(U) Preproduction and production engineering work on tactical equipment for the Basic HERCULES system began in November 1954, some 2 months before the first R&D missile firing in January 1955. Contracts for production engineering and for fabrication of prototype missiles and ground equipment were signed in April 1955, along with a contract for the first lot of production missiles and concurrent spares. The production contract for the first lot of tactical battery sets was signed 7 months later, in November 1955. The delivery of prototype missiles began in 1956 and continued into December 1958, overlapping initial deliveries of tactical battery sets and missiles, which commenced in June 1957 and December 1957, respectively. The first three batteries were deployed in CONUS on 30 June 1958, followed by deployment of the first overseas unit (Taiwan) in September. In September 1961, Army units finished their package training, and on-site deployment of all prograrmned CONUS and overseas units was completed at the end of the year.

Preproduction Phase

(U) As a general rule, preproduction activity starts on the date that a definite commitment for production is made to assure delivery of the first tactical units for programmed deployment. Preproduction commitments begin with this production authorization and embrace production tooling, facilities, and production engineering, whichever is earliest. Some subphases of preproduction end with the first production delivery, but other subphases continue. Among these continuing activities are tooling necessary to maintain a certain quantity of production (commonly known as sustaining tooling), expansion of facilities, and additional production engineering. Major time phases for the Basic HERCULES preproduction activities are depicted in Chart 6.

	Chart 6 - Major Time Phases for Preproduction

Prototype Missiles and Ground Equipment

(U) Contract DA-30-069-ORD-1447, which was awarded to WECo on 29 April 1955, covered the fabrication of 100 prototype missiles and the conversion of five AJAX ground equipment sets to HERCULES for use in support of the R&D program. Later in 1955 and in 1957, the contract was supplemented to include three additional lots of missiles, increasing the total number of prototype missiles to 320. In FY 1958, the contract was further supplemented to provide for the construction of one prototype set of Improved HERCULES ground equipment. The major portion of this fixed-price contract, excluding the Improved HERCULES equipment, was redetermined in 1957 and 1959, resulting in a total price of $49.656,000 for the Basic HERCULES prototypes. The price of the Improved HERCULES prototype set was $6,771,500, giving a total contract price of $56,427,500 as of 31 October 1960. Contract prices for prototype missiles and ground equipment, including tooling, are shown in Table 7.

	Chart 7 - Prices for Protype Missiles & Ground Equipmment Under Contract ORD-1447

(U) The Douglas Aircraft Company fabricated all 320 missiles at its plant in Santa Monica, California. WECo manufactured the prototype ground equipment sets at its Burlington, North Carolina, plant. Deliveries of the prototype missiles were completed in December 1958, or 3 years and 8 months after date of the contract. WECo completed delivery of the five ground equipment prototypes in June 1957. or 2 years and 2 months from the contract date.^l

Production Engineering

(U) Production engineering work on tactical equipment began with the Army's authorization in November 1954. however, much of the preliminary design work on the Basic HERCULES was performed under WECo's R&D contract, ORD-1082, as early as 1953, long before negotiation of the first production engineering contract (ORD-1448) in April 1955.² The design and development vork done under Contract ORD-1082 was aimed at providing R&D drawings which, with a minimum of effort, could be used for manufacturing, once authorization had been given. Production engineering on the basic system was considered complete on 9 January 1960, when all R&D drawings were released to production.

(U) A total of $95,372.882 was funded for production engineering and allied services on the Basic HERCULES through FY 1960. The first contract (ORD-1448), awarded to WECo on 15 April 1955, provided for production engineering services (including preparation of manufacturing drawings and specifications, spare parts lists, maintenance manuals, and qualification testing) on the Basic HERCULES and the modified portion of existing AJAX ground equipment. Field engineering services were initiated with the signing of Contract ORD-1717 in February 1956, and extended, in 3 1958-59, under Contracts ORD-1065, ORD-1342, and ORD-2802. These and other identifiable production engineering contracts are listed in Table 8.

Table 8 - (U) Ordnance Corps Production Engineering Contracts

Facilities

(U) The principal production sources for the HERCULES system, all carried over from the NIKE AJAX program, were (1) the DAC plant at Santa Monica, California; (2) the Charlotte Ordnance Missile Plant (COMP) at Charlotte, North Carolina, also operated by DAC; and (3) the Western Electric plant at Burlington, North Carolina.

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(U) The production facility for missile guidance sections was continued from the NIKE AJAX program at WECo's Winston-Salem. North Carolina, plant until July 1959, when the Stovepipe configuration was phased out of production. A new facility was built at WECo's Greensboro, North Carolina, plant for production of the new Mushroom guidance section.

(U) The Western Electric Company manufactured ground equipment for the Basic HERCULES at its Burlington plant. As in the case of missiles, existing ATAX facilities were used for initial production and new ones were added as production expanded. Electronic ground equipment was assembled at the Tarheel Ordnance Plant of WECo^* (Burlington) and non-electronic equipment at DAC's Santa Monica plant.

