedule because of public
opposition. No one particularly wanted "push-button warfare devices" installed in
their neighborhoods.65 Civic officials, real estate groups,
farmers, and homeowners objected to the installations for several reasons: fear of
falling debris from cases, reduction in real estate values, damage to crops, and the
possibility of a missile misfire or explosion.66
Initially the Army's public relations problems stemmed, in part, from government
security regulations that prohibited surveyors and engineers from disclosing why they
wished to examine a landowner's property. In some instances, land owners denied
access to the surveyors. Eventually, Army officials realized they had to permit a
"minimum of intelligence" to be released to area
residents.67 Press reports also raised concerns
about the safety of the missiles. On April 6, 1953, Time magazine commented:
-
While doing ther defending duty, the Nikes will not be desirable neighbors.
The boosters that bounce them into the air are big enough to do damage when they
fall to the ground and so are the Nikes themselves...68
Eventually, the needs of national security prevailed and there seemed to be an
understanding between the armed forces and the communities surrounding the Nike
installations. In November 1955, the Chicago Sun-Times reported:
-
The reaction has varied from vigorous protest to indiffereence and ignorance of
what is under way. Tut the Army is making a valiant public relations attempt
to tell the public what it's up to and temper the shock of the American civilian
population's first direct contact with radar and guns.69
The Army acquired most of the land through purchase, declaration of taking, and
straight condemnation. Whenever possible, the Army utilized government-owned land,
which also reduced cost and land acquisition concerns. On December 17, 1953, a
Department of Defense press release stated that the use of government land could
"reduce to a minimum, inconvenience to the civilian population and the removal
of revenue-producing land from tax rolls."70
In several cases, existing military bases converted to Nike installations.
Nike Missile Base C-84
The Army designated Chicago as Priority No 3 for Nike Ajax installations,
following Washington, D.C., and New York.71
Prior to the construction of Nike bases to defend the Chicago area, antiaircraft
artillery battalions, armed with 120mm and 90mm guns, were already present in and
around Chicago. In April 1954, the Army Corps of Engineers advertised construction
contracts for the first Nike bases in the Chicago area: C-93 (near Skokie), C-45
(Gary, Indiana), and C-51 (Alsip). Nike Missile Bases C-03 (Belmont Harbor), C-41
(Jackson Park), C-40 (Burnham Park), C-61 (Lemont), C-44 (Wolf Lake), C-80
(Arlington Heights),
C-72 (Addison), C-49 (Homewood), C-92 and C 94 (Libertyville), and C-98 (Ft. Sheridan)
were deployed by 1957.72
In the Chicago area, the Army utilized park land for Nike installations as much as
possible. Under lease arrangements, Nike installations were situated in Chicago's
Jackson Park, Burnham Park, Lincoln Park, Belmont Harbor, and Montrose Harbor. In all,
the Chicago Park District leased 88.5 acres of lake front land to the Army at the rate
of $1.00 per year per site. Some local citizens criticized the loss of public recreation
land and lack of compensation. On March 6, 1956, Major General Carter, chief of the
5th Regional Antiaircraft Command at Fort Sheridan, told the Chicago Daily News
-
We don't want to take any park land, but we have no alterantive ... a circular defense
of the city is best from a military point of view. In lake front cities like Chicago,
the defense must cut across the "diameter" of the circle, the lake shore.
We will make every adjustment possible without throwing defense out the window.
The Army acquired the land for Nike Missile Base C-84, which was approximately 25 miles
northwest of Chicago near the town of Barrington, through a combination of purchase,
declaration of taking, and condemnation. Dur ing 1956 and 1957, the Army acquired
26.87 fee acres, 54.67 easement acres, and two no-area permits (pole line and sanitary
sewer line in public road right-of-way) for use as Nike Missile Base C-84. The Launch
Area, which was just east of Quentin Road, consisted of 15.80 fee acres. The Battery
Control Area, which was to the east just north of Lake Cook Road, contained 11.07 fee
acres. Of the 54.67 easement acres, 0.19 acres were comprised of an access road and
utility easement for the launcher and housing area, and the remainder of the 54.59
easement acres were line-of-sight and safety
easements.73
The cost for Nike Missile Base C-84 was $1,214,502.97. By June 1962, the Army had
constructed 12 Nike installations for the Chicago Defense Area, which cost
$13,774,674.11 ($55,071.89 over budget).74
In all, the Army built 23 Nike installations in the Chicago-Gary (IN) Defense Area,
although they were not all in operation simultaneously.
Two Army battalions and the National Guard manned Base C-84. In 1956-1957, the
13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion -- which earlier had been part of the Chicago
defense system of 90mm and 120mm antiaircraft guns -- was headquartered at Nike
Missile Base C54 (Orland Park), and served as a Nike-Ajax battalion. On July 16, 1956,
the battalion designation was changed to 13th Antiaircraft Artillery Missile
Battalion, Nike-Ajax. Also that month, D Battery transferred from Base C-71
(La Grange to Base C-84. Battery A was lo cated at Nike Missile Base C-70
(Naperville); Battery C was at Base C-51.75
The 13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion inactivated September 1, 1958. At that time,
the 2nd Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery, activated with headquarters at Nike
Missile Base C-54. Through 1959, Nike Missile Base C-84 served as this battalion's
Battery D. Battery A was located at Nike Missile Base C-49 (Homewood); Battery C
was at Nike Missile Base C46 (Munster, Indiana). By 1961, a National Guard unit
manned Nike Ajax Missile Base C-84.76 By this time,
Nike Hercules was the more advanced version of the missile, and several Nike Ajax
installations in the Chicago defense system were converted to accommodate the
larger and more powerful Hercules missile. However, Base C-84 was not converted.
