AUTHORITY

Specific authorization for the Army to engage in air defense operations is derived from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 2, United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), November 1959. These directives assign the Army primary functions as follows: "To organize, train, and equip Army forces for me conduce of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land area." UNAAF assigns the Army the following air defense missions: "To organize, train, and equip Army air defense units, including provision of Army forces as required for defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

The broad principles of Army air defense doctrine are stated in FM 44-1, U.S. Army Air Defense Employment. The provisions in FM 44-1 apply to US Army air defense artillery units with a unified command or serving in a combined force. The policies and procedures prescribed by the Joint air defense commander will prevail when they conflict with doctrine and procedures described in FM 44-1.

The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) is a combined command exercising operational control of forces allocated for air defense of Canada, Alaska, and the continental United States. Its mission is "to defend the North American Continent against aerospace attack." Headquarters NORAD, located at Colorado Springs, Colorado, prepares operational plans, conducts tactical exercises and readiness tests, and coordinates plans and requirements for new air defense weapons. It is the supreme headquarters for directing the air defense of North America in the event of war.

EVOLUTION

NORAD was formed in September 1957 following an agreement between the governments of Canada and the United States which, in effect, was official recognition of the fact that air defense of the two countries is an indivisible task. A high-level Canadian-United States committee (Military Cooperation Committee) drew up an emergency plan for the common defense of North America and directed that air defense organizations of the two countries prepare detailed emergency air defense plans. The first of these was issued in 1950.

Early in 1954, the same committee authorized a combined planning group of representatives from the Royal Canadian Air Force and the US Air Force Air Defense commands. Studies conducted by this group indicated that the best air defense of North America was an integrated defense, with forces of both countries operating under a single command, responsible to both governments. Following the completion of another study 2 years later which had the same conclusions, integration of operational control of me two forces was recommended.

In the meantime, the two countries had gone ahead with the development of a joint radar warning network. Together, they built the Pine Tree line of radars across southern Canada. Canada started constructing the mid-Canada line, and the United States began the distant early warning (DEW) line across the northern rim of the continent. Conditions for operating and manning these lines were mutually agreed upon.

Thus, by 1957, there had been a considerable history of joint planning, coordinating, and sharing, and the need for further integration had been recognized. In August of that year, the United States Secretary of Defense and the Canadian Minister of National Defence announced that the two governments had agreed to establish a system of integrated operational control of air defense forces for North America and an integrated headquarters. On 12 September 1957, NORAD was established, followed by the signing of an official agreement by both countries on 12 May 1958.

This agreement provided, among other things, that NORAD was to be maintained for a period of 10 years, or such shorter period as agreed upon by both countries. The Commander in Chief, North American AirDefense Command (CINCNORAD), was to be responsible to the Chief, Defence Staff of Canada, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. During the absence of CINCNORAD, command would pass to the Deputy CINCNORAD. The agreement further stipulated that the appointment of CINCNORAD and his deputy had to be approved by both governments and that both would not be from the same country.

NORAD FORCES

NORAD has no Organic fighting elements of its own, but is furnished combat-ready forces including Reserve and National Guard forces by three component commands (fig 1): US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), US Air Force Air Defense Command (USAP ADC), and Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defence Command (RCAF ADC), plus the air defense forces of the Alaskan Command. CINCNORAD exercises operational control over all forces attached or otherwise made available by component commanders.

The Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) is a unified command under NORAD concerned with purely national air defense matters, thus preserving flexibility for unilateral action where strictly United States interests are involved. Accordingly, the mission of CONAD is aerospace defense of Alaska, Greenland, and the continental United States (CONUS), and Mexico if requested by the Mexican Government. The senior American officer in NORAD is the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense (CINCONAD). If CINCNORAD is an American, he also is CINCONAD. If CINCNORAD is a Canadian, then the Deputy CINCNORAD is CINCONAD.

ARADCOM furnishes Nike Hercules missiles (high-altitude, surface-to-air) and Hawk missiles (low-altitude, surface-to-air). Under this command are the US Army missile units protecting the key population and industrial centers of the United States.

US Naval Forces operate the US Navy's space surveillance system (NAVSPASUR), which furnishes information to NORAD through the space defense system. The US Navy would also provide augmentation forces upon direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Most of NORAD's fighter-interceptor squadrons are provided by the USAF ADC. This component also contributes Bomarc surface-to-air missiles and a large number of radar squadrons and early warning airborne radars. USAF AM: is responsible for the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) and SPACETRACI( (a part of the space defense system), providing NORAD important information about ballistic missiles and orbiting space objects. The Air National Guard provides interceptor squadrons and aircraft control and warning squadrons on full-time assignment to NORAD through USAP AM:.

The RCAF ADC, not a member of GONAD but operating directly under CINCNORAD, provides fighter-interceptor squadrons and two surface-to-air Bomarc missile squadrons. It also contributes heavily to performance of surveillance, detection, and identification functions .

The Alaskan Air Defense Command is the air defense agency of the Alaskan Unified Command; it is also a NORAD region responsible directly to CINCNORAD for air defense of the State of Alaska.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

To accomplish its mission, NORAD is guided by these air defense principles: hit the enemy as far out as possible; increase the pressure as he continues; complicate his tactical

problem by employing a family of weapons to perform low, medium, high, close-in, and distant missions; and realize optimum economy and efficiency of effort through centralized direction and decentralized execution of the air battle.

NORAD must guard against manned bomber attack, ballistic missile attack, and the space threat. It must watch over the North American Continent from treetops to beyond the atmosphere. Currently, the North American Continent is divided into eight regional areas (fig 2) of air defense responsibility. Six of these are numbered regions, including some of the southern portions of Canada and all of the continental United States, excluding Alaska. The Northern NORAD Region encompasses the rest of Canada, including highly populated industrial areas of Ontario and Quebec. The Alaskan NORAD Region completes the picture. Each region commander is responsible to CINCNORAD for all aerospace activity within his designated area.