(U) The estimated total cost for both AJAX and HERCULES facilities, under Contracts ORD-652 and ORD-1798, was $27 million; for HERCULES facilities alone, it was about $9 million teas Table 9). These Ordnance Corps facility contracts, however, provided for machinery and equipment only. Construction costs (land, buildings, and building rehabilitation) were funded through the Corps of Engineers. The estimated total facility funding for AJAX and HERCULES, including construction, was $56.6 million; for HERCULES alone, it was $15.4 million (see Table 10).⁶

Production Program

Missiles

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Table 9 - (U) Ordnance Corps Facility Contracts

Table 10 - (U) Estimated funding for Facilities
NIKE AJAX and NIKE HERCULES (Millions)

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{A photo that is a barely factory and missiles - quality to poor to present.}

NIKE HERCULES missiles near the end of the final assembly line at the Charlotte Ordnance Missile Plant (October 1958)

(U) The major cost components for the missile consisted of (1) the missile airframe (which included the forward and aft body, main and center fin, booster fin, and booster cluster), the warhead body assembly, and shipping confainers, all of which were assembled by DAC at COMP; (2) the guidance section, manufactured

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by WECo's plants in North Carolina; (3) the M30 (XM-30) solid sustainer motor metal parts and blast tube assemblies; (4) the solid sustainer motor loading and blast tube lining; and (5) the M42 (XM-42) rocket motor (booster) metal parts and loading. The last three groups of components were supplied by contractors other than WECo.⁸

(U) At the beginning of the program, the two major contractors for XM-30 sustainer motor metal parts and blast tube assemblies were the Borg-Warner Corporation and the Goodyear Aircraft Corporation. With the initiation of competitive procurement, in 1958, the International Manufacturing Company, Inc., became the major supplier of motor metal parts, blast tube assemblies, and gas generators. The Watervliet Arsenal also supplied a small quantity (about 150) of metal parts and blast tube assemblies. These contractors delivered the motor hardware as Government-furnished equipment (CPE) to the Longhorn Ordnance Works (later renamed the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant--LAAP), a Government owned plant operated by the Thiokol Chemical Corporation. The Thiokol Longhorn Division loaded the M30 motors under its openend contract (ORD-200) and shipped them to Ordnance depots for issue to the users. The average unit price for loading the first 5,590 motors was $5,585.⁹

Chart 7. MATERIAL FLOW - NIKE HERCULES MOTORS

Chart 8. MATERIAL FLOW - NIKE HERCULES MISSILE BODY SECTION

(U) Beginning in FY 1962, the Hicks Corporation became the major supplier of M30 motor metal parts under Contract ORD-13055. The delivery of motor cases under this contract was subject to frequent schedule slippages owing to technical problems with welding procedures. In 1963, for example, serious problems involving cracking on non-pressure area welds were detected after the motors had been loaded and shipped to the depots. Intermittent welding difficulties and schedule slippages continued until May 1964, when the quality problems affecting deliveries were resolved. All delinquent units were delivered by the end of June 1964, and no further schedule delays were reported.l0 The lowest LAAP unit price for loading M30 sustainer motors at a rate of 100 per month in FY 1964 was $4,430.¹¹

(U) The M5E1 booster and igniter metal parts for the M42 (XM-42) rocket motor originally were procured from the Borg-Warner Corporation and the Goodyear Aircraft Corporation at a unit cost of about $900 per booster or $3,600 per missile. The Radford Arsenal, a Government-owned plant operated by the Hercules Powder Company, assembled and loaded the XM-42 booster motors under its open-end contract (ORD-37) and shipped them to Ordnance depots for issue to users. Booster loading costs through FY 1958 averaged about $4,300 per missile. Beginning in FY 1959, Radford Arsenal purchased the booster and igniter metal parts from National Electric, a division of the H. K. Porter Company, at reduced costs, and included the booster metal parr costs with loading costs. As a result of the change in producers. the unit cost for both booster metal parts and loading was reduced to $7.600 per missile. Another change concerned the cluster hardware coat, which originally was part of the DAC airframe cost. Beginning in FY 1960, this cost was included in the Radford Arsenal loading cost, and cluster hardware procurement was made under an Arsenal contract with DAC/COMP, rather than under a WECo subcontract with DAC. This change was effective with the 339-unit missile lot procured under WECo Contract ORD-2591.¹²

(U) The warhead body assemblies produced by DAC/COMP were delivered to the Ramon Engineering Company as GFE for assembly with the loaded warhead. The M17 (T45) warhead metal parts were loaded at the Iowa Ordnance Plant, installed in the warhead body assembly, and shipped to Ordnance depots for issue to the users. The nuclear warheads were assembled at AEC depots and furnished directly to field sites. The Elgin National Watch Company produced the safety and arming devices and shipped them to Ordnance depots for field issue. Missile batteries were requisitioned through Signal Supply Agency channels. Final assembly and checkout of the missile with warhead was accomplished at field sites.^l3

(U) In view of the May 1965 target date for completion of missile end item production at CAMP, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Logistics), in March 1965, directed the initiation of negotiations with DAC for maintenance of the facility in a state of partial layaway. Under this directive, which reflected recommendations of MLCOM personnel, DAC would occupy about 20 percent of the plant for non-production activities and the rest of the plant would remain idle with a production capacity of 100 missiles per month to safisfy future HERCULES requirements.^l4

On 13 August 1965, however, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Logistics) determined that retention of the plant could not be justified under policy guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense on 11 June 1965, and that the plant should be declared excess. The HERCULES Project Manager promptly prepared a formal objection to the proposed closeout of the plant,¹⁵ but to no avail. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, on 8 December 1965, announced that the Charlotte Army Missile Plant was one of the excess DOD installations scheduled to be closed and put up for disposition.^l6