After the 2nd Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery
became a Nike Hercules battalion, Battery D moved from Base C-84 to Base C-61 (Lemont).
Nike Missile Base C-84, Barrington, Illinois
191 K Bytes
Site overview
71 K Bytes
Launch Area Site Plan
57 K Bytes
In 1961, Colonel R.E. Vollendorff wrote to U.S. Congresswoman Marguerite Stitt Church
that "Nike Site C-84 is an active NIKE Ajax Site which is being manned by a National
Guard Unit.77
Indeed, the Department of the Army planned for the Army National Guard
to eventually man 50 percent of the missile sites in the air defense of the
Nation.78
In its 1961 annual report, the National Guard listed Chicago as one of 15 defense areas
where NikeAjax batteries were operated by Guard
units.79
Nike Missile Base SL-40
Initially, St. Louis, Missouri, was to receive only 90mm guns as its main defense
against enemy aircraft. Since the mid-1950s, 90mm and 120mm guns had been a mainstay
of air defense around America's major population centers. However, St. Louis officials
fought to obtain the Nike Hercules weapon system. On February 4, 1956, the St. Louis
Globe-Democrat reported:
-
Although St. Louis is listed officially as one of the "most probable targets
for atomic attack," ther are no immediate plans to equip this area with
anti-aircraft weapons capable of stopping Soviet Russia's best planes.
This was disclosed to the Globe-Democrat yesterday by Army and
Civil Defense authorities. The Army announced Thursday that anti-aircraft defense
planned for St. Louis consists of 32 90-millimeter guns to be installed by mid-1957
and manned by National Guardsmen. The 90-millimeter weapons cannot bring down planes
flying at 40,000 feet or beyond the speed of sound. Such ships can be tracked and
destroyed by the Nike guided missile. "To our knowledge, there are no immediate
plans to bring the Nike to St. Louis," sain Lt. Col. J.H. Farren, executive officer of
the Army Central Anti-Aircraft Regional Command at Grandview Air Force Base,
south of Kansas City. "We are basing our plans for St. Louis on a 90-millimeter
defense and not a missile defense. In two or three years, St. Louis might get
something better."80
About one month later, U.S. Congressman Frank M. Karsten from St. Louis asked that
"St. Louis be put on the priority list of cities which will receive Nike guided
missiles for defense against hostile aircraft," or at least have 120mm guns installed
instead of the older 90mm guns.81 Based on the i
nformation available, Karsten's arguments proved effective. Two weeks after his
complaints were printed, the Defense Department informed Karsten that it was asking
the Army to resurvey the St. Louis defenses.82
In May 1956, the people of St. Louis learned that the deployment of Nike Hercules
batteries around their city might occur within the next two years. Until that
announcement Army officials had been somewhat vague about air defense plans for
St. Louis, committing only to the 90mm guns. There was some speculation that the
Army chose to announce the deployment of Nike missiles because of Air Force promises
that the air approaches to St. Louis would be protected by its Tales and BOMARC
missiles.83
Four sites were chosen for the installation of Nike Hercules missile facilities
for the St. Louis area: one near Pacific, Missouri, and the three others in
Illinois, at Hecker, Marine, and Pere Marquette State Park, near Grafton. Each
site is located about 35 miles from St. Louis. The headquarters for the battalion
deployed at St. Louis was Scott Air Force Base, near Mascoutah, Illinois. The bases
were built under the supervision of the Chicago District of the Army Corps of Engineers.
One Nike Hercules battalion served the St. Louis Air Defense System. The 62nd Air
Defense Artillery, Ist Automatic Weapons Missile Battalion activated June 1, 1959,
at St. Louis, Missouri, under the command of Lt. Col. Robert H.
Zimmerman.84 It was redesignated December 20, 1965,
as the Ist Battalion, 62nd Artillery, and activated January 15, 1969, at
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Throughout this time, Scott Air Force Base (SL-20)
served as battalion headquarters. Battery A was located at Marine, Illinois (SL-10).
Battery B was at Hecker, Illinois (SL-40). Battery C was at Pacific, Missouri (SL-60),
and Battery D was located at Grafton, Illinois (SL-90). The St. Louis Defense System
was under the 5th ARADCOM Region jurisdiction until 1966, when it came under the
2nd ARADCOM Region, where it remained until the closing of the Nike bases surrounding
St. Louis in 1968.
The land for the Hecker base (SL-40) had previously been used for farming. In 1958,
the Army purchased the land from Charles "Pete" Strautz, a local farmer. The installation
encom passed a total of 227.71 acres. The three non contiguous parcels of land were
comprised of: 34.28 fee simple acres (20.12 acres for the Housing and Control Area;
14.03 acres for the Launcher Area; 0.13 acres for the well site); 193.18 easement
acres (line-of-sight and safety easements); and 0.25 acres leased for a water
line.85 According to the Disposal Plan for Base SL-40,
the acquisition cost for this site was $2,638,800. Land costs were $22,450;
improvements were $2,600,850; and personal property $15,500.