Each of these NORAD regions is further subdivided into areas, called sectors, the basic NORAD unit for decentralized fighting of the air battle. Sectors that cross the international boundary are jointly manned by United States and Canadian personnel. The size of one sector may differ greatly from another, depending generally on the amount of air traffic and number of vital target areas located within sector boundaries.

To perform its mission, NORAD must accomplish four basic actions: detect the presence of airborne objects, aircraft, or missiles; identify them as friendly or hostile; intercept and examine those not identified as friendly; and destroy those identified as hostile, using interceptor aircraft or air defense missiles.

NORAD employs three detection systems, each designed to detect one of the three possible threats. The northernmost detection system is BMEWS. The three BMEWS stations (Thule, Greenland (fig 3), Clear, Alaska, and Fylingdales Moor in Northern England) are electronic systems providing detection and early warning of attack from enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

(figure 3 not included in this conversion)

BMEWS was made possible by recent scientific developments in the electronics field. The system uses huge radars, approximately the size of a football field, which can detect a missile at a distance of 3, 000 miles. The power required for a single station would meet the electrical needs of a small city.

The heart of the BMEWS detection system is a combination transmitter-receiver which transmits an extremely brief burst of energy many times each second in narrow fans of radiofrequency energy at two different degrees of elevation. As a missile passes through these fans, it reflects energy to the station, enabling the coordinates of flight to be recorded. From a set of coordinates, the trajectory can be plotted and the impact point, time, and point of launch calculated. Data processing equipment at the site rapidly computes the data and flashes a warning to NORAD.

A second detection system is the manned bomber surveillance network, composed of land-based radar networks (fig 4) and Air Force planes. The first line of radars begins in the far north with the distant early warning (DEW) line (fig 5). This radar fence, which stretches from the eastern shores of Greenland across the Canadian Arctic and along the Aleutian chain, provides initial warning of attack by manned bombers. A ground-based radar system, called contiguous coverage, is extended out to sea off both coasts by Air Force radar planes (fig 6). All of these systems are joined together by a communications network terminating in the NORAD combat operations center at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Figure 4. NORAD radar detection system.

(figure 5 not included in this conversion)
(figure 6 not included in this conversion)

A third part of the NORAD detection and warning system is the space defense system (SDS) which keeps track of all manmade objects in space and determines entry time and location of new ones. Through a global system of radar, radio, and optical sensors, the SDS brings under NORAD operational control all space detection and tracking resources available to the military. Civilian and government scientific agencies throughout the free world contribute to the SDS on a cooperative basis.

Primary military members of the SDS are the USAP SPACETRACK system and US Navy's NAVSPASUR. SPACETRACK provides tracking information through a series of USAF operated radar sensors and BMEWS. The RCAF provides inputs from optical surveillance devices, such as the Baker-Nunn camera (fig 7) and radar sensors. NAVSPASUR is composed of three powerful transmitter stations and four receiver stations alternately spaced across the southern United States from California to Georgia. Data from this network are furnished to Space Defense Center (SDC) computers through the system's headquarters and operations center at Dahlgren, Virginia. The third type of information comes from other cooperating agencies, such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Security Agency(NSA), and Pacific and Atlantic missile ranges on an on-call basis.

(figure 7 not included in this conversion)

Figure 7. Baker-Nunn camera.

Space tracking information from this widespread system flows into the SDC (fig 8) at Colorado Springs, Colorado, where giant digital computers digest reams of complex orbital data on space objects.

(figure 8 not included in this conversion)

The wide variety of data received from the numerous sources enables the SDC to provide complete and timely tracking information on all manmade objects in space. SDC also maintains a running catalog, constantly revised and updated, on all space traffic. Thousands of observations are received daily and are used to refine existing orbital characteristics of more than 600 objects. This includes not only payloads but space junk, such as burned-out boosters, wires the size of a lead pencil, and nuts and bolts that go into orbit with every payload launched.

Once the computers have digested all the tracking data and produced their findings, the information is displayed on large status boards (fig 9) in the SDC. From here it is transmitted to the battle staff area in the adjacent NORAD combat operations center by closedcircuit television.

It is expected that at some future date the SDS must be equipped to determine the purpose and threat potential of unfriendly space objects, to warn of hostile activity in space, and to provide space traffic control, operational support to antisatellite weapons when and if developed, and support to United States space and weapon activities.

Identification is one of NORAD's most difficult problems, caused chiefly by the large amount of air traffic in the United States and Canada. On the average, there are approximately 800 to 1.000 overwater incoming flights daily to the United States and Canada, plus an estimated 300,000 internal flights.

(figure 9 not included in this conversion)

Figure 9. Status boards in the Space Defense Center.

Aircraft penetrating the North American Continent enter air defense identification zones (ADIZ) established around and throughout the continent to assist in identification processing. Any aircraft originating from an oversea area must enter an ADIZ within 20 miles of a pre determined point and within 5 minutes of an estimated time, based on the pilot's flight plan filed at his takeoff point and sent ahead to the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in the United States and Department of Transport (DOT) in Canada. This information is relayed to appropriate NORAD sector direction centers (NSDC) and used for correlation when the trade is acquired.

If an aircraft enters an ADIZ, but is not within prescribed limits, it is declared an unknown and an interceptor is scrambled to make positive visual identification. The ADIZ system is part of the NORAD identification process known as flight plan correlation.