(U) Beginning with the conclusion of missile end item production at CAMP in May 1965, and continuing on a phaseout basis until 1 December 1966, the effort at Charlotte was limited to repair parts production, with.simultaneous disposition of excess equipment. After 1 December 1966, DAC produced HERCULES spare parts at its California plants. In May 1967, the last HERCULES production equipment left CAMP, and the facility was made available for final sale or disposal on 1 July 1967.¹⁷

{page 133, 134, 135 - about 15 inches}

Ground Equipment

(U) The Western Electric Company began production of the Basic HERCULES ground equipment in November 1955, under Contract ORD-1562. Five months later, in April 1956, DA sought to accelerate production through the conversion of existing NIKE AJAX ground equipment to HERCULES capability. Under this 3-year program, the production of modification kits and the fabrication of new ground equipment sets were to be scheduled simultaneously at a combined maximum rate of 20 per month. Contract ORD-1876 was awarded to WECo on 25 June 1956 for conversion of the first 20 AJAX sets at an estimated cost of $41.2 million. Later in 1956, WECe submitted a proposal for conversion of 37 more sets at a cost of $40.6 million, bringing the total cost of converting 57 sets to $81.8 million. The WECo contract, however, was cancelled in December 1956, when the AJAX conversion program was suspended because of the high cost and complicated scheduling involved. Instead, a lot of 57 new HERCULES battery sets was added to Contract ORD1562 at an estimated cost of $63.2 million. This was $18.6 million less than the price of the 57 AJAX conversions under Contract OBD-1876, representing a cost saving of about 23 percent. At the same time, 12 NIKE AJAX sets under Contract ORD-1534 were diverted to HERCULES production.

{page 136-137 - about 5 inches}

(U) After Contract ORD-L562, the launchers and associated equipment were contracted for directly with DAC under Contracts ORD-983 and ORD-1592. This eliminated WECo's overhead and profit, resulting in a sizeable cost savings. The equipment quantities and costs for the first 362 battery sets under major WECo and DAC contracts are given in Table 13. The contractor structure and 20 flow of materiel are shown in Chart 9.²⁰

Training Devices

(U) Only limited equipment was available for the early training courses on the Basic HERCULES system; however, several training devices were developed and produced for troop use. These varied in complexity from dummy missile handling trainers to intricate electronic equipment capable of exercising a NIKE battery in all tactical modes of operation. They included the XM-74 (L8-B-3) warhead section trainer; the Type II missile (afr body) trainer; the XM-29 (3-044) booster handling trainer; and the AN/MPG-36 (15-D-2) radar target simulator.

{All of pages 138-139 - about 18 inches}

Chart 9. NIKE HERCULES GROUND EQUIPMENT CONTRACTOR STRUCTURE

(U) Developed for CONARC by the Naval Training Device Center (NTDC), the XM-74 (Type X) warhead section trainer was designed as a handling and checkout device for use by launcher troops responsible for final assembly, checkout, and launching of the HERCULES missile. NTDC initially procured 225 of the warhead trainers with repair parts from the Bendix Aviation Corporation. CONARC evaluated the trainer and accepted the NTDC technical data package. In FY 1960, ARGMA procured 103 of the trainers with repair parts from Bendix, with the Picatinny Arsenal providing engineering support.

(U) The Type II missile handling trainer, developed for ARGMA by DAC, had the same weight, center of gravity, and exterior configuration as the tactical missile aft body section, and was designed to mate with the Type X warhead section trainer and the XM-29 (3-G-44) booster trainer. Its component parts, however, were not interchangeable with tactical hardware. The total contract price for the design and manufacture of 191 trainers was $718.096.

(U) An inert device which simulated the tactical HERCULES booster assembly, the XM-29 (3-644) booster handling trainer was Used to train personnel in assembling, handling, and mating procedures. NTDC developed the trainer under direction of CONARC and made the design release to ARGMA in March 1961. Procurement of 21 this item during the FY 1958-61 period totaled 222.²¹

(U) The 15-D-2 radar target simulator was a trailer-mounted device used with tactical missile radar systems in training operating personnel. The original 15-D-2 simulator for the NIKE ATAX operators was developed by Aircraft Armaments, Inc., and produced by the Federal Division of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (ITT), under contract to NTDC (CDNARC). NTDC procured 96 of these devices at a unit cost of about $96,000. On 31 March 1961, NTDC transferred the 96 simulators to Ordnance (AOMC/ARGMA), along with the responsibility for logistical support and future procurement. Spare parts to support these devices were provisioned in the amount of approximately $3.5 million, and the parts were distributed to Ordnance field support units. During this phase of the program. the 15-D-2 simulator was renamed the AN/MPQ-36.

(U) Owing to the excessive effort required to connect and disconnect the AN/MP9-36 when going from a non-tactical to a tactical situation, a requirement was established for a quickdisconnect kit to enable the device to be disconnected from the AJAX in a matter of 2 or 3 seconds. Ninety-six of the NIKE AJAX quick-disconnect kits were procured from ITT, and ARGMA later had a HERCULES quick-disconnect capability incorporated in the kits. However, when the AN/MPQ-36 simulator was connected to the NIKE HERCULES system, it would only train in the AJAX mode of operation. In view of the urgent training requirement for HERCULES operators, ARGMA, in mid-1961, prepared a procurement package for updating the AN/MPQ-36 to handle more advanced targets than those confronted by the short-range AJAX. The contract for updating the simulator for Basic and Improved HERCULES application was awarded to Aircraft Armaments, Inc., on 28 December 1961. As an interim measure, pending completion of the AN/MPQ-36 updating program, a second contract was awarded to ITT to provide Annual Service Practice (ASP) live missile firing capabilities to 10 of the existing simulators.²²

The consummation of these contracts extended into the improved HERCULES phase of the program and will be discussed in the succeeding chapter.