The Army began constructing Nike Missile Base SL-40 in June 1958 and finished one
year later, at which time the 62nd Artillery, Ist Missile Battalion, was activated.
M.H. Wolfe & Co. and J.J. Altman & Co. of East St. Louis were the contractors for
the Marine base (SL10). Fruin-Colman Contractors Co. ofSt. Louis was the primary
contractor for the remaining St. Louis bases, including SL-40. Warren & Van Praag,
Inc., of Decatur, Illinois, served as a consultant.86
Nike Missile Base SL-40 Hecker, Illinois
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Site overview, topographical map
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Battery Control Area Site Plan
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Launch Area Site Plan
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Site Descriptions
The buildings and structures at each Nike base were organized into two basic parcels:
the Battery Control Area and the Launch Area. The Launch Area contained the underground
missile storage magazines and launch equipment, as well as buildings used for maintenance
and testing. The Battery Control Area contained the radar and computer equipment.
Housing and administration buildings, including the mess hall, barracks, and recreation
facilities, were sometimes located in a third parcel of land. More likely, however, the
housing and administration buildings were located at either the Battery Control Area or
the Launch Area, depending upon site configuration, obstructions, and the availability of
land. At Nike Missile Base C-84, the housing and administrative buildings were located
in the Launch Area. At Nike Missile Base SL-40, the Launch Area was separate from the
combined Housing, Administration, and Battery Control Area. All Nike buildings and
structures were built from standardized drawings approved by the Corps of Engineers,
which were adapted to each individual missile base.
The building descriptions and arrangements listed below are based on Nike Missile
Bases C-84 and SL-40. It must be noted, however, that structure types and numbers
varied from base to base.
Housing, Administrative, and Support Buildings
In 1955, the standard Nike Ajax battery consisted of 106 officers and enlisted men.
By 1960, that number increased to 115 men.87 The buildings
and structures that housed these crewmen were also standardized, although (like the
number ofcrewmen) there were variations. Initially, the Army considered the use of
pre-fabricated buildings for Nike installations, but the Army found that they were
unsightly and did not contribute to troop morale. As a result, the Army constructed
more substantial buildings that were of "modified emergency" type design. Typical of
most Nike missile installations, Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40 each included sentry
guardhouses, an administration building, barracks, mess hall, a basketball court, and
various storage sheds. Most of these buildings were vernacular, one-story structures
with cinder-block walls and slanted metal roofs.
Sentry Guardhouse: Sentry guardhouses -- small, square structures with
cinder-block walls -- were at the entrances to all portions of
a Nike missile base. In addition, as part of base security, two lines of fencing and a
firebreak marked the boundaries of the installation.
Administration Building: The administration building housed the administrative
support services for the base. The one-story, cin der-block building included a day room,
offices for the battery commander and officers, a supply room, a supply office,
hobby room, communications room, barber shop, mail room, restroom, and arms storage room.
Barracks: Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL40 each contained two barracks buildings,
which provided living quarters for base personnel. Typical of most Nike installations,
one barrack was for launch personnel, the other was for the battery control crewman.
The construetion drawings indicate that each barrack con tained an officers' lounge,
non-commissioned officers' lounge, several storage rooms, heater room, restroom,
shower room, and large common sleeping room. The barracks, which had cinder-block walls
and slanted roofs, were onestory buildings with "L"-shaped floor plans
Mess Hall: The mess hall was the common eating facility for personnel stationed at
the base. The building included a kitchen, dining area, storage area, and boiler room.
The building had cinder-blocks walls, a slanted roof, and two entry vestibules.
Paint and Oil Shed: The paint and oil shed was very similar in design to the
sentry guardhouse, a small square structure with cinderblock walls.
PX (Supply Store): Nike bases often included a PX (Supply Store); the store at
Nike Missile Base C-84 is a gable-roofed rectangular building, with sheet metal walls
and roofing.
Water Treatment/Sewage Facilities: Typical of all Nike missile installations,
Nike Missile Base C-84 and SL-40 both had their own water treatment and sewage facilities.
Depending on location, these base facilities might include wells, pumphouses, sewage
lagoons, holding tanks, and/or septic tanks.
Basketball Court: When not on alert, Nike crewmen reported that life at a
Nike missile installation could be tedious. In order to provide some recreational
opportunities, the Army equipped each base with a basketball court. In addition,
crewmen often played team sports, such as softball, with servicemen from other
nearby bases or with teams in the surrounding communities.
