(U) As stated earlier, the need for an improved air defense weapon became apparent early in 1952, during the final development stage of the NIKE AJAX missile system. The problem stemmed from limitations of the AJAX system in dealing effectively with bomber formations, the units of which were too closely packed for individual resolution by the NIKE radar. These limitations became particularly severe when the spacing between the aircraft was larger than the lethal radius of the NIKE's conventional warhead. In recognition of these shortcomings, the Special Assistant for Mobilization Production, OCO, suggested on 11 March 1952 that a study be made to determine the feasibility of providing the NIKE missile with an atomic warhead. As a result of this suggestion and a series of requests from other Army Staff elements, the Chief of Ordnance, on 9 May 1952, asked BTL to investigate the feasibility of an antiaircraft guided missile carrying an atomic warhead and using the NIKE AJAX ground guidance system.^l

(U) personnel of BTL and DAC, assisted in a consulting capacity by the Sandia Corporation and Picatinny Arsenal, completed a brief study of the problem in mid-July 1952 under the existing NIKE AJAX R&D contract (ORD-3182). They concluded that there were two equally feasible solutions to the problem, each possessing both merits and disadvantages. One would involve a rearrangement of the existing XW-9 gun-type warhead. The other solution would entail the design of a new and larger diameter (30-inch) missile which would carry the existing XW-7 warhead without modification. Experimental verification of the modified AJAX missile system could be expected 18 months after date of authorization, while for the new missile system this would require 36 months. On the other hand, the warhead of the latter system would be about three times more efficient in its use of fissionable material than that of the modified NIKE AJAX. The use of such a system, however, would involve severe operational problems, and further study of these would be required to demonstrate the ultimate utility of a system of this sort.

(U) The study group therefore recormnended that a more thorough engineering study be initiated to fill in the gaps left by the brief preliminary investigation, and to give more detailed attention to the specific design of the new and large diameter missile.² The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, on 13 August 1952, approved the proposed engineering study and authorized the use of funds available in Contract ORD-3182.³

(U) In the process of selecting the optimum air defense weapon system, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, considered many systems and components then under development. The guiding considerations in the analysis were twofold: One was the need for providing an early capability weapon at a minimum cost; the other was the necessity of using a warhead permitting great flexibility of yield and maximum economy in use of fissionable material. At the time of the analysis, the NI1CE AJAX guided missile system had reached a fairly advanced and successful stage of development, and locations were being selected for establishment of defense sites throughout the country. It was therefore natural, for every technical, economical, and military reason, to consider primarily the use of a guided missile in conjunction with the NIKE AJAX ground equipment.

(U) Although the NIKE airframe modified to carry the TX-9 guntype warhead would provide the earliest capability weapon, it was ruled out because of the requirement for extensive missile redesign and the low efficiency in use of fissionable material. Missiles such as the CORPORAL, TALOS, and HERMES, that either were intended or could be made to carry an atomic warhead, could be modified for use with some part of the NIKE ground equipment; however, these would have to be so radically redesigned that any arrangement of that type would result in a completely new system.

(U) In an informal presentation to OCO on 16 March 1953, BTL and DAC representatives outlined three possible systems of ground guidance and control equipment that would permit maximum intercept ranges of 25, 35, and 50 miles, respectively· The 25-mile system would require very few changes to the existing AJAX ground equipment, while the 35-mile system would entail a moderate amount of modification, and the 50-mile system a major redesign effort. Regardless of the range selected for the ground guidance equipment, however, the new version of the NIKE missile would be designed for 50-mile range. The preliminary proposal for the 3-year development program embraced the construction and test of 30 NIKE HERCULES missiles, with system tests and demonstration to be conducted during the period October 1955 to March 1956.⁶

(U) Later in March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Army's proposed NIKE HERCULES project and requested that development of the two-stage missile be undertaken with 1A priority. Also included in the approved effort was a parallel design study of a single-stage solid propellant missile. A final decision on modification of the NIKE AJAX ground equipment to permit intercept ranges beyond 25 miles was held in abeyance pending more detailed studies and the submission of a firm weapon system proposal in October 1953.⁷