Under combat conditions, the identification process would be somewhat simplified when provisions of emergency plans, SCATER (security control of air traffic and electromagnetic radiation) and ESCAT (emergency security control of air traffic), are placed in effect. SCATER in the United States and ESCAT in Canada provide for orderly grounding of nonessential aircraft and for establishment of military control over radio navigational aids.

In view of the large numbers of aircraft flights taking place within NORAD airspace in any given 24-hour period, it is a rare day when none of these appear at the NORAD combat operations center as unknown. The average number of unknowns in the system has steadily declined over the years until now the number is less than 10 per day. Of these, it is common

to find two or three instances where interceptors are scrambled but recalled before intercept because of the identity being established by further communication checks. The remaining unknowns are intercepted and visually identified by an interceptor crew.

In all, there are more than 40 regular fighter-interceptor squadrons (fig 10) in the NORAD system. In an emergency, these forces would be augmented by available fighter aircraft of the US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Air Forces, Air National Guard, and interceptor training units of the RCAF ADC. All of these forces are highly mobile and constantly practice dispersal and forward base deployment.

(figure 10 not included in this conversion)
Figure 10. USAF ADC fighter-interceptors go into action.

If an unknown is identified as hostile, the aircraft will be destroyed by the most expeditious method available in CINCNORAD's varied arsenal.

NORAD COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER

Nerve center of the North American Air Defense Command is the combat operations center(COC), situated in a two-story concrete blockhouse at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado (fig 11). It is from the COC that first warning of an attack on North America would come; if such an attack should come, the air battle for survival of the United States and Canada would be directed from the COG.

Data are received in the COC from the huge complex of radar stations, interceptor squadrons, missile sites, space tracking and ballistic missile warning units, and NORAD regions and sectors and are stored in a large digital computer. Here, too, information is received from other sources, such as the Strategic Air Command(SAC), naval forces off both coasts, the Pentagon, and the Department of National Defence in Canada.

(figure 11 not included in this conversion)
Figure 11. NORAD COC building at Ent Air Force Base.

This information is electronically displayed by a system known as Iconorama (fig 12). The system permits almost instantaneous observation of the positions of aerospace and seaborne objects thousands of miles away and over any part of the continent covered by radar networks. Iconorama flashes surveillance information on a large, theater-like screen for easy observation.

On this screen is a map of North America, the surrounding oceans, Greenland, Iceland, Parts of Siberia, and the Caribbean islands. Symbols show the location and direction of travel of all aircraft of special interest to NORAD. These may he strategic friendly elements or a commercial or military aircraft that for one reason or another is classed as an unknown until Positive identification 19 made. NORAD is interested in unidentified submarines, friendly aircraft carriers, Soviet fishing trawlers, and air activity over Cuba and Siberia. All this is presented on the main display with special coded symbols that provide a variety of information about the subject.

The US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) is both a major combat command of the US Army and a component of NORAD. As a member of the two-nation air defense organization, ARADCOM is assigned the mission of providing combat-ready Army forces to the Commander in Chief, NORAD, for the air defense of designated strategic and metropolitan target complexes. The mainstay of ARADCOM's weapon inventory is nuclear-capable Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles, augmented by low-level nonnuclear Hawk missiles, currently deployed in defense of the Homestead-Miami and Key West areas in southern Florida.

HISTORY

The history of ARADCOM dates back to 1 July 1950 when it was established as the Army Antiaircraft Command. However, it was 10 April 1951 before all antiaircraft artillery units located within the continental United States and allocated to its defense were placed under the command jurisdiction of the newly formed command.

The command's early armament consisted of World War II vintage 90-mm and 120-mm guns. Later, the 75-mm Skysweeper, last of the conventional antiaircraft artillery weapons, was added to the command's arsenal. The first surface-to-air guided missile to be phased Into the Army air defense system was the Nike Ajax, which became operational on site in the Washington-Baltimore defense in May 1954. On 21 March 1957, in recognition of its growing combat-ready, surface-to-air guided missile force, this command was redesignated the US Army Air Defense Command.

In June 1958, ARADCOM's first Nike Hercules unit attained operational readiness in the Chicago defense. Since that time, all of the command's missile sites have been converted to the second-generation Nike Hercules.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Department of the Army authorized the Army National Guard to convert 32 antiaircraft artillery battalions, then equipped with conventional guns, to Nike Ajax missile battalions in 1957. The 4th Missile Battalion(Nike Ajax), 25lst Artillery, California Army National Guard, was the first National Guard surface-to-air guided missile battalion integrated into the active continental United States defense mission. This unit assumed around the-clock operations at four battery sites in the Los Angeles area on 14 September 1958. At the completion of the phased training program, the Army National Guard was furnishing 76 batteries in 14 states, defending 15 areas. These were the first US Reserve Forces with modern surface-to-air missiles.

In May 1962, the first of the Army National Guard Nike Ajax units were phased out and started retraining to operate and maintain the second-generation Nike missile, the nuclearcapable Nike Hercules. Four units of the Maryland National Guard were selected for the initial conversion to Nike Hercules, becoming operational on 11 December 1962.

The last four Nike Ajax sites manned by the National Guard were phased out in May 1964 at Norfolk, Virginia. The final stages of the Nike Hercules conversion program were completed in 1965 with 48 Army National Guard batteries, representing 16 states and defending 18 areas, participating in the on-site program.

Guardsmen assume full operational responsibility for manning the sites around the clock. Full-time personnel man the equipment 24 hours a day, keeping it in constant readiness. This cadre of full-time specialists is capable of initiating effective fire on the enemy without additional personnel. Remaining members of the units are citizens of the community who keep up on their military skills by attending regular drills with their units. If an air attack should occur, they would report immediately to their assigned units.