The Battery Control Area
The Battery Control Area-- often referred to as the
Integrated Fire Control (IFC) Area included all of the necessary radar, computer,
and control equipment needed to detect and identify a target, and to launch and guide a
missile to intercept that target. In general, the Battery Control Area was located
on higher terrain that was relatively level and well-drained. Since this area contained
all of the Nike system's radar equipment, the location also had to be free of any
visual obstructions such as trees, radio towers, power and telephone lines, and smoke
stacks.88
The Battery Control Area required a minimum of ten servicemen to operate, and was the
focal information and communications point for the battery. Communication cables
connected the various elements within the Battery ControlArea, as well as with the
Launch Area. The major structures within the Battery Control Area included:
Battery Control Trailer: The Army originally designed Nike to be a mobile
system that would be suitable for use with a field army. As deployed for continental
air defense, Nike bases were permanent installations. However, the
military still wanted the system to be suitable for field use. As a result, the key
pieces of the Nike weapon system's radar, launch, and battery control equipment were
in mobile trailers connected through communications cables. Other trailers were used
for spare parts, maintenance, and antenna equipment. "It appeared more reasonable,"
noted an Army training manual, "to adapt the mobile equipment for use in a fixed type
of installation rather than to redesign the equipment specifically for fixed
installations. The latter would be costly and time-consuming and it offered no promise
of operation improvement or substantial ultimate economy.89
The battery control trailer was at the heart of the Nike missile system. The Army
equipped the trailer so that it would provide the battery control officer all the
information required to direct the battery. The trailer contained the battery control
console assembly, the acquisition radar cabinet assembly, the computer assembly, an
early warning plotting board, an event recorder, and a switchboard cabinet assembly.
From this trailer, the battery commander directed the acquisition of targets and the
firing of the missiles. The acquisition radar operator and computer operator also were
stationed in the battery control trailer.90
(Note: Prior to the recordation of Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40, all equipment
and control trailers were removed.)
Radar Control Trailer: The radar control trailer (often referred to as the
central tracking trailer) housed the target radar console as sembly, the
missile-tracking radar console assembly, the radar power cabinet assembly,
the radar range and receiver cabinet assembly, and additional equipment
associated with the target and missile-tracking radars. The targettrack console
assembly provided the control and displays necessary for the operation of the
target-tracking radar. The missile-track console assembly provided the control
and displays for the operation of the missile-tracking radar.91
Generally, the battery control trailer and the radar control trailer were positioned
back-toback, which allowed easy access to both trailers by operating personnel.
The maximum distance between the trailers was 25 feet.92
Low-Power Acquisition Radar (LOPAR): The LOPAR search radar was composed of the
acquisition antenna, receiver, and transmitter. The radar rotated constantly at a
predetermined speed. Through the acquisition radar scope, the battery commander
(or battery control officer) received a pictorial image of a potential enemy target
coming within range of the Nike installation. The battery commander, through
electronic interrogation, could determine whether the target was "friend or foe."
Generally, Nike radars were mounted directly onto concrete pads. In some cases,
because of visual obstructions, it was necessary to mount the radars on towers.
These towers consisted of steel-reinforced concrete columns sheathed in aluminum
for even heat distribution.93
The acquisition radar was positioned between the target-tracking and
missile-tracking radars, although not in exact line with them.
High-Power Acquisition Radar (HIPAR): This radar, which was installed at
Nike installations equipped with Hercules missiles, was capable of locating targets
at much higher altitudes than the LOPAR system. Since a ballistic missile or
high-speed plane may not have been detected until it entered the antenna beam,
high-altitude coverage was necessary to give adequate reaction time to allow for
an intercept at a safe distance. Some bases also included an Alternate Battery
Acquisition Radar (ABAR).94 The HIPAR was often
located on a support and tripod structure, often as high as
50 feet. A dome-shaped cover, known as a radome, surrounded the radar and various antennas.
There were usually three types of antennas: the main, omni, and auxiliary antennas.
HIPAR Equipment Building: This building was adjacent to the HIPAR system and
housed electronic equipment necessary to operate and maintain the HIPAR radar.
Target Tracking Radar: The target-tracking radar tracked the enemy aircraft's
range, direction, and elevation, and transmitted this electronically to the computer.
The radar composed of the tracking antenna, receiver, and transmitter.
Missile-Tracking Radar: This radar was very similar in appearance and operation
to the target-tracking radar. The missile-tracking radar tracked the missile throughout
its flight, continuously sent that information to the Nike installation's computer system.
In turn, the computer transmitted steering commands to the missile through the
missile-tracking radar to direct the missile toward its predicted intercept point with
the target. Continuous commands were sent to the missile to correct evasive actions by
the target. When target and missile converged, the missile was detonated and the
missile-tracking radar automatically transferred to the next missile readied for firing.
Generator Building: The generator building housed diesel-driven generators for
power to operate the area during periods when commercial power was not available.
Transform ers were mounted outside the building for utilization of commercial power.
Commercial power, with electrical converters to change 60cycle power to 400-cycle
power, was utilized where available. Power source switching con trol also was provided
at this point.
Radar Collimation Mast Assembly: The radar collimation mast assembly was composed
of:
- the radar test, which had two track-radar frequency band generators;
- the radar collimation mast, which was usually about 60 feet tall;
- the targethead assembly;
- and cross arms, for correcting bore-sight.
The mast assembly was used for collimating (adjusting the line-ofsight), testing, and
adjusting the missile-track ing and target-tracking radars. Typically, the mast
assembly was located approximately 600 feet from the missile-tracking radar and
the target-tracking radar. Spatially, the mast assembly and the two tracking radars
formed a tall triangle.
Launch Area
The Launch Area provided for the maintenance, storage, testing, and firing of the
Nike missiles. The selection of this area was primarily influenced by the relatively
large amount of land required, its suitability to extensive underground construction,
and the need to maintain a clear line-of-sight between the missiles in the Launch
Area and the missile-tracking-radar in the Battery Control
Area.95 At Nike Missile
Base SL-40, the Launch Area included a sentry guardhouse, a ready building for the crew,
a water treatment building, a missile test and assembly building, a warheading building,
a generator building, a canine kennel, an acid fueling station, an acid storage shed,
and three missile launching sections, each equipped with four missile launchers.
