Over a year before the preliminary field test program ended, thePlanning Conference recognised the need for a study on the nature,extent, and requirements for the final system tests. These testsrepresented the greatest single jump in complexity during the wholecourse of the program, because the entire system loop was to beclosed for the first time. In addition, many auxiliary facilitieswere required to implement the test. More generally, it wasnecessary to determine what the system tests should discover and howthis discovery could best be made with only a limited number of testvehicles. Accordingly, a System Test Committee was appointed, whichdrew up a series of plans for the system tests. In such acomplicated endeavor, it was not to be supposed that these planscould be adhered to in absolute detail; however, they were followedrather closely and served as a guide throughout the program.
As a result of this continued planning effort, the project founditself in the fall of 1951 with a system which had been fullycomponent-tested in the field, with the additional systems componentsand gear ready and completely laboratory tested, the test equipmentand instrumentation readied for use, and the test plans already laid.
To implement the procedure set forth in the test plans, it wasnecessary to have, first, a target through which the system loopcould be closed; second, a carefully designed net of instrumentationcapable of furnishing all the data required; and finally, suitabletest-firing circuits for coordinating all elements of the overalltest system.
When the Target-Computer-Missile control loop was to be closed forthe first time, the most cautious procedure conceivable would havecalled for establishing a motionless target sufficiently high abovethe ground to insure a clear radar localization unhampered by groundreflection influences. Artificial radar targets carried by tetheredballoons or slowly falling and drifting parachutes were consideredbut later abandoned as involving undesirable operationalcomplications. Several of the planning conferences occupiedthemselves with many details of the entire test target problem. Thevalue or significance of "proving" the NIKE system loop against aspace-fixed target prior to its extensive tests against flyingtargets was extolled by some and disputed by others.
It was realised that the terminal phase of tracking a missiletowards a ground target would be disturbed by ground reflections.[page 103]
Therefore, no ground target shots could be regarded as trulyrepresentative of the situation prevailing in the "end game" againstan airborne target. Eventually the controversy was resolved by acompromise decision to fire the first and at least one more missiletowards a fixed ground target located by a topographical survey, withthe missile steering orders zeroed at two seconds before impact sothat spurious orders would be avoided.
To implement this plan,a two-panel corner reflector, about sixteenfeet high, was set up on a slight rise of ground at a point aboutseven degrees west and 31,000 yards north of the NIKE radar stationsite. The reflector could be seen by the radar so that the radarsight angles could be statically checked against the topographicalsurvey, and they agreed within a fraction of an angular mil and a fewyards. However, there remained dynamic perturbations due to groundeffects. To avoid them in the ground target firing tests, the targetposition data were fed to the computer in the form of known surveycoordinates rather than by locking on the reflector, the main purposebeing to verify the proper functioning of the missile tracking andguidance system and to demonstrate that the entire apparatus was nowready to take on flying targets.
The necessity of testing the NIKE system against flying aircrafttargets was recognised in the beginning of the project. As far backas the September 1948 Planning Conference, a proposal to fire anumber of test missiles at live aircraft as flying targets wasaccepted as an indispensable partial objective of the NIKE systemtests. The chance of an incapacitating hit, even without combatwarhead, was deemed too great a risk to consider firing at a mannedaircraft. Hence, unmanned, remotely-controlled drones had to beadopted despite their complications, cost and operationallimitations.
Since the NIKE system was designed to combat bombers of thefuture, at the time of the system tests no aircraft of typical targetperformance was yet available, much less a remotely controllabledrone capable of serving as a target. A study of the relative meritsand shortcomings of various types of target drones in service led tothe compromise choice of two types of targets. One was the QB-17Gdrone modification of the Flying Fortress bomber, which would berepresentative in size but deficient in speed, altitude andmaneuverability; and the other was the QF-80 drone version of theShooting Star fighter, which would come closer to the desired targetspeed range, though it was too small to represent a typical bomberand still deficient in altitude capability. An effort was made toobtain both types of drones, but the fighter type (QF-80) did notactually become available in time for the system tests. (QF-80drones did become available shortly afterward and were successfullyused as targets in a number of NIKE I firings.) Hence, all aerialtarget firing had to be directed against QB-17 aircraft, which servedtheir purpose most capably though within the limitations dictated bytheir speed, range, ceiling, and maneuverability. Even so, theadaptation of QB-17 drones turned out to be a major effort, requiringthem to be equipped with improved autopilots, with automaticmaneuvering programmers, with additional radio gear, and withspecially developed photographic scoring cameras. These preparationswere completed between 1950 and the fall of 1951.