These Army National Guard units, although an integral part of the air defense system when they become operational in wartime, retain their identity as State units under the command of the governors of their respective states in peacetime. ARADCOM has been assigned responsibility for training supervision and support of these units. In event of an emergency requiring use of these units in a combat role, operational command would be exercised by CINCNORAD.

OPERATIONS

Administrative and training supervision over the widespread defenses is exercised by ARADCOM regions. Figure 16 shows the region boundaries and ARADCOM headquarters at Colorado Springs, Colorado. Region headquarters and their locations are as follows:

1st Region - Fort Totten, New York
2d Region - Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri
5th Region - Fort Sheridan, Illinois
6th Region - Fort Baker, California
7th Region - McChord AFB, Washington

The combat effectiveness of ARADCOM units is determined by certain indicators, such as engagement simulator training, operational readiness evaluations, tactical effectiveness evaluations, NORAD exercises, short notice annual practices (SNAP), radar bomb scoring (RES) missions, command maintenance management inspections (CMMI), and technical proficiency inspections (TPI). All indicators must be considered together to determine the effectiveness of units. ARADCOM materiel readiness evaluation teams aid the units in maintaining a combat-ready posture.

and region headquarters.

AKMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND POST IN NORAD OPERATIONS

The wide dispersion of ARADCOM sites poses a unique problem that requires a specific control and communications 8ystem. As the heart of this control and communications system are the Army air defense command posts (AADCP). Tactical supervision of Nike Hercules and Hawk fire units is exercised from AADCP's. An AADCP can use a semiautomatic electronic fire distribution system, Or the AADCP can be manually operated. The fire distribution system used is either Missile Master (AN/FSG-1), a transportable fire distribution system (BIRDIE AN/GSG-5 or AN/GSG-6), or the new AN/TSQ-51. The Key West defense utilizes a battalion operations central, a component of the field army Missile Monitor system.

AADCP's are linked to NSDC SAGE by digital data, voice, and teletype lines and to their associated fire units by data and voice lines and by radio. Normal operation calls for semiautomatic data Processing from NSDC SAGE to fire units through the AADCP's, with backup facilities available for emergency and supplemental operations. Fire distribution systems provide for complete semiautomatic operation with fire units when SAGE data are cut off. Facilities are also available for manual plotting and voice telling if needed.

AADCP's automatically receive early warning, aircraft identification, and other data from associated NSDC SAGE. These data are collected by the AADCP's, improved when

possible, and transmitted to fire units. In NORAD sectors equipped with SAGE where Army Missile Master systems or other fire distribution systems are in operation, NORAD has prescribed four modes for SAGE air defense artillery operations.

• Mode 1: The Primary NSDC SAGE exercises complete control over all air defense forces within its sector.
• Mode 2: When a primary NSMC SAGE becomes nonoperational for any reason, adjacent NSDC 's assume control of the disabled sector by expanding their areas of responsibility. Not all sectors have a mode 2 capability.
• Mode 3. If adjacent NSDC's SAGE are unable to control operations or if other situations develop which preclude or seriously degrade mode 1 or mode 2 operation, a NORAD control center commander, who has been monitoring the conduct of the air battle during modes 1 and 2, assumes operational control of the air defense battle within his assigned areas of responsibility.
• Mode 4. In this mode, Army air defenses operate autonomously if communications are lost with the NORAD control facility. The individual batteries may operate autonomously if communications are lost with the AADCP.

Specified United States air defense artillery units in Europe are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integrated air defense system of Allied Command Europe (ACE), one of the military commands of NATO. The senior military authority in NATO is a military committee composed of a chief of staff or special delegate of each member nation.

The standing group, composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, is the executive agency of the military committee.

NATO is divided into three military commands and a regional planning group. The command which concerns air defense is ACE, which covers the land area extending from the North Cape of Norway to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey.

Of particular interest in ACE is Allied Forces, Central Europe, extending from the southern boundary of Denmark to the northern boundary of Italy. Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, has responsibility for air defense of this area and has divided the area by a line running southwest-northeast through the approximate center. The responsibility for air defense of the northern portion is assigned to the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force (2 ATAP), while the responsibility for air defense of the southern portion is assigned to the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF).

The commander of 4 ATAF exercises operational control of all air defense artillery forces assigned through two sector operations centers (SOC). Tactical control of surface-to-air guided missile units in the US area of responsibility is exercised by the SOC sector director. This SOC is a unified (US Army-US Air Force) installation, combining facilities of the battle staff, Air Force control and reporting center, and Army missile control center or AADCP.

The missile control center, tactical headquarters of me Army air defense commander, supervises the operation of units through AADCP's of subordinate air defense groups. The battle staff, supervised by the sector director, supervises overall air defense operations and coordinates activities between the missile control center and control and reporting center. Operational procedures of US Army air defense artillery units in NATO are similar to those of air defense artillery units in the United States.

In the Pacific area, US Army air defense artillery units are deployed in Korea, Okinawa, and Hawaii. The Commanding General, US Army, Pacific, commands, trains, and administers these units. Operational control of all Pacific area air defense forces is vested in Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) (fig 17).

Figure 17. Pacific Air Forces operational control structure.

Figure 18. Concept of PACAF Air Defense Operations.

Air defense artillery units in Korea are integrated for operational control into the overall air defense system of the West Pacific North Air Defense Region, a subordinate command of PACAF. The Commanding General, 5th US Air Force, is the West Pacific North Air Defense Region commander. The region is divided into four specific actively manned air defense sectors, one of which is the Korean air defense sector. The 314th Air Division is responsible for air defense of the Korean air defense sector and operates a master direction center which coordinates air defense activities of all services providing air defense support (fig 18). The air defense artillery director element, under operational control of the master direction center, exercises operational control over all United Stares and Allied Army air defense artillery units in South Korea. Operational procedures of air defense artillery units in Korea are similar to those of Army units in the United States.