Training and Deployment

(U) The tactical battery sets of Basic HERCULES equipment were distributed between the U. S. Army and countries in the Military Assistance Program (MAP), with the Army receiving about two-thirds of the total. The deployment phase of the Basic HERCULES system was considered to start in November 1956, with the initiation of formal guided missile school courses, though key personnel training began some 9 months earlier. The time required for deployment of authorized U. S. Army batteries, including the necessary training, site construction, and emplacement of equipment, covered a period of about 5 years. The last tactical Army battery became operational in the fourth quarter of FY 1961. The deployment of MAP batteries began in September 1958 and continued into 1962.

Training Program

(U) Key Personnel Training. The key personnel training phase began in February 1956 and continued on an intermittent basis until about the end of 1957, at which time training courses were initiated on the Improved HERCULES system. Training of key personnel, which was conducted at the Ordnance Guided Missile School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, consisted of courses for selected depot and field maintenance personnel and served as a means of training school specialists for the operational training center at Fort Bliss, Texas.

(U) Air Defense School Training. The service school training, which marked the start of the deployment phase, was composed of formal classroom study for military personnel who eventually were to operate and maintain the deployed system. Formal training of specialists began in November 1956, about 16 months before the start of package training. The leadtime involved in this phase was based on the longest course offered by the Army Air Defense School at Fort Bliss; i.e., maintenance of electronic equipment. This training continued until about August 1961, when the specialists were integrated into the last package unit.

(U) Troop Trained Specialists, The enlisted men who were to operate the equipment (as distinguished from maintenance personnel) were trained in both classroom and on-the-job study at the First Guided Missile Brigade at Fort Bliss. Classes started in late March 1958 for the first package of the conversion program, and continued into the third quarter of FY 1961. The period covered by this phase varied from 4 weeks for conversion packages to 8 weeks for new packages.

(U) Package Training. Package training activities, which included missile firings, required 8 weeks of instruction at the First Guided Missile Brigade at Fort Bliss. At this point in the training cycle, troop trained specialists and school trained personnel were combined into a unit through formal and informal training on their own battery equipment just before deployment to the completed tactical site. Package training for U. S. batteries started in April 1958 and continued until about September 1961, at which time the equivalent of 191 battery packages of active Army units completed courses at the Fort Bliss facility. Package training for MAP batteries conrmenced in October 1958 and continued into 1962.²³

The HERCULES-BOMARC Controversy

(U) In September 1958, shortly after initial deployment of the HERCULES, a feud erupted between the Army and Air Force over the respective merits of the NIKE HERCULES and BOMARC missiles and the role of each in continental air defense.²⁴ At that time, the first Basic HERCULES batteries had just become operational at converted AJAX sites in the Washington-Baltimore, New York, and Chicago defense areas, and construction was already completed or underway on numerous other sites. The HERCULES-BOMARC dispute, which paralleled the bitter JUPITER-THOR rivalry, came to a head in September 1958, when LTG Charles E. Hart, then Commanding General of the Army Air Defense Comnand, complained to the Secretary of Defense that wherever the HERCULES was installed, Air Force people leaked false stories about the relative merits of the system as it compared to the BOMARC. He called attention to a number of newspaper articles comparing the two weapons, with the strong implication that the BOMARC would or should eventually replace the HERCULES. Indeed, one such article stated that Air Force officials were calling for replacement of Army NIKE sites surrounding Chicago with BOMARC bases. Convinced that this was a carefully organized campaign aimed at discrediting the military value of the HERCULES, the Department of the Army took up the challenge in a spirited public information program known as Project TRUTH.

(U) Briefly, the Air Force view was that the BOMARC was an area defense weapon, while the HERCULES was a point defense weapon, and that area defense was better than point defense. Top Air Force missilemen argued that the HERCULES was inherently a short-range weapon designed to reach a maximum of 100 miles but was more likely to cover about 85; that it was useless against low-flying aircraft; and that it could not differentiate between friend and foe. On the other hand, the 200-mile BOMARC, they claimed, was an all-altitude weapon that could be stationed in combat readiness by June 1961. Since the radar detection net for the BOMARC, unlike the NIKE, would be linked directly with the early warning system in Canada, they argued that it was much less likely to fire on friendly planes. Moreover, they contended that the 400-mile version of the BOMARC then being tested would have much greater growth potential than the HERCULES.

(U) The Army proponents countered the Air Force claims and arguments with general statements on the capabilities of the NIKE HERCULES and its proven growth potential, emphasizing that the weapon system was already operational and in the hands of our air defense forces. On the other hand, they pointed out, the BOMARC was not yet operational, its reliability was very low (something on the order of 25 percent of the proven reliability of the HERCULES), and its altitude range was distinctly limited because of its air-breathing engines. So far, they said, about $1 billion had been spent on the BOMARC and it was still some 3 years away from an operational status. This was more than twice the amount spent on the entire NIKE family and the land-based TALOS, a Navy weapon which the Army was evaluating. As for the alleged lack of aircraft identification by the HERCULES radar, the Army pointed out that the Army air defense units were to shoot down only those targets picked out for them by the North American Air Defense Command, which was then headed by GEN Earle E. Partridge of the U. S. Air Force. Alluding to the criticism that the HERCULES provided point defense as opposed to area defense, the Army asserted that the area of coverage of the NIKE HERCULES was actually about 20,000 square miles--quite a large point.²⁵