An estimated 21 men, including the launching control officer and the section chief,
operated launch control. Ofthese, six missile crew members manned each of the three
launching sections.96
The following descriptions are based on the launch areas at Nike Missile Bases C-84
and SL-40. As noted above, actual launch site buildings and arrangements varied
throughout the Nation.
Launch Control Trailer (LCT): The
launch control trailer contained the necessary equipment to function as the control
center between the battery control trailer and the launching sections. Similar in
appearance to the battery control and radar trailers in the Battery ControlArea,
the launch control trailer contained the launching control panel, the launching
control switchboard, and test responder. Included within the launching control panel
were the controls, displays, and communications equipment that were needed to
supervise and monitor the launching sections, and to act as a relay station between
the launching sections and the Battery Control
Area.97
Missile Test and Assembly Building: Missiles arrived at Nike bases unassembled
and unarmed, as peacetime Interstate Commerce Commission restrictions prevented the
transporting of ready missiles from a central assembly site.98
In the Missile Assembly and Test Building and its adjacent hardstand, Nike crews
uncrated, assembled, and tested the missiles. Missile "assembly" referred primarily
to the installation of the missile control fins, main fins, ailerons, and fairings.
The missile's hydraulic and propulsion systems were also checked. The crew
visually inspected the various components and lines of both systems for correct
assembly and serviceable condition. Crewmen also ran leak tests on the missiles'
lines and components.99
Following the system tests, the crew performed a complete missile test. In preparation
for this test, crewmen connected the missile to an external source of hydraulic
power and to the radio frequency and electrical test sets. The missile was then
operated from these external sources. In effect, the missile was made to perform as
it would in flight and its performance was carefully observed. After this test, the crew
connected the missile to a compressed air source, and both the hydraulic air tank
and the propulsion air tank were pressurized. The crew installed a charged battery
in the missile guidance section, and conducted a pressure test to assure that it
was properly sealed.100 The Missile Test and Assembly
Building had two large, garage-like doors at either end, through which the missiles
were rolled in and out. In addition to the main test and assembly
room, the building included a stock room, first aid room, restroom, and boiler room. A
concrete walkway for missile movement connected the Missile Test and Assembly Building
with the acid fueling station.
Acid Fueling Station: At the acid fueling station, crewmen fueled and joined the
missile to the booster. The servicer that fueled the missile was a crank-operated
lift approximately 12 feet high. Crewmen hoisted the fuel onto this platform, allowing
the fuel to flow into the missile by gravity. Likewise, the acid servicer had an assembly
that automatically inverted the barrel as it was raised.101
As protection against the caustic acid, crewmen wore rubber suits during the fueling
process.
Acid Storage Shed: Located near to each acid fueling station was a metal storage
shed. Also located nearby were shower facilities, in the event of accidental contact with
dangerous chemicals and fuels.
Warheading Building: For safety in the event of explosion, the missile warheading
operations were also performed at the acid fueling
station, which was encircled by an earthen berm approximately eight to ten feet high.
The warheading process basically involved installing two arming devices, the warheads,
and connecting these components with the detonating cord.102
At Nike Missile Base SL-40, which had Nike Hercules missiles, the crew attached the
warheads in the Warheading Building, which was located near the fueling station. Nike
Missile Base C-84, which was equipped only with Ajax missiles, did not include a separate
Warheading Building. This was typical of most Nike Ajax installations. For example,
when Nike Missile Base SF-88L near San Francisco was equipped solely with Nike Ajax
missiles, the missile test, assembly, and warheading activities all took place within
the same structure. After the base acquired Hercules missiles, crewmen used a
prefabricated metal building for missile test and assembly, and a separate building for
warheading.
Underground Storage Magazines and Launcher-Loader Assemblies: Although they were
originally designed to hold six magazines, Nike Bases C-84 and SL-40 each had only
three underground storage areas, designated as letters A through C. Each unit had
associated launch pads, access areas, and ground electrical units. The magazine pad
had a double elevator door, which swung down to open. Stairways led to the double-door
main entrances to the magazines. (Access to many Nike maga zines was solely via armored
hatches and vertical ladders. The staircases were later additions, which many Nike
installations never received.) Emergency escape hatches, with counter-weights for
easy opening, led from the underground personnel rooms to the inside. The magazines
were made of reinforced concrete; fresh air was provided via a ventilation unit.
Each unit also had several ventilator shafts.
Each underground unit contained a room for storing the missiles (the magazine room),
an elevator to carry the missiles to the surface for firing, and four launcher-loader
assemblies. Three of the launchers, numbers 2 through 4, were permanently emplaced
above the ground and were referred to as satellite launchers. The fourth launcher
(number 1) was mounted on the elevator. When the elevator was in its lowered position,
the missile crew pushed a missile and booster from the storage racks onto the launcher
on the elevator. When the elevator was raised, the missile and booster on the elevator
could be pushed from the elevator launcher onto the satellite launchers. Nike crewmen
could operate the elevator, which could be raised, lowered, or stopped, via a master
control station in the magazine room, from the controls on the elevator, or from the
launching section control panel in the personnel room. Hydraulic power operated the
elevator, and the doors were supplied by an elevator assembly power unit in the magazine
room.103
During "alert stages," servicemen stationed at Nike Missile Base SL-40 stayed in the
personnel room of the underground launch area. The personnel room, which was equipped
with bunks, was separated from the magazine by three blast-proof doors. An emergency
escape hatch provided direct access to the outside. During an alert, after a launching
section was placed "on deck," the launcher crews completed their checks of the missiles
and launchers and went to the underground personnel room for
safety.104 (Most Nike magazines apparently did not
have personnel rooms. The crew stayed in a nearby "ready room" within quick response
distance. The only protected room was a small "panel room" that contained the section
control panel and just enough space for a crew to stay in during actual launch.)