In World War II and Korea, the ground-gaining arms could almost always be assured of being able to operate without serious hindrance from enemy air. This basic assumption that our airpower could and would always provide us with air superiority and hence freedom of action on the ground in any future action has generally gone unquestioned, and has been perpetuated in the scenarios of almost every major exercise, command post exercise (CPX), Army training test (ATT), or other field problems.

This assumption is no longer valid. A technically and tactically competent enemy can gain and maintain air superiority for at least a limited time over areas of his own choosing. This problem is greatly simplified if he has adequate conventional gun and surface-to-air missile defenses in being so that he is relatively free to shift his fighter aircraft, even for short times, from basically defensive to offensive operations.

Figure 19. Air defense command and control structure.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 8, Doctrine for Air Defense for Oversea Land Areas, May 1964, serves as common doctrine and prescribes the establishment of a coordinated and integrated air defense system under a single commander (fig 19). This document states that air defense forces must be organized, equipped, trained, and, when possible, positioned and alerted prior to hostilities. An air defense cannot be adequately improvised. Constant surveillance must be maintained to insure timely response of air defense forces and concurrent warning to the offensive forces of the command. The enemy air threat must be considered as an entity and

countered by a strategy based unity of effort. The hostile threat and targets to be defended are the points of departure for all air defense planning and the basis on which air defense requirements must be computed.

Within an oversea unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the Air Force component commander. Representation from me other service components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the air defense commander's headquarters. The mission of the area air defense commander will be to coordinate and integrate the entire air defense effort within the unified command. Subject to the authority of the unified commander, he will establish broad policies and procedures for the employment of air defense means and the coordination of such means with the operations of other elements within the area. Where a significant portion of the means for air defense is contributed by a service other than that of the area air defense commander, a senior officer should be appointed from that service to serve as deputy in air defense matters to the area air defense

The area air defense commander will establish air defense regions. The number of such regions may vary, depending upon geographical and political factors and the complexities of the air defense problem. He will appoint the regional air defense commanders and designate their areas of responsibility, taking into consideration such factors as the geography of the area, the hostile threat, and the contributions of the services. In a region where a significant portion of the regional air defense means consists of air defense weapon systems of another service, a senior officer of that service should be appointed to serve as deputy in air defense matters to the regional air defense commander. Service staff representation will be assigned, as appropriate, to the regional air defense activities. The regional air defense commander will be fully responsible for, and will have full authority in, the air defense of his region. However, he will normally delegate authority to the field army commander(s) for control and operational employment of organic Army air defense artillery means within the field army

In essence, JCS Pub. 8 states that, in a normal situation, the Army commander may deploy his own organic air defense artillery units in support of the forces of his command; however, these units will be subject to the overall guidance and rules established by the area and region air defense commanders. The field army commander may move his air defense weapons as required to support his scheme of maneuver--a vital requirement for the safety of the field army--while the region or area air defense commander maintains operational control of the fires of these weapons through target assignment, rules for engagement, identification criteria, establishment of battle zones, and other SOP--a vital requirement for the safety of both friendly pilots and rear area complexes.

The air defense means of the field army may include an air defense artillery brigade made up of two or more groups composed of a number of Nike Hercules and Hawk battalions. In addition, an air defense artillery group may be assigned or attached to each corps. These groups may include one or more Hawk battalions. It is the Air Defense School position that one air defense artillery forward area weapons (ADA FAW) battalion be organic to division as a part of division artillery (fig 20). This position does not, however, preclude the attachment or assignment of ADA FAW battalions to the air defense artillery group at corps level if the units are available.

Figure 20. Organization of type field army.

Figure 20. Organization of type field army.

The air defense artillery brigade has the responsibility of providing an umbrella of air defense for the entire field army area. The air defense artillery group(s) assigned or attached to the corps will employ their Hawk battalions to provide air defense against low and medium-altitude targets in corps areas. The ADA FAW battalions will be employed within the division in support of the division priorities.

The air defense artillery brigade commander, as senior air defense artilleryman, is responsible for the coordination of the Army air defense effort (fig 20). He can accomplish this through direct command within the brigade; however, he normally has no command authority over the air defense artillery groups assigned or attached to the corps.

Coordination of the employment of all air defense means within the field army is normally accomplished in the tactical operations centers at field army level (FATOC), corps (CTOC), and division (DTOC). The tactical operations center is an integrated staff facility where representatives of the special and general staff sections are grouped to assist the commander in exercising control of current tactical operations. The air defense representation is known as the air defense element (ADE); a liaison team is provided for in the brigade TOE and by augmentation in the air defense artillery group. The ADE, whether at army, corps, or division, coordinates air defense operations with other combat operations, the use of air defense artillery nuclear weapons, surface-to-surface missions, and the use of airspace, and exercises staff supervision of the application of electronic security measures by air defense artillery units.

Joint service coordination is accomplished by means of liaison sections (fig 21). The air defense artillery brigade establishes liaison with the Air Force at the tactical air control center(TACC), this section being organic to the brigade, and at the control and reporting center by an augmentation section. Air defense artillery groups assigned or attached to the corps would be expected to establish liaison with a command and reporting center; however, considering such factors as distance, available communications, identification capability of the facility concerned, and concept of operations, this liaison could be accomplished with the forward extension of the command and reporting center which is a control and reporting post. Coordination may be accomplished by collocation of the AADCP's with the appropriate Air Force installation or by utilizing established communications networks used by liaison teams. In sophisticated air defenses, coordination may be effected by having the systems operationally connected.

Figure 21. Air defense artillery liaison.