(U) In truth, the HERCULES and BOMARC were different systems designed for different air defense tasks; one for long-range area defense, the other for defense of close-in city or metropolitan areas. In recognition of this and the requirements of the defense in depth concept proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Air Defense Command, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy announced that the procurement and deployment of both systems would be continued, and ordered an end to the interservice bickering. The defense in depth concept adopted by the Defense Department involved the use of manned interceptors, pilotless interceptors of the BOMARC type, and shorter range missiles of the NIKE family supplemented by the HAWK low-altitude defense system. Under this concept, invading aircraft would be subjected to continuous attack of increasing severity as they approached critical target areas. Aircraft detected by the early warning system in Canada would first be attacked by manned interceptors, then by BOMARC guided missiles. Enemy aircraft succeeding in penetrating the BOMARC line would come under attack by the BERCULES and HAWK systems, as well as manned interceptors and BOMARC missiles. The HERCULES and BOMARC normally would be assigned targets by the Semiautomatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system. The BOMARC was dependent on the SAGE system, while the HERCULES could be operated autonomously; i.e., it had its own control system and could operate with or without SAGE.²⁶

Changes in Army Requirements

(U) The DOD decision to deploy both the HERCULES and BOMARC systems ended the interservice fuss over their military value. But it left open the question of how much of the shrinking defense budget should be spent on the two weapons, and the rivalry continued in the annual battle for funds. Congress Boon made it clear that it liked neither of the programs and indicated that it would take more of a hand in actual programrming of military production if the Secretary of Defense did not take a firmer stand to eliminate interservice rivalries and what it considered duplicate development of equipment. In the end, Congress cut FY 1960-61 appropriations for both programs below the levels requested by DOD, with the Army's HERCULES playing the familiar role of the underdog.²⁷

{1 inch on page 148, 5 inches page 149}

Site Construction for CONUS Defense Areas

(U) The Basic HERCULES system was employed in fixed or permanent CONUS defense sites and in semimobile sites for the field army air defense role. Most of the CONUS sites used permanent structures and underground launchers, maling fewer vehicles necessary. The semimobile site had no permanent facilities and required a greater number of vehicles and trailers. The equipment used in a HERCULES site was located in three distinct areas: the battery control area, the launching area, and

{all of page 150}

the assembly area. The minimum space requirement for the battery control area was about 370 by 880 feet. The launching area was the largest of the three main areas, needing a minimum of 130 acres for a semimobile and 43 acres for a permanent CONUS site. A typical launching area for a permanent sire contained three underground magazines, each having four launchers, missile assembly and warhead storage areas, and billets for the crew. The suting requirements for the assembly area were not critical to the operation of the unit; however, because of safety factors, the area had to be a minimum of 150 feet from the nearest launcher.³⁰

{4 inches page 151, 4 inches page 152}

Organization and Deployment of Tactical Units

(U) The organizational unit of HERCULES was the battalion, which generally consisted of four battery sets of three firing sections, each with four launchers. The CONUS missile battalion Table of Organization 6 Equipment (TOE 44-545T) called for a HERCULWS system of 25-percent mobility, with transportation including only the minimum required for administrative purposes. The personnel requirement for a CONUS battalion at full strength (Headquarters & headquarters Battery and four Missile Batteries) totaled 554 (507 enlisted men and 47 officers).

Page 153 - Artist's Drawing of a Typical AJAX-HERCULES Installation
{Not included by me - not much left after multiple Xeroxings}

Page 154 NIKE HERCULES USAREUR Installation.
{Not included by me - not much left after multiple Xeroxings}

(U) The field army missile battalion (TOE 44-5352) called for a HERCULES system with maximum mobility and transportation allowances. Personnel requirements for a full-strength field battalion totaled 703 (652 enlisted men and 51 officers).³⁴

{7 inches page 155}

Japanese Co-Production Program

(U) In July 1965, a joint HAWK/HERCULES MICOM team, including contractor personnel, visited the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tokyo to discuss possible co-production programs for both systems with the Japanese Government. Since 1959, the Douglas Aircraft Company had been actively pursuing co-production of NIKE equipment with Japanese industry, with complete approval of the DOD International Logistics Negotiator. The HAWK contractor had also engaged in such discussions, though in a more recent timeframe. During the July co-production meeting in Japan, it became evident that no clear-cut statement of U. S. policy relating to co-production was available, and that such guidance was essential to the initiation of formal Government-to-Government negotiations, That industry-to-industry talks had progressed far beyond the status of any Government-to-Government agreement became obvious after the July meeting, when representatives of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., visited the United States to discuss co-production with Douglas Aircraft and other contractors.