Generator Building: At Nike Missile Bases C-84 and SL-40, electric power for
the underground magazines was supplied by 150-kilowatt, 60-cycle diesel generators,
or commercial sources when available. Direct 60-cycle power
was used for the elevator. Where 400-cycle power was required, the 60-cycle power was
converted to 400-cycle power by means of frequency converters (changers).
Ready Building: The Launch Area at Nike Missile Base St-40 was located
approximately one and one-fourth mile from the combined Housing, Administration,
and Battery Control Area. As a result, the Launch Area also included a ready building
for the crewmen. Typical of most Nike base buildings, the ready build was a vernacular,
one-story structure with cinder-block walls. The building included a squad room, a dining
and day room, toilet, and heater room.
Canine Kennel Area: Guard dogs were an important part of a Nike missile base's
security system, as military patrolman and dogs patrolled the base. At Nike Missile Base
SL-40, the kennel was a small, gable-roofed, metal building surrounded by chain link and
barbed wire fencing. The kennel held training equipment, leashes, dog food, and grooming
tools. Nike canine areas also often included a dog training area equipped with jumps
and barricades.
Nike Missile Base - SL-40
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Nike Operations
The Nike system was part of the joint American-Canadian North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) and the U.S. Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD). Within NORAD,
the Canadian and American air forces were responsible for detecting, identifying
(as friend or foe), and destroying or turning back targets. The detection phase began
with the idenntification of intruders through the Distant Early Waring radar system,
commonly known as the DEW Line. The DEW Line, designed to give warning of hostile aircraft
approaching from the north, consisted of a net of radar stations near the 69' north
parallel that initially extended from northwestern Alaska to northeatern Canada.
The United States and Canada jointly built and operated the DEW Line. The DEW Line
became operational on July 31, 1957, extended to the Aleutian Islnnds in 1969,
and across Greenland in 1961. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force provided sea flanks for
the DEW Line with radar-equipped aircraft operating from the Aleutian Islands to the
mid-Pacific and from Newfoundland to the mid-Atlantic. The DEW Line provided up to six
hours of advance warning of aircraft penetrating the northern hemisphere, complementary
to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), which since June 1961 had been
on guard to detect approaching ballistic missiles.
The DEW Line also alerted the back-up defenses of NORAD, including the Mid-Canada
(55th parallel) and the Pine Tree (49th parallel) radar warning and control lines.
The MidCanada Line was about 600 miles to the south, built and manned by Canada, and
used Doppler detection equipment. The U.S. contiguous radar system was extended
offshore by the Navy, as well as by Air Force radar-equipped aircraft. In the Atlantic
Ocean, Air Force radar platforms (Texas Towers) were part of a system that was tied
together by a communication network terminating in the NORAD command post.
The Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), an Air Force command and control
system, received all data from these radar networks. SAGE centers were located
in several sectors and attempted to identify the intruders and transmit intruder
locations to the appropriate Air Force and ARADCOM control and
direction centers. Hypothetically, when an enemy intruder entered the band of contiguous
radar coverage overlapping the United States Canadian border, SAGE would initiate attack
by sending fighter-interceptor squadrons and launching BOMARC missiles. If the area
defense provided by these weapons failed, SAGE continued tracking the intruder and
passed this information to ARAACOM Nike fire units. Nike batteries then came into play
as "the ultimate defense" of the protected localities.105
Once notified of an intruder, ARAACOM would alert the appropriate Army Air Defense
Command Post which, in turn, would designate one or more Nike batteries to attack
the incoming target. The Nike system utilized a command guidance type of control
system that revolved around the use of several types of radars and a computer.
The target was initially picked up by the Nike acquisition radars, the LOPAR
(low-power radar) or HIPAR (high-power radar in the Hercules) systems. From the
information provided by the acquisition radar, the target-tracking radar acquired
the designated target and tracked it throughout the engagement. The missile-tracking
radar locked on the missile prior to firing, and tracked that missile throughout its
entire flight.106
The two tracking radars fed target and missile position data into a computer located
in the battery control trailer. Using this informa tion, the computer continuously
determined a predicted point of intercept and issued the steering orders that guided
the missile toward that point. At the point of "highest kill probability," the computer
issued a burst order to the missile. This order simultaneously detonated the three
warheads in the Nike Ajax, and the single warhead in the Nike Hercules. The computer
transmitted this order to the missile through the missile-tracking radar.
The battery control officer, stationed in the battery control trailer, received
all of the infermation and controls necessary to engage the enemy target. A series
of lights and a meter showed the officer the number of missiles prepared for firing,
and the progress of the fire unit in accomplishing the steps necessary to prepare
and fire the missile. Prior to firing, the predicted point of intercept and the
current position of the target were continuously displayed on two plotting boards
in the battery control trailer. With this information, and knowing the rules of
engagement and the restricted areas, the battery control officer determined the
most advantageous time to fire the missile. After the missile was fired, the two
plotting boards illustrated the course of the target and the missile flight path.