Figure 21. Air defense artillery liaison.

Current oversea deployments vary from area to area. The principal differences are generated by the need to tailor the defense to the local conditions. The local conditions are included in a consideration of the threat and geographical and political factors.

To meet the requirement for rapid response to hostile air activity, communications are paramount. The Army, realizing this need for faster, more positive fire distribution of surface-to-air missiles in the field army, developed the AN/MSG-4 (Missile Monitor) fire distribution system. This system may be employed for centralized or decentralized control as directed by the Army air defense commander.

Coordinated air defense effort is a requirement, not only within a field army but between the field army and tactical air force. To fulfill this responsibility, the Army air defense commander normally establishes liaison with the tactical air force. This liaison may be accomplished by collocating the AADCP of various air defense artillery commands with the functional counterpart of the tactical air force or by liaison between these elements. Figure 21 graphically depicts a typical solution of the liaison requirement. Liaison expedites the flow of early warning and identification information, two vital elements of data for any air defense. Both the control and reporting center and the control and reporting post can provide early warning information to air defense artillery units, and the control and reporting center can provide target identification information. Field army air defense is dependent upon complex communications networks and extensive intelligence inputs. Provisions must also be made for operations if communications fail, if intelligence inputs are limited, or if a key command post is destroyed. Identification is facilitated and reaction time reduced through use of the battle zone concept. In this concept, Hawk units are deployed well forward, perhaps to within 10 kilometers of the forward edge of the battle area, and in depth to form a zone or umbrella of protection. When the battle zones are implemented by appropriate authority, aircraft entering this zone and not identified as friendly would be engaged on a weapons-free basis, providing the aircraft met certain criteria as to speed and altitude. For example, the criteria may be to engage aircraft flying below 10,000 feet altitude and at speeds in excess of 100 knots. This procedure would preclude the possibility of engaging our helicopters or other slow-flying Army aircraft.

Figure 22. Battle zone concept.

Figure 22. Battle zone concept.

A Nike Hercules battle zone would also be established. The Nike Hercules zone, however, could consist of a series of separate battle zones; for example, Alfa, Brave, and Charlie. In zone Alfa, for example, Nike Hercules would attack all targets, at any altitude, to the edge of the battle zone extending over the composite defense; in zone Brave, the range would be extended; and finally, in zone Charlie, the range would be extended even farther. Again,

speed also could be used as a criteria, and the air defense commander would designate the Alfa, Brave, or Charlie zone as the air defense battle progressed, dependent upon the means available. The limits of the battle zones may be defined, using a grid coordinate system. A composite battle zone employed in a field army is illustrated in figure 22.

The tactical and operational requirements of current and future air defense artillery systems demand employment of skilled technicians and adequate Lest equipment to provide responsive maintenance support to the ADC. Preventive maintenance must be efficiently scheduled and malfunctions rapidly corrected. Maintenance management is the responsibility of every commander and includes motivation, organization, accurate records and reports, and training.

The commander of an air defense artillery unit must have the capability of maintaining a high degree of operational readiness around the dock, in peacetime as well as in combat, and in the United States as well as overseas. He requires technicians who are system diagnosticians, supported by repairmen with a capability for repair of defective assemblies and subassemblies. Emphasis must be in the direction of performing tests, maintenance, and repairs as close to the point of failure as practical. Support personnel organic to air defense artillery units and organizations provide the commander a maintenance capability commensurate with his responsibility. In this light, the principal maintenance functions (organizational and direct support) are immediately responsive to the operational requirements of the system.

The organizational maintenance technician is concerned primarily with system analysis. He has a thorough understanding of electronic theory, the practical application of this theory, and me functions of all components within his area of responsibility. He supervises or performs preventive maintenance and verifies system operational readiness. To reduce repair time and minimize travel on the battlefield, the organizational maintenance technician is trained and must be permitted to perform maintenance to the highest practical level under combat operational conditions.

Timely reports must be made of conditions that adversely affect the maintenance effort. Examples of these conditions are shortages of qualified personnel, equipment, and repair parts; improper scheduling of training; and assignment of missions which impair maintenance of equipment. Commanders must insure that reports concerning maintenance support of their equipment are accurate and reflect the operational readiness of their unit. Analysts of these reports aids in determination of total support requirements.

In short, an effective maintenance program is of the utmost importance in air defense artillery units. Air defense commanders must apply techniques of maintenance management which will insure operating equipment to meet operational readiness requirements. The best in air defense, in peacetime or war, is dependent on efficient maintenance.

The ability to interfere with the enemy's electronically controlled equipment while operating our own without interference is included in an area of military activity known as electronic warfare.

Electronic countermeasures (ECM) is that major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of enemy equipment and tactics that employ or are affected by electromagnetic radiations.

The US Air Force has equipped its aircraft with varying types of intercept receivers, transmitting electronic jammers, and chaff dispensers contingent upon the tactics to be employed. Intelligence reports indicate that potential enemies of the United States have spent vast amounts of money in the development of ECM equipment.

Generally speaking, ECM is introduced into a radar receiver to impair the use of the reflected radar signal. If a jamming signal enters the receiver and prevents the radar operator from seeing the target or causes him to lose the target, the jamming has reduced the effectiveness of the air defense.

Electronic countermeasures may range from relatively simple measures, such as chaff, to complex devices known as spoofers, whereby false targets are electronically displayed in addition to the actual target echo.

This susceptibility of radar equipment to jamming, both reflective and transmitted, once again forced military planners to the drawing board. This time the criteria for research was To counter the advantage gained by an attacking force employing ECM. These studies resulted in extensive improvements to radar systems which allow effective operation despite heavy jamming. Since we are countering the use of electronic countermeasures, the term, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), came into existence.