During the course of the earlier field firings, a great number ofinstrumentation facilities had been built up, many of them associatedwith regular Proving Ground activities. Among these were theBowen-Knapp camera which followed the boost and separation phases ofthe trajectory; the Askania and Mitchell phototheodolites which hadlong furnished the project with its basic trajectory data; thevarious
high-power telescopic cameras which had proved of great value inanalysing trouble conditions; and the various telemetry stations. Inaddition to these sources, however, it was necessary to introduceother instruments especially adapted to the rather rigorousrequirements of the system tests.
The instruments used in these tests had to fulfill a number ofoverlapping but distinct functions. One basic function was toprovide in each round a determination of the miss - not only thevector miss distance at burst, but also an adequate knowledge of therelative trajectory of the missile and drone in the neighborhood ofintercept. Another function of the instrumentation net was to allowa detailed and quantitative analysis of successful rounds, so thatthe contributions of the major system components and the balancesamong them might be accurately appraised. In the event of roundsless than wholly successful, it was necessary to be able to tracedown the design features which were at fault and to determine thenature of needed improvements. Finally, in the case ofmalfunctioning rounds, the instrumentation had to be of asufficiently fine mesh to allow quick isolation of the cause of thefailure. To fulfill the functions outlined above,a correspondinglyelaborate set of instruments was required. The terminal portion ofthe trajectory where great accuracy was demanded was derived mainlyfrom the ground-based IGOR (Intercept Ground-Station OpticalRecorder) camera system and from the drone-borne ITOR (InterceptTarget Optical Recorder) camera system. Both of these systems werecapable of meeting the ten-foot accuracy requirement on the point ofburst, which was tokened by the detonation of a spotting charge inthe missile. In addition, to the extremely accurate account of theend game, reasonably precise trajectory data on both missile anddrone were required throughout the flight. Here, major reliance wasplaced on the phototheodolites, on the boresight cameras attached tothe tracking radars, on plotting board data derived from radarmeasurements, and on the continually photographed records of thecomputer dials which repeated the radar position data. The abilityto analyze completely the performance of a given round required, inaddition, a knowledge of what was going on inside the missile.Accordingly, all of the rounds, except for five with live warheads,carried telemetry sets which gave a continuous record throughout theflight of the various functions associated with propulsion, guidance,and control.
There remained the problem of ground guidance equipment consistingessentially of the two radars and the computer. The operation of theradars could be reconstructed from three sources of data. The firstof these was the continuous photographic record obtained throughtelescopes attached to and boresighted with the radars. The secondwas the photographic records of the computer dials which followed theradar position inputs to the computer. The third was the account ofthe internal functioning of the radars as recorded on eighteenchannels of pen oscillograph recording all the important functions,not only of the radars themselves but also of the communication linkfrom the missile radar to the missile. Accurate monitoring of thebeacon responses and the computer orders transmitted by the radar waspossible by such instrumentation
The many complex functions performed in the computer were recordedin several ways. An oscillograph pen recorder ("events recorder")gave an account of various discrete events in the course of theflight, such as the end of the turn phase and the initiation of theburst. In addition, eighteen pen channels gave informationsufficiently detailed so that computer operation throughout theflight could be completely reconstructed.
A completely instrumented system of this complexity, involvingmany agencies with personnel at many locations over the ProvingGround range, demanded excellent coordination at the time of firingto assure that the target, instrumentation, and and system properwere ready for the test firing. The system test firing circuits weretherefore organised in such a way that the overall system was brokendown into a number of well-defined areas of responsibility. TheProject Commander, who directed the operation and actually orderedthe missile to be fired, had reporting to him three control officers,each of whom was responsible for bringing his section of equipment orinstruments to readiness prior to firing..One of these sectionscomprised the radars and the computer; another the missile operation;and the third the drone operation, range safety, and rangeinstrumentation. Each position in the firing organization wasprovided with visual indication of events only in its immediatesphere of interest. The system was designed to provide adequatecommunication by means of telephone circuits and lamps between theProject Commander and his auxiliary officers, and between each ofthem and the units under their control. Inter-locking firingcircuits were designed so that, unless all stations were ready, thefire order could not be transmitted.
This arrangement proved to be entirely satisfactory, and a greatdeal of valuable experience was gained (which benefited the eventualdesign of the NIKE I fire-control equipment).