These plots provided the battery control officer with a graphic presentation of the
missile and target flight paths. Controls necessary for premature or delayed
detonation of the warheads were incorporated into the system.
The Nike system operated with four batter ies in one battalion. Each battery could
acquire and track targets, as well as launch and control missiles. Each battery had
three underground storage facilities, which had the capa bility of firing one missile
from the elevator/launcher and three others from satellite launchers loaded from
the same facility. As sophisticated as the Nike missile was, however, each battery
could only track and fire one missile at a time.
Firing a Missile
Once the Army Air Defense Command Post received word of an impending attack, it
notified its battalions. As the target entered the range of the acquisition radar
and the missiles at each battery readied for launch, a "blue alert" status sounded,
signalling that all personnel should go to battle stations. Three missiles were
brought above ground, one at a time, on the elevator, and pushed to the satellite
launchers and locked in place with pins. The fourth missile was brought to the surface
on the elevator, where it could also be launched.107
The chief of the launching section removed the air regulator safety pin and the
missile support yoke safety pin. The launching crew checked for stray voltage and
continuity at the detonator receptacle on the launchers with the squib (or detonator)
tester. If test readings were within acceptable tolerances, the launching crew made
the connections and removed the booster squib shorting plug. The chief of the section
then announced over the intercom: "Launcher 1, 2, 3, and 4 ready."
An Army film on Nike Hercules provides a visual re-creation of the firing of a
missile. Safety was the central theme stressed in the film. Among the precautions
that were employed were a series of color-coded streamers attached to critical
plugs and keys. For example, red streamers were attached to those mechanical parts
that had to be removed before the missile could be launched. Even when the streamers
were removed, personnel had to use special keys to unlock the "awesome power" of the
missile system.108
After preparing the missiles for launch and checking the area to ensure all
personnel were below, the section chief descended into the underground personnel
room, closing the escape hatch cover behind him. The section chief then entered
the magazine room, closed the vents, and returned to the personnel room, securing
blast-proof doors. He checked the pin board to ensure that all the safety pins and
the booster squib shorting plug were present. At that time, he also inserted the
crew safety keys and placed them in the "fire" position. At the launching control
console, there was a green "ready" light for each section, and a green numbered
launcher identification light for each section in action. The "missile prepared"
meters for each section indicated the number of missiles ready for launch in each
section.
As the target came within range of the acquisition radar, the battery control
officer corroborated the target appearing on the plan position indicator with the
early warning plot data received from the Air Defense Command Post. At this time,
the alert status switched from blue to red. The battery control officer and the
acquisition radar operator designated the target to the target-tracking radar,
and interrogated it by using the identification friend-or-foe facilities on the console.
The missiles were then raised to a vertical position. The missile-tracking radar
shifted to the designated missile and cast its electronic beam onto it. The battery
control officer determined the proper time to fire the missile using the plotting
board information, his knowledge of the defense area, the geographic limitation of
his field of fire, and the method of engagement directed by the Army Air Defense
Command Post. The "ready to fire" lamp in the battery control console presented a
visual summary of the state of readiness of the guidance and launching area. When
the missile-tracking radar and target-tracking radar engaged, the computer was on
line, and the target identified as the enemy, the "ready to fire" lamp changed from
amber to green. After these events, the battery control officer could fire the missile.
If necessary, he could also designate the target as friendly aircraft, by pressing the
"friend" button at the acquisition radar control panel. The battery control officer
could also designate a new target that had priority by placing the "designate-abandon"
switch in the "abandon" position. If the target was abandoned, the battery control
officer had to designate a new target.
Historian Merle T. Cole,
in his description of a Nike installation in the Maryland air defense area
[W-25:
The Davidsonville Site and Maryland Air Defense, 1950-1974],
described the order in which the missiles were fired:
-
During a fire mission the missile on the elevator-launcher of one launching section is
fired, followed by the missile on the elevator-launcher on the [second and third
sections]. Using this sequence each section can reload the elevator-launcher
while the other two sections are firing, and consequently maintain the maximum
rate of fire. This procedure is followed as long as missiles are available
in the undergroond Imagazinesj. When these have been exhausted, the three
missiles located on satellite launchers at each section are fired as
desired by the commander.109
When the battery control officer operated the "fire" button, the missile launched.
Four seconds after "missile away," the computer ordered the missile to execute a
7g dive (1g is equal to
32.2 feet/second/second). At the same time, the computer
modified this order, if necessary, to insure that the missile ground path was parallel
to the line between the launcher and the intercept point. Steering orders were
transmitted to the missile via the missile-tracking radar. At a predetermined
interval before the time of intercept, the "burst" signal was transmitted
to the missile, and an arming device detonated the
warheads.110
The Nike system could fire one missile per minute for one hour against targets
at moderate ranges (approximately 25,000 yards) and, if required, two missiles
per minute for short periods against short-range targets (approximately 15,000 yards).