To counter an ECM attack, many ECCM devices and techniques have been evolved. The salient factors concern frequency diversity and frequency change, increased power, increased receiver sensitivity, greater antenna gain, and special ECCM circuits. Some devices employed are special ECCM receivers to allow selection of the best (least jammed) video presentation, parametric amplifiers to reduce receiver noise level, amplitrons to increase power, coincidence circuits to counter random pulses, and other special ECCM circuits, such as antijam displays, track-on-jamming, and side-lobe blanking circuits. Frequency diversity, involving the use of several radars in different frequency bands, imposes a great problem to any attacking force.

During any future conflict, ECM will be the normal operational environment; therefore, operators must expect ECM, recognize ECM, report ECM, and take appropriate action to counter its effects. Trained operators must use the ECCM devices only as absolutely necessary. The purpose of ECCM operation is to obtain a scope presentation that is free of interference and retains the greatest possible amount of information useful for accomplishing the mission .

To survive in an ECM environment, air defense artillery units must have their radar equipment operating at peak efficiency, the latest ECCM equipment, well-trained operators, and skilled maintenance personnel.

Identification of airborne objects presents a major problem to all air defense units. To prevent destruction of friendly aircraft, a positive means of identification must be provided. This need was initially met by development of the Mark III identification, friend or foe (IFF), system. This system, used with ground station radars during World War II, assisted in the identification of aircraft, but limitations of the system caused its use to be discontinued at the end of the war. Research was started to develop an identification system to satisfy the needs of all services. The Mark X IFF system was the result.

The MarkX IFF system is composed of two groups of equipment. One, the interrogator-responder, is located with ground radars and the other, the transponder, is located aboard friendly aircraft. The interrogator-responder is installed at the ground station and depends on a parent radar for a synchronizing trigger, an ac power input, and a plan position indicator (PPI) to display IFF video. Its major components include a coder control (modes 1, 2, and 3), receiver-transmitter and antenna. The interrogator-responder antenna is unidirecdonal; since the radar antenna is also unidirectional, it is necessary to have the two antennas synchronized for azimuth resolution, (This causes IFF video to be portrayed on the PPI at the same azimuth as the radar video of the interrogated target.) The airborne transponder is independent of any radar that might be located in the aircraft; however, it requires power from a source in the aircraft. The unit consists of a receiver-transmitter and antenna. The antenna is omnidirectional in order to receive and transmit in any direction.

The sequence of operation (fig 23) for Mark X equipment is the same for Nike Hercules and Hawk batteries, battalion operation centrals, fire distribution systems, and AADCP's. When target video appears on the PPI, the acquisition radar operator or tactical control assistant (Hawk battery) places the interrogator-responder in operation by turning on the challenge switch. (The acquisition radar operator or tactical control assistant will determine which IFF mode is to be interrogated.) This causes a pair of radio frequency (RF) pulses to be transmitted from the IPF antenna at the same azimuth as the radar pulse. These RF pulses will have an interpulse spacing, from leading edge to leading edge, of 3, 5, or 8 microseconds, depending on which mode is being interrogated (mode 1, 3 microseconds; mode 2, 5 microseconds; and mode 3, 8 microseconds). The transponder receives the RF pulse-pairs and amplifies the challenge signal (both RF pulses must be present because one pulse does not constitute a valid challenge). Upon receiving a valid challenge, the transponder will then transmit its identification signal. The reply is received and amplified in the interrogator-responder receiver. The output of the receiver is sent to the PPI where it will be displayed as one, two, or four arcs at a range greater than the interrogated aircraft but at the same azimuth (one are is the valid response for a mode 1 or 3 challenge, two arcs constitute a valid response in mode 2, and four arcs indicate that the aircraft has declared an emergency).

The Mark X IFF equipment used in conjunction with air defense artillery radars includes a selective identification feature (SIF) which enables the IFF equipment to receive 32 mode 1 responses and 64 each of mode 2 and mode 3 responses. The 160 possible mode and code responses of the Mark X IFF/SIP system enabled the establishment of a more positive identification system. When the selective identification feature of the Mark X IFF system is used, correct responses by the interrogated aircraft will be displayed as one are at a range greater than the interrogated aircraft but at the same azimuth. Should the aircraft declare an emergency, the SIF reply would appear on the PPI as four area.

Figure 23. Identification, friend or foe (IFF).

The vital link between weapon systems and command/control facilities of air defense artillery is communications. The supersonic nature of the aerospace threat dictates that air defense artillery communications be rapid, reliable, and redundant to insure maximum effectiveness on a continuous basis.

Within NORAD, air defense artillery communications in a fixed environment is adequately provided by a combination of means to include both commercial and sophisticated military facilities of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). The extension of the DCA system automatic voice net (AUTOVON) throughout the NORAD organization combined with leased cable, microwave radio, and other means have provided the degree of redundancy that enhance communications survivability while insuring reliability under a host of adverse conditions. Presently, the only organic radios provided to NORAD air defense artillery units are the AN/TRC-47 used to furnish backup intra area communications for the cable connecting the battery control and launching areas in Nike Hercules on-site units and TOE radios for Hawk units.

Communications for air defense artillery units in an oversea or mobile air defense environment is furnished by attached Signal Corps units as well as organic means. The primary means of communication for field air defense artillery units is a very high frequency/ultrahigh frequency (VHF/UHF) radio relay system. Personnel and equipment organized under Signal Corps TOE 11-500 are attached to air defense artillery units at group

or battalion level. This primary system of VHF/UHF multichannel equipment supports the electronic fire distribution system deployed with these field units. It is capable of transmitting digital data as well as voice information. To provide a backup to this system and to allow for manual operation if the VHF/UHF radio relay system is lost due to a break in the communications link, TOE radio equipment is utilized.