As stated earlier, the NIKE R&D System was designedspecifically for test purposes, with provision for instrumentationand observation wherever possible. It was neither a quantityproduction design nor a fully tactical equipment, the latterobjective being the goal of the NIKE I version which was getting ontoits stride concurrently. Convincing as they were, the system testsdid not and could not prove or explore the performance boundaries ofNIKE, chiefly because of the speed and altitude limitations of theavailable target drones. Though restricted in number to less thanany fair statistically representative sample, they covered thecentral part of the speed, altitude and maneuvering range for thewhole gamut of approach aspects with such good results that modestextrapolation of lethality to somewhat larger ranges than testedseemed obviously justified. To what extent unexpected phenomenamight be encountered at extremes of altitude or other parametersremained to be experienced or explored on future occasions. On theother hand, at the long-range moderate end of a coasting flight,previous tests had already shown the missile to be controllable inthe transonic and subsonic areas down to much lower speeds than hadbeen assumed at the time of the AAGM report.
In the course of the initial R&D System Test firing program,twenty-three rounds were fired. These tests, of course, were onlythe beginning, since firings continued with the tactical NIKE Imissile after the R&D rounds were expended. The results here,however, are confined to those rounds fired during the first systemdemonstration, Naturally, no single event or test shot was intendedto be representative of anything like the "proof of the pudding".Indeed, even the whole of the system test with its various facetscould do no more than convey a picture of the results of some sixyears R&D effort, the ultimate objective of which was todemonstrate the feasibility of a command-guided missile system.
General information on the circumstances and results of the 23test rounds is given in the accompanying table, entitled "Summary ofSystem Test Rounds."1 In examiningthis summary sheet, it becomes evident that the rounds to bediscussed fall into three sharply definable categories. Category 1includes those rounds for which there was no evidence of malfunctioneither in the ground equipment or the missile-borne gear. InCategory 2 belong those rounds for which some known malfunctionexisted, the deficiencies of which were directly and definitelytraceable to this malfunction. Category 3 comprises those roundsthat were unsuccessful, as far as the system was concerned, becauseof some missile component failure. Of these three categories,Category 1 is of the greatest significance and will be discussedfirst.
The rounds of category 1 divide into two groups-two rounds (67 and73) fired at a ground target, and seven rounds fired at aerialdrones.
The first firing at the ground target occurred at WSPG on 15November 1951. It was a high point in the history of the NIKE system,marking the first time-six years after the inception of theproject-that the NIKE system loop was closed in the field. Theresult of this 18-mile firing was completely successful with themissile passing at a distance of 46 feet from the corner reflector atthe ground target. (An analysis of the test data furnished assurancethat the system was ready to take to the air. Consequently, severalrounds were fired against aerial drones before returning to theattack of a ground target.) The second ground-target firing (round73) on 18 December 1951 was equally successful, with the missilepassing 38 feet from the corner reflector. In both these ground-target firings, large variations in the elevation position of themissile occurred shortly before intercept, as had beenexpected.2 These variations resultedfrom ground reflections at low-elevation angles. Partly on theiraccount and partly to insure a spotting charge detonation aboveground, the time of the burst with respect to intercept had beenadvanced in the computer. Accordingly, valid burst time were notdetermined for these rounds, and the miss figures shown in theforegoing table are those of the closest approach of the missilecourse to the target.
The first firing of a NIKE at an airborne target took place on 27November 1951, when Round 69 was fired. It was an immediate success;the missile token burst appeared 57 feet from the centre of the droneflying a crossing path at a 12-mile range and 33,000 feet above sealevel (see Figure 22, Page 113). This event represented asignificant milestone, not only in NIKE history, but also in asomewhat broader sense, in that it marked the first successfulengagement of an air-target by an antiaircraft command-guided missilesystem. (The subsequent 20 tests were accomplished in fairly rapidsuccession and concluded within five months thereafter)
Other Category 1 rounds dispatched against airborne targets wereRounds 75, 76, 77, 83, 90, and 92. Although this summary sheet givesthe basic information pertaining to these rounds, it does not tellthe complete story in some instances. In the case of Round 77, forexample, the burst miss distance figure of 20 feet obscures the factthat the missile actually struck the tail assembly of the drone andcaused serious damage. Similarly, in Round 83, where a burst missdistance of 23 feet is listed, it is important
IGOR photographs of Rounds 69, 75, 77 and 83 are shown in Figures 22 through 25. These pictures are samples of photographic coverage of the intercept phase by the IGOR system of ground-based high-speed long-focus cameras developed by BRL for the purpose of insuring a pictorial record of intercept even if the drone was destroyed and ITOR films were lost. (Rounds 90 and 92 are discussed separately under "Live Warhead Firings.")
An examination of the overall results of rounds in Category 1 reveals two basically important facts. First, the miss distances vere all adequately small in the sense that the missile at burst was, in every case, generously within lethal range of the target. The second point of importance is that the command fusing appeared to be very accurate indeed. As a matter of fact, there appeared to be little likelyhood that its quality could be improved or even met by the use of influence devices.