(U) In a letter recommending the establishment of a DA policy group to formulate U. S. Government policy for co-production programs, the Commanding General of MICOM pointed out the many risks and inherent problems involved in authorizing any government to produce such highly technical and sophisticated weapons as the HAWK and HERCULES. MICOM, he said, had experienced thousands of problems with its breakout program, which was limited to U. S. manufacturers. And, while attempting to obtain alternate sources to eliminate dependence on the system prime contractor, the Command had found that all manufacturing and testing know-how was not transferable. In short, if manufacturing was to be on a coproduction basis, "it must be established which government or agency has the responsibility for insuring that the end product is in fact a HERCULES or HAWK Weapon System.³⁷

(U) In February 1966, a DOD team, including DA Staff and MICOM members, presented proposals for barter, sale, or co-production of additional HERCULES battalions. Then, in May, a military survey team from the Japan Defense Agency Air Staff Office toured HERCULES production facilities in the United States. A DOD team planned to visit Tokyo for further negotiations in June 1966; however, political considerations in Japan at that time delayed the meeting until May 1967. During talks held on 9 May, a DOD official completed preliminary arrangements with the Japan Defense Agency for co-production of the HERCULES missile and purchase of the required ground equipment from the United States. The missile, to be called the NIKE J (J for Japan), would be converted to carry only conventional warheads and would be manufactured by the Mitsubishi Heavy industries Company, Ltd., under a licensing contract with the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.³⁹

(U) Final negotiations between the Governments of the United States and Japan began in July and continued until 13 October 1967, when a memorandum of understanding was signed for co-production of HERCULES and HAWK missiles and purchase of related ground equipment.³⁹

In November 1967, DOD assigned the Department of the Army as executive agent to implement the program, and designated AMC as the agency responsible for implementation. AMC, in turn, designated the NIKE HERCULES Project Manager as the U. S. project manager for the program and authorized the formation of a liaison office in Japan. A MICOM team, visiting Tokyo in January 1968, concluded a support agreement for a field office.40 The MICOM Field Office, Japan, was a provisional unit of the Command from 15 February 1968⁴¹ to 15 April 1968, when AMC approved its establishment. Its mission was to represent MICOM and designated project managers in the implementation of the memorandum of understanding relating to Japanese co-production of designated U. S. Army missile systems and related control systems. The office would serve as the in-country point of contact for DOD elements and the Japan Defense Agency in the coordination of matters included in the memorandum of understanding and other instructions.⁴²

(U) The MICOM Field Office's coordination actions relating to the initial sales cases for HERCULES equipment were severely hampered by a lack of personnel and by restrictions on temporary duty abroad. DCSLOG approval of the field office, in March 1968, had been contingent upon Japan's agreeing to pay the costs of the office. The Japan Defense Agency, however, refused to bear this cost. The MICOM Project Managers' agreements with the U. S. Army, Japan (USARJ) and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Japan, to furnish administrative and logistics support, office space, and housing, remained in effect through 30 June 1969. On 26 February 1969, DA assigned COL Edward L. Smith as chief (and sole member) of the MICOM Field Office effective 23 May 1969.

Colonel Smith arrived at his post on 26 August 1969, following a period of orientation in preparacion for the assignment.⁴³

(U) The Japan Defense Agency, on 28 June 1968, signed the major sales cases for HERCULES ground equipment, totaling $37.9 million, which were included in the 13 October 1967 memorandum of understanding. Japan later accepted a $3,000 sales case for inspection services, which was forwarded from MICOM on 23 August 1968. The aforementioned failure to staff the Field Office in Japan led to a consolidated sales case to cover all MICOM projects (i.e., NIKE HERCULES, HAWK, and related air defense control systems). MICOM forwarded the consolidated sales case to AMC, where it was divided into three cases. A general meeting in Washington, on 15 October 1968, resulted in the decision to send a MICOM team to Japan to survey support requirements. However, when the team departed in November, a DCSLOG representative headed it, and its mission was to sell the sales cases for support of the program. The Japan Defense Agency did not consider reimbursement for all support to be proper, and indicated a willingness to pay only for limited services which they would request.

(U) The HERCULES Project Manager, on 30 September 1968, completed primary contractual action to support the initial sales cases for HERCULES ground equipment. The first shipment of classified hardware left for Japan in March 1969, using a military escort at contractor expense.⁴⁴

(U) Meanwhile, the production of HERCULES missiles in Japan continued on schedule, with resident U. S. contractor personnel providing technical assistance. Fifteen missiles were produced and accepted in FY 1970 and 108 in FY 1971. During October and November 1970, a Japan Defense Agency team conducted a highly successful flight test program of nine missiles at McGregor Range, New Mexico, with Fort Bliss and the HERCULES Project Office providing support. By 30 June 1971, the resident contractor technical assistance personnel had completed their tours in Japan and returned home.⁴⁵ With the initiation of ground systems overhaul in FY 1971, other U. S. contractor personnel rendered the necessary short-term technical assistance. The U. S. Government provided extensive documentation under foreign military sales to support the overhaul. Problems encountered primarily concerned the continued availability of materials and parts from the United States to support both missile production and overhaul.

(U) The first expansion of production in Japan under terms of the 1967 agreement came in FY 1971, when Japan bought depot test equipment and agreed to manufacture other test sets.⁴⁶

-------------------------

• 1 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 55-57, 59. RHA Ex 13-592.

• 2 For an account of the early design and development work, see Chapter III.

• 3 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 59, 63-65. RHA Ex 13-592.

• 4 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 64, 67.

• 5 Army Navy Air Force Journal Vol. 96, 1 Nov 58, p. 274.

• * The real estate and buildings of the Tarheel Ordnance Plant were Government-owned, but the contractor owned the greater portion of the production equipment. WECo originally leased the plant from the General Services Administration for cormnercial work. As the AJAX and HERCULES programs evolved, placement of an increasing amoumt of ground equipment production into the facility resulted in its becoming predominately devoted to military production. Beginning 1 March 1961, all real property and buildings were leased to the contractor. NE Wpn Sys Plan (Indus Op Plan), WSP-1, Annex B, Sep 61, p. 12. Hist Div File.