The basic Signal Corps equipment used to establish primary communications, furnished by the attached signal detachment, is radio terminal set AN/MRC-69 (fig 24). This set is a package consisting of two AN/TRC-24 radio receiver-transmitters and two AN/TCC-7 multiplexers. it provides a 12-channel, duplex capability with rated ranges of 30 to 50 miles between stations, providing a direct line of sight is available. A variation of this set issued to missile batteries is the AN/MRC-73. This package contains one AN/TRC-24 radio and one AN/TCC-7 multiplexer. It also has a 12-channel duplex capacity but can act as a terminal set only. It is not capable of acting as a terminal set and relay station at the same time. The final equipment package found in the VHF/UHF radio relay system is the AN/MRC-54, a repeater or relay station consisting of three AN/TRC-24 radios.

(figure 24 not included in this conversion)

Figure 24. Radio terminal set AN/MRC-69 shown in a signal subcenter (AACS).

Providing backup nets to the primary system, Nike Hercules and Hawk units are issued organic radios.

Radio receiving set AN/GRR-5 (fig 25) is found at higher headquarters (group or brigade) as well as at battalion and battery level. Its prime use is in higher headquarters warning nets and For intradefense intelligence nets.

(figure 25 not included in this conversion)

Figure 25. Radio receiving set AN/GRR-5.

(figure 26 not included in this conversion)

Figure 26. Radio set AN/GRC-1Y.

The AN/GRC-19 (fig 26), an amplitude-modulated (AM) radio set, is used in tactical and administrative nets. Designed for mobile use, it can be used for both fixed and portable service and is capable of providing communication over a distance of 50 miles when using the organic whip antenna. Modified antennas increase the transmission range to 150 to 1,500 miles .

The AN/GRC-46 is a shelter-housed transportable radioteletypewriter set which uses the AN/GRC-19 as its major basic component. The AN/GRC-46 is authorized for air defense artillery battalions primarily to provide communication with higher headquarters.

The AN/GRC-26 is a long-range AM radio used at group and brigade level.

For command and logistical control, Nike Hercules and Hawk battalions and batteries are issued AM radio sets that have a range of 10 to 15 miles, Hawk units are issued vehicle-mounted AN/VRC-34 radios, while Nike Hercules units are issued the ground-mounted AN/GRC-87. These two radios are basically the same except for the mounting configuration.

The only FM radios presently issued to air defense artillery units are the AN/VRC-9 and AN/VRQ-2, each having a range of 10 to 15 miles. A Hawk battalion is issued one AN/VRC-9 to provide the capability of establishing liaison with a supported unit if such a mission is assigned. The AN/VRQ-2 (fig 27) has a retransmission capability and is issued to Nike Hercules units in the field army area to provide backup communication for the cable link between the battery control and launching areas.

(figure 27 not included in this conversion)

Figure 27. Radio set AN/VRQ-2.

It is anticipated that radio terminal sets AN/TRC-84 and AN/TRC-85 will replace the AN/VRQ-2 radios and cable as the primary interarea communications in Nike Hercules batteries overseas, thus considerably enhancing their operational capability and mobility. The AN/TRC-84 and AN/TRC-85 have a range of 5 miles and are capable of electronically passing all required data within the Nike Hercules battery.

Revised TOE for all air defense artillery echelons, brigade to battery, include up-to-date communications equipment. In voice command nets, the new AN/VRC-12 family of frequencymodulated (FM) radios are to replace the AN/VRC-34 and AN/GRC-87 radio sets. The basic receiver-transmitter of the AN/VRC-12 family issued to air defense artillery units is the AN/VRC-46. The AN/VRC-47 (fig 28) is a basic receiver-transmitter with an auxiliary receiver, and the AN/VRC-49 consists of two of the basic receiver-transmitters on a single mounting. These small, rugged radio sets possess a range capability of 20 to 30 miles, using a Whip antenna. Channel capacity is increased to 920 channels capable of netting with infantry, armor, or field artillery units.

(figure 28 not included in this conversion)

Figure 28. Radio set AN/VRC-47.

Technical advances in weapon systems and advanced concepts of deployment result in ever-increasing demands within the field of communications. Fortunately, improvements in communications equipment design have met this challenge, and the end product is a new series of radios with improved capability as well as reduced size and weight.

The mainstay of these radios is the vehicle-mounted AN/GRC-106, a compact, AM, single-sideband replacement for the AN/GRC-19, with a range of 50 miles. Additional

equipment may be added to this basic set to double its range and provide teletype capability. The AN/GRC-106 (fig 29) is presently prescribed by TOE for all levels of air defense artillery units to provide required tactical communications.

The man-packed AN/PRC-25 radio, another of the improved radios, is a forward area radio set to replace the AN/PRC-8, -9, and -10 radios. Its use by Nike Hercules batteries will improve unit security control. This basic set is also to be built as a vehicle-mounted version (AN/VRC-53) (fig 30) or as a convertible man-packed/vehicle-mounted version (AN/GRC-125). The normal range of 3 to 5 miles may be increased to 15 to 20 miles by use of an amplifier.

(figure 29 not included in this conversion)

Figure 29. Vehicle-mounted radio set AN/GRC-106.

(figure 30 not included in this conversion)

Figure 30. Vehicle-mounted radio set AN/VRC-53.

The challenge presented to air defense artillery communications as a result of technical advances in fire distribution systems and modern weapons has been more than adequately satisfied by aggressive research and development within the field of communications equipment. The new, compact, longer range communications equipment will soon be issued to all echelons of air defense artillery to provide an even greater capability to accomplish the latter portion of the artillery axiom--move, shoot, and communicate.