(U) On 30 June 1953, the New York Ordnance District executed a new contract (DA-30-069-ORD-1082) with the Western Electric Company for design and development of the NIKE HERCULES missile system. The basic contract was for $2,261,400 and covered R&D work through December 1953, at which time the planning phase of the program was to be completed. Two weeks later, on 16 July 1953, the Secretary of the Army approved the establishment of the NIKE HERCULES project and the formal statement of military characteristics (MC's).⁸

(U) Briefly, the primary role of the second-generation NIKE system was to attack, with a single atomic warhead, formations of aircraft flying at speeds up to 870 knots (1.000 mph), at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, and at a horizontal range of 50.000 yards (110,000 yards desired) from the launching site. In addition to the primary warhead for engagement of multiple targets, the weapon system was to be supplied with an alternate conventional warhead for use against single aircraft or missiles. It also was desired that the system be provided with the capability of employment against ground targets, but this provision was not to compromise the primary surface-to-air application. Competing characteristics, in the order of priority, were as follows.

1. Antiaircraft effectiveness.
2. Reliability of system.
3. Safety of friendly population and installations from accidental high or low order atomic detonation.
4. Immunity to countermeasures.
5. Ruggedness. (Ability to give trouble-free operation during, or after, exposure to extreme environmental conditions.)
6. Ease of maintenance.
7. Safety of friendly population and installations from any portion of the rocket which may be discarded in flight.
8. Effectiveness in a surface role.
9. Mobility.
10. Standardization of major and minor components.
11. Low maintenance costs.
12. Low silhouette.
13. Small required battle crew.

(U) By late October 1953, sufficient design studies and laboratory work had been done to establish the general performance and physical characteristics of the HERCULES missile and to define the problems and costs of fitting this missile into the existing NIKE AJAX ground equipment. Personnel of BTL and DAC outlined the details of the proposed weapon system in a presentation to the Army General Staff on 21 October 1953 and to the Department of Defense (WD) Committee on Guided Missiles on 26 February 1954.

(U) In selecting the missile configuration for the 30-inch primary warhead, the contractor considered both the two-stage and single-stage designs. The results of the feasibility study by DAC disclosed that a single-stage, solid-propellant missile with probable superior performance to that of the two-stage version could be developed; however, such a missile would require significant technological advancements and would probably lag the contemplated Model 1810 program by as much as 2 years. Since the immediate objective of the HERCULES program was to provide a high energy warhead delivery capability at the earliest possible date, BTL reommended that primary effort be focused on development of the larger two-stage (Model 1810) vehicle using proven propulsion techniques and components of the AJAX missile, and that DAC be authorized to conduct a parallel design study of the boosterless solid-propellant missile for possible future use in the HERCULES system.

• a/ Including cost of 40 Model 1810 experimental missiles and system tests through the first quarter of CY 1956.

• b/ To modify an AJAX battery to a 25-mile IWCULES would cost $170,000. To modify an AJAX battery to a long-range HERCULES would cost $335,000, while to modify a 25-mile HERRCULES to a long-range HERCULES would cost the difference between these two figures, or about $165,000.

• c/ The cost of an ATAX battery, consisting of three sections of four launchers each and including ORD 7 spare parts and test equipment, was $1,442.000. The 25-mile HERCULES battery with eight launchers for AJAX and four launchers for HERCULES would cost $1,500,000, while the long-range HERCULES battery with the same launcher complement would cost $1.550,000.

• d/ The unit cost for the HERCULES Model 1810 missile considered to be the average cost of the first 2,500 missiles produced. The early missiles would cost more, the later ones less.

• e/ The current cost of an AJAX assembly area was $653.000 per battalion. To handle the HERCULES missile, additional equipment costing $150,000 would be required for each assembly area.