• 6 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 60, 67-69. RHA Ex 13-592.

• 7 (1) Ibid., pp. 83, 89. (2) NH Wpn Sys Plan (Indus Op Plan), WSP-1, Annex B, Sep 61, p. 29. Hist Div File. (3) MI PM2P, Ch 8, 30 Jun 65, p. 16g. Hist Div File. (4) Hist Rept, NH PM, FY 1965, p. 20. Hist Div File.

• 8 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, p. 89. RHA Ex 13-592.

• 9 (1) Ibid., pp. 105, 108, 110-11. (2) NH Wpn Sys Plan (Ind Op Plan), WSP-1, Annex B, Sep 61, pp. 3-4, 6. ttist Div File. (3, Total funding for the first 5,590 units. procured during Fl 1956-6 was $31,219,895. In FY 1957, 23 additional motors were loaded for R69 at a total cost of $263,691. SRI TR 24, Aug 61, p. 111.

• 10 See Weekly PM Repts to CG, AMC, May 63 - Jun 64. Hist Div File.

• 11 Lr,, CG, MICOM, to CG, AMC, 21 Feb 67, subj: FY 67 PEMA 4911 Just - Expansion of Facs to L/A/P [sie] NH, M30A2 Sustainer Mtrs - Lk4P, Marshall, TX (Proj Rev), archd to SS AMSMI-I-16-67, 20 Feb 67, same subj. Hist Div File.

• * In the Army reorganization of 1962, the Charlotte Ordnance Missile Plant was redesignated as the Charlotte Army Missile Plant (CAMP).

• 12 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 92, 110, 112-13. RI1A Ex 13-592.

• 13 NH Wpn Sys Plan (Indus Op Plan), WSP-1, Annex B, Sep 61, pp. 6-7. Hist Div Pile.

• 14 Hist Rept, Nh PM, FI 1965, p. 20, d incl thereto: 2d Ind, DCSLOG, DA, to CG, AMC, 2 Apr 65, subj: Dspo of CAMP, w Memo For The CofS, fr ASA (IhL), 25 Mar 65, subj: CAMP. Hist Div File.

• 15 Ltr, CG, MICCPI, to CG, AMC, 25 Aug 65, subj: Ltr of Xmitl, w incls: Memo for CofS, fr ASA (I&L), 13 Aug 65, subj: CAMP, and ppsd Ltr, CG, AMC, to GEN Harold K. Johnson, CSA, n.s. All atchd to SS HE-P-25, BERC PM, 25 Aug 65, subf: CAMP. Hist Div File.

• 16 Hist Rept, NH PM, FP 1966, p. 4. Hist Div File.

• 17 (1) ibid., P.4, (2) Ltr, CG, MICOM, to CG, AMC, undated (circa 25 Mar 66), subj: Rept of Excess for Real Property (CAMP), atchd to SS AMSMI-OE-21-66, Act Chf, Instl & Svcs Ofc, 22 Mar 66, subj: same. Bist Div File. (3) MICOM Hist Sum, Fl 1967, pp. 103-104.

• 19 (1) MICOM Kist Sum, FY 1967, pp· 104-105. (2) Kist Repts, NH PM, FY 1967, pp. 1-3; FY 1968, p. 6; h FP 1969, n·P· (3) Ltr, CG, ~no Proc h Supply Agency (APSA), to CG, MUCOM, 3 Jan 67, subj: FP-67 PEMA 4911 Just - Expansion of Facs to L/A/P [sie] NE. M30A2 Sustainer Mtrs - LMLP, Marshall, TX, atchd to SS AMSHI-I-2, 24 Jan 67, subj: same. (4) Ltr, CG, MICOM, to CG, AMC, 21 Feb 67, subj: FY 67 PEMA 4911 Just - Expansion of Facs to L/AIP [sie] NE. M30A2 Sustainer Mtss - LAAP, Marshall, TX (ProJ Rev), atchd to SS AHSMI-I-16-67, 20 Feb 67, subj: same. (5) NH PM2P, 30 Sep 67, p. 28b. All in Kist Div Pile.

• 20 (1) AMP Fl 1963-70, Vol. III, Mar 64, pp. 125, 129. C&DP Files. (2) SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 79, 84, 114, 117, 130. RHA Ex 13-592. (3) Also see Mary T. Cagle, Development, Production, amd Deployment of the NIKE AJAX Guided Missile System, 1945-1959 (AROMA, 30 Jun 59), p. 179.

• 21 NH Wpn Sys Plan (Indus Op), ARGMA WSP-1, Annex B, Sep 61, pp. 8-9, 22-23. Hist Div File.

• 22 (1) Ibid.. pp. 9-10, 23. (2) NB Frog Repts, Apr 60, p. 33, h Jan 62, p. 7. (3) ARGMA Hist Sum, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 60, pp. 68-69. (4) ARGMA Diary, 1 Jul 61 - 11 Dec 61, p. 234. (4) NE PM2P. Oh 5, 30 Sep 64, p. 3. All in Bist Div File.

• * Renamed the Army Missile & Munitions Center & School (AMMCS) effective 1 January 1966. DAGO 43, 28 Dec 65.

• 23 (1) SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 139-42, 227-30, 253. RI~A Ex 13-592. (2) For further details on the administration and execution of the training program for the NIKE AJAX and HERCULES systems, see NIKE Blue Book, pp. 220-43.