Actual rates, however, varied according to prevailing
circumstances.111
Nike crewmen needed a minimum of 36 seconds to launch the first missile. This
included approximately 30 seconds to acquire, identify, designate, and track
a target; four seconds for computer settle; and two seconds for the fixed time
interval between the initial fire order command and missile launch. A new missile
could be launched approximately 11 seconds after the bursting or abandonment of
the previous missile. After the previous target has been tracked, the acquisition
radar operator was free to examine and interrogate any new targets.
There were two situations in which a missile could be rejected. Either the
missile-tracking radar failed to get an adequate signal response from the missile,
or the missile did not fire within five seconds aRer the "fire" command signal.
As soon as the red "reject" lamp lit, the elevator was lowered, and the rejected
missile was removed; another missile was then loaded onto the elevator launcher.
Training and Inspection
The Army Air Defense Command instructed its commanders to:
1) Maintain 25 percent of all Nike batteries so that they were "capable of launching
one effectively controlled missile within fifteen (15) minutes of receipt of
signal or warning, and of maintaining sustained fire until the supply of ready
missiles is exhausted;"
2) Ensure that 50 percent of all batteries were "capable of launching one effectively
controlled missile within thirty (30) minutes of receipt of signal or warning, and
of maintaining sustained fire until the supply of ready missiles is exhausted;" and
3) Allow 25 percent of all batteries to be on a training and maintenance cycle,
retaining the "capability of returning to an operational status within two (2)
hours of receipt of signal or warning.112
These alert-status measures had a far-reaching effect. As a result, Nike bases
assumed a combat-like readiness, as 15-minute status permeated the atmosphere.
A siren meant an exercise, a readiness test, or an attack; one never knew. As Nike
units had to meet these requirements 24 hours a day, they assumed an ever-increasing
feeling of responsibility for the Nation's defense.
All personnel for Nike batteries trained at the Army Air Defense Center at
Fort Bliss, Texas. At the center, Nike personnel studied each element of the
Nike system. Commanders learned the overall operation of the missile system
and their responsibilities. Radar personnel trained on radar equipment, and each
battery underwent a series of tests. Nike personnel also participated in test
firings of missiles at White Sands Missile Range, which occupied approximately
1,200 square miles of desert land in New Mexico. No Nike missile was ever fired
from a U.S. installation, other than for training purposes at White Sands. The
only exceptions were firings in Alaska to test the operation of Nike equipment
under cold weather conditions. The Army also conducted live firing exercises in
Okinawa, for Nike crews stationed in the Far East.
Annual service practice, also called short notice annual practice, began July 1961
to enable batteries to fire a missile and to test their proficiency. As part of this
practice, batteries
traveled to Fort Bliss on only 48-hour notice. Once there, the units had one week to set
up equipment, assemble, emplace, and fire their assigned missiles. Because batteries
were selected at random, no one ever knew when they would be called and, therefore,
could not "cram." Therefore, each battery had to maintain a high state of readiness.
Competition for the annual high score was intense.113
When not participating in annual practice -- or unless the battery was "hot,"
meaning that it was on duty 24 hours a day -- Nike servicemen often reported that
life at the missile installations could be tedious. Most Nike bases
did have a basketball court to relieve excess energy. Sometimes, softball teams would
play against teams in the community, or football teams would be set up within the Army
to play one another.114
Inspections, planned or unplanned, broke up some of the monotony. From its
inception, ARAACOM relied heavily on inspections to
deternime the effectiveness of its units. There were two types of inspections.
The first was a formal command inspection of all assigned units conducted by
the commanding general. The second consisted of an instruction visit by staff
officers to units which required emphasis in some particular facet of
training.115
Another type of inspection, which tested the firing units, was a "Blazing Skies"
alert. These inspections could be either scheduled or surprise alerts, and sometimes
occurred as often as once a week. As part of the alert, a randomly chosen aircraft
entering the defense area was designated as an intruder, and all firing procedures,
short of missile launch, were performed. In addition, the Air Force Strategic Air
Command and the Aerospace Defense Command periodically provided "faker" aircraft to
simulate enemy aircraft for battery training. The Strategic Air Command combat
crews benefited from these exercises, as they were also scored on target run and
evasion techniques.116
DEACTIVATION
Nike Missile Base C-84 closed in 1963, one of the first bases deactivated in the
Chicago-Gary Defense Area. As reported by the Chicago Tribune, the Nike Ajax base, which
was manned by the National Guard, was closed because it could not accommodate the
larger Nike Hercules missiles. Several other Nike installations in the Chicago area
-- including bases in Naperville, Munster (Indiana) and at the Argonne National
Laboratories -- had also been manned by National Guard units. However, since these
other bases converted to Nike Hercules missiles, they remained active until
1971.117
On June 10, 1963, Lake County began leasing Nike Missile Base C-84 from the
U.S. Army for the purposes of civil defense, records storage, and as an auxiliary
highway department site. The Army declared the property government surplus in 1964.
On November 26, 1965, the Government Services Administration quitclaimed the 26.87
fee simple acres and the 0.18 acre access and utility easements to the County of Lake,
Nike Missile Base C-84, Barrington, Illinois
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Site overview
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Launch Area Site Plan
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Nike Missile Base SL-40 Hecker, Illinois
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Site overview, topographical map
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Battery Control Area Site Plan
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Launch Area Site Plan
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Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules Missile Drawings
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Underground Storage Magazine and Launcher-Loader
Assemblies - Plan and Section
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Nike Missile Base - SL-40
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