In round 88, the warhead burst occurred about 81 feet below thebelly of the plane and a little to one side. In spite of this largemiss distance, however, the bottom of wings and fuselage werepunctured with about 170 fragment holes, a large number of whichcontinued on through the aircraft. The damage was such thatpersonnel would have been killed or wounded-in particular thebombardier probably killer-and hydraulic lines were severed. The AirForce assessor, who was present at the firings, was unable todefinitely classify the formal category of damage; however, theavailable evidence pointed to a "C" kill, which is taken here to meanthe inability of the plane or its crew to complete a successfulmission. Actually, the plane was eventually landed by remotecontrol.
Rounds 90 and 92 were quite similar in their effects. Round 90had a moderate CG to CG miss of 65 feet, while Round 92 represented aclose miss of 23 feet. Both produced immediate destruction of theaircraft ("K" kill) as illustrated in Figures 26 and 27.
These two firings represented another dramatic milestone in NIKEhistory, in that they fully demonstrated the power of NIKE as adestructive antiaircraft weapon, thus marking the culmination of theR&D program. Of equal significance is the fact that thesefirings were witnessed by a number of high-ranking Army, Navy, andAir Force officials. While Rounds 90 and 92 were spectacular andreassuring shots, little can be said concerning the mechanisms of thedamage. The crews would have been wiped out (with the possibleexception of the tail gunners); fuel fires were set; holes were boredthrough the propellers; and the structures first weakened byfragments were deformed by blast and gust. To a considerable extent,the wreckage was molten and dispersed. While the above facts may befairly summarised from the remains, little else can be said.
No statistical facts could be gleaned from these few firings;however, it was the general consensus of opinion that the time andexpense involved were eminently justified. They gave to the designand the user a sense of the power of the weapon for its task thatcould have been obtained in no other way.
In appraising the overall results of the formal R&D systemdemonstration just described, the reader should bear in mind that theprimary objective of the program up to this point was to prove in thefield that a physical system similar to that proposed in the originalAAGM Report would perform as envisioned and would, in fact, meet thespecifications imposed on it. Therefore, the system test missileemployed research and development equipment designed only todemonstrate the feasibility of the NIKE command-guided missilesystem.
For all intents and purposes, then, the overall NIKE R&DSystem demonstration could be considered a complete success, despitethe fact that only a little over 50% reliability was attained evenwhen firing under optimum test conditions. While it was apparentthat a considerable amount of engineering effort would still berequired to produce an acceptably reliable NIKE Missile and controlsystem, the R&D System Tests proved by a generous margin that theoriginal specifications could indeed be met and, in many respects,could clearly be exceeded. Moreover, these tests yielded invaluableexperimental data on several scientific problems of controllingimportance that had been the subject of much theoretical debate for anumber of years. Among these was the basic problem of obtainingsufficient radar, computer, and missile response accuracy to make acommand system effective up to the ranges contemplated for NIKE I
Even though the R&D System was neither required nor designedto be a tactical weapon as such, tactical requirements were adheredto as closely as sound scientific evaluation of the system wouldpermit. Consequently, a minimum of change was required in theaccelerated development of the first tactical guided missile systemwhich was to become the NIKE I.
1. PROJECT NIKE SYSTEM TEST REPORT, BTL & DAC, 1 September1953.
2. PROJECT NIKE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT, BTL & DAC, 1 April1954.
3. PROJECT NIKE ARMY ORDNANCE TECHNICAL LIAISON REPORTS, by LtColonel Robert E. LeRoy, ResidentArmy Ordnance Officer;
Period Covered Report No. Lib. File
Oct 51 14 R-8584
Nov 51 - Apr 52 15-20 incl. R-8585
May 52 - Jun 52 21-22 incl R-8586
4. NIKE LIAISON REPORT NO. 169, 28 Jan 52, by Lt Colonel John C.Bane, Army Field Forces Liaison Officer, BTL.
5. NIKE LIAISON REPORT NO. 170, 19 Feb 52, by Lt Colonel John C.Bane, Army Field Forces Liaison Officer, BTL.
6. PROJECT NIKE PROGRESS REPORT, BTL, 1 Dec 51 (Lib FileR-12061).
7. PROJECT NIKE PROGRESS REPORT, BTL, 1 Mar 52 (Lib FileR-16726).
8. PROJECT NIKE PROGRESS REPORT, BTL, 1 Jun 51 (Lib FileR-16727).
*Documents filed in ARGMA Technical Library (Bldg 7120) andLibrary Annex (Igloo Area).
Footnotes for Chapter 5 - NIKE R&D System Test Firing Program
1. See Appendix 7 for further detail.