• * This HERCULES-BOMARC feud was actually a continuation of the controversy that began some 5 years earlier. It started back in April 1953, when the Army took the wraps off the NLKE ATAX and announced plans to begin its deployment around U. S. cities. The Air Force inadvertently let slip a drawing of its BOMARC missile and the battle in the nation's press began. (Aviation Week, 6 Apr 53, p. 15.) In the ensuing years--while the AJAX stood on guard around key U. S. cities and overseas installations and the BOMARC remained in development--the Army was constantly faced with defending the AJAX, as well as the second-generation HERCULES system, against disparaging remarks released to the press by Air Force officials. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson put the whole controversy in proper perspective when he declared: "Bur one hard, solid fact emerges above them all: No matter what the Nike is or isn't, it's the only land-based operational anti-aircraft missile that the U.S. has." (Newsweek, 11 Jun 56, p. 35.) Among other periodicals carrying stories of the controversy were Aviation Week, 6 Dec 54, 20 Dec 54, 28 May 56, 4 Jun 56; Business Week, 8 May 54; Life, 4 Jun 56; and Popular Science, Sep 56. Also see Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 85th Congress, ist Session, DOD Appropriations for 1958, Parr 2, 28 Feb 57, pp. 1367 - 1372.

• 25 (1) DA Msgs 364169, 9 Sep 58, 364294, 10 Sep 58, 364418, 11 Sep 58, 364417, 12 Sep 58, subj: Proj TRUTH. Hist Div Files. (2) Army-Navy-Air Force Register, Vol. 79, No. 4111, 20 Sep 58.

• 26 (1) U. S. News& World Report, Vol. XLV, No. 12, 19 Sep 58, p. 10. (2) Army Navy Air Force Jaunurt, Vol. 96, 8 Nov 58, p. 287. (3) Also see DOD News Release, undated (circa mid-Sep 58), subj: Questions 6 Answers: HERCULES-BOMARC (Appendix C).

• 27 (1) Ltr, CG, AOMC, to ARGMA Comdr, st at., 27 May 59, subj: NE Const. Hist Div File. (2) Missiles and Rockets, 10 Aug 59, p. 44; 18 Jan 60, pp. 7, 24; & lFeb 60, pp. 7, 11.

• 28 SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 147, 150. RHA Ex 13-592.

• 29 (1) Ibid., pp. 144-46. (2) NH Sys Configuration Sta Repts. Maint Engrg Div, Dir for Maint Files.

• 30 (1) SRI TL( 24, Aug 61, pp. 37-39. RIIA Ex 13-592. (2) AMC TIR 2-3-1(4), Aug 63, p. 9. RSIC.

• 31 (1) Ibid.. p. 9. (2) SRT TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 142. 231-35. RBA Bx13-592. (3) NIKE-ATAX to NIKE-RERCULES Site Conversions, atchd as Incl 3 to DF, Cmt 1/2, Dir, Fld Svc Ops, to Chf, AROMA Con Ofc, 19 May 61, subj: Comd Presn on the NE Program. Bist Div File. (4) Also see above, p. 90.

• 32 For a complete list of the converted CONUS sites, see Appendix D, Table I.

• 33(1) SRI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 142, 237-38. (2) For a complete list of the new CONUS sites, see Appendix D, Table II.

• 34 SBI TR 24, Aug 61, pp. 37, 39-40. RBA Bx 13-592.

• 35 (1) Ibid.. pp. 144, 239-42. (2) NH Sys Configuration Sta Repts. Maint Engrg Div, Dir for Maint Files. (3) For specific operational dates, ass Appendix D, Tables I & II.

• 36 NB Sys Configuration Sta Repts. Maint Engrg Div, Dir for Maint Files.

• 37 SS HE-P-26, HERC Proj Ofc, B Sep 65, subj: Co-Pdn Fley, w Ltr, CG, MICOM, to MG Selwyn D. Smith, Jr., CofS, AMC, 8 Sep 65, n.s. Hist Div File.

• 38 (1) Hist Repts, NH PM, FY 1966, p. 5; FI 1967, p. 3. Hist Div File. (2) "Mitsubishi To Build Missiles." Technology Week, 5 Jun 67, p. 19. (3) The Douglas Aircraft Company, original producer of the HERCULES, merged with the McDonnell Aircraft Company in 1967.

• 39 (1) Bist Rept, NH PM, FY 1968, p. 4. Hist Div File. (2) A Japanese defense official, frustrated and "very much confused" over troubles encountered during the U. S.-Japanese talks, killed himself on 7 October by lying down in front of a speeding passenger train at a busy Tokyo station. Mikio Morita left a note in which he apologized for the difficulties which arose during the negotiations. The Washington Post, 8 Oct 67, p. A23.

• 40 Hist Rept, Nh PM, FY 1968, p. 4. Bist Div Pile.

• 41 AMC GO 11, 8 Feb 68.

• 42 AMC GO 45, 12 Jun 68.

• 43 (1) Fist Repts, NH PM, FY 1968, p. 4; FY 1969, n.p.; & FY 1970, n.p. Hist Div File. (2) MICOM Hist Sum, FY 1969, p. 69.

• 44 Hist Rept, NE PM, FY 1969, n.p. Hist Div File.

• 45 Hist Repts. Nh PM, FY 1970, n.p.; h FY 1971, p. 4. Hist Div File.

• 46 Ibid., p. 